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APOLLO SPACECRAfT 
Thf' Sp;Hf'craft (S I C) consists of a launch f'sca~ systf'm (LES) aSSf'1n­
bl)". command modulf' (C / \I). sf'r\°icf' modulf' (S/ M). and thf' spacf'craft l 
lunar modulf' adaptf'r (SLA). Thf' LES assf'mbly providf'S thf' lIIf'ans foc­
rapidlv st'paratin~ Iht' c.' \1 from Ihf' S/ M durin~ pad oc- 'Iuborbilal aborts. 
Tht' <,: . '~I lorms Ihf' spacf'craft conlrol Cf'nlf'r. contains nf'cf'ssary aulo­
malic and manual f'quipmf'nt 10 conlrol and monilor Ihf' spaCf'Crafl 
SVSIf'ms. and conlains thf' rf'quirf'd f'quipmf'nl for saff'ly and romfort of 
Ihf' Cff'W o °1 he S / ~I is a cylindrical slru 'urf' localf'd ~Iwf'f'n Ihf' C / M 
and Ihf' SLA. It conlains Ihf' propulsion syslf'ms for altiludf' and v~loc· 
ilv chan!i!:f' manf'U'°f'rs. ~Iosl of Ihf' ronsumablf's uSf'd in Ihf' mission arf' 
slorf'd in Ihf' S/ M. Thf' SLA is .. Irullralf'd conf' which connf'Cls thf' 
S,' ~I 10 Ihf' launch ' °f'hidf'. II also prO\oidf's Ihf' spacf' whf'rf'in Ihf' lunar 
modulf' (L/~I) is carrif'd on lunar missions. 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Spacurafl 012 was undf'r!;oinol\ a "Plugs OUI Inlf'gralf'd Tf'SI" 011 Ihf' 
limf' of Ihf' Ol(cidf'nl on Januarv 'l.i. 196;. O~ralional Chf'ckoul Procf" 
durf'. df'si!i!:nalf'd OCP FO·K·OO21·1 applif'd 10 this If'SI. Within this 
rf'porl Ihis prOCf'durf' is Oflf'n rf'ft'rrf'd 10 as OC P·0021 • 
TESTS AND ANALYSES 
Rf'suhs of If'slS and analysf's nOI complttf' 011 Ihf' tilllf' of publicalion 
of this rf'port will bf' conlainf'd in Ap~ndix G. Addf'nda and Corrigf'nda. 
CONVERSION Of TIME 
Throughoul Ihis rf'port. timf' is slatf'd in Greenwich Mean Time (G~). 
To convert G~ to Eastern Standard Time (EST), subtract 17 hours. 
For namplf', 23:31 GMT converted is 6:31 p.m. EST. 
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SPACECRAFT AND GROUND SUPPORT 

EQUIPMENT (GSE) CONFIGURATION PANEL 

A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 
Configuration Panel 1. The task assigned for accomplishment by Panel 1 was prescribed as follows: 
Establish and document physical configuration of spacecraft and GSE immediately prior to 
and during fire accident including equipment configuration, switch position, and nonflight items 
in cockpit. By deviation, document configuration differences with respect to expected launch con­
figuration and configurations used in previous testing, (altitude chamber, for example), as perti­
nent to this problem . To a lower level of detail, document configurational difference between the 
spacecraft and other spacecraft as pertiment to this problem. ..
,. 
In response to the task assignment, the Panel Chairman presented for Board approval a Statement 
of Work which further described the individual elements of the task . The Statement of Work defined 
the term, "Spacecraft and GSE Configuration", as: "The physical state of the Spacecraft and/or 
supporting systems, including components, ground equipment, facilities, and their interfaces at a specified 
point in time." 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
L MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Spacecraft and Ground Sup­
port Equipment (GSE) Configuration Panel : 
Mr. Jesse F . Goree, J r., Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Charles D. Gay, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Carroll R. Rouse, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Charles R. Haines , Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Ronald V. Murad, NASA Headquarters, Office of Manned Space Flight 
Mr. William F. Edson, North American Aviation, Inc. , Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
Mr. Ray F . Larson, North American Aviation, Inc . , Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. John J. Williams, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA, Board Member , was assigned to 
monitor the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Configuration Panel. 
C.PROCEEDINGS 
1. INVESTIGATIVE APPROACH 
Enclosures 1-1 , 1-2, and 1-3 are general representations of the Spacecraft, Launch Vehicle and 
Launch Complex, and are provided to aid the discussions contained in this section. This Panel pur­
sued the investigation in terms of exceptions to the required launch configuration. For this purpose, 
the required launch configuration was defined as that documented by engineering data approved (re­
leased) for implementation . Identification of the configuration differences existing at the time of the 
accident was accomplished through review of work records against released engineering data . These 
differences were analyzed to identify items pertinent to the accident. This approach did not constitute 
presumptions as to the adequacy of the documented launch configuration. Rather, these data were con­
sidered to represent the engineering effort accomplished during the design of the Spacecraft and pro­
vided a baseline for comparative analyses. The Spacecraft and supporting systems were identified accord­
ing to the major hardware elements to permit discrete consideration of each element relative to the 
accident. Major hardware elements were: 
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a. Spacecraft (S / C) ­
(1) Command Module (C / M) interior 
(2) General configuration of the Command Module, Service Module (S/M), and Adapter 
b. Spacecraft / Launch Vehicle 
(1) Spacecraft / Launch Vehicle 
(2) Spacecraft/ground system 
c. Ground system ­
(1) Spacecraft Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 

12) Supporting facilities 

(3) Remote monitoring and control equipment, including Acceptance Checkout Equipment 
(ACE), the Operational Inter-Communications System (OIS) , and other Radio Frequency .(RF) com­
mand, record, or audio links. 
Configurations of the hardware elements were defined as of the time immediately prior to and 
following the accident on January 27, 1967. The time of the accident is described as occurring during 
the performance of Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) FO-K-0021-1, "Space Vehicle Plugs Out 
Integrated Test", at the condition of a countdown hold ten minutes (T-I0) prior to simulated launch . 
The term, "Plugs Out", refers to disconnection of spacecraft/GSE umbilicals . The C / M interior was 
pressurized with oxygen to approximately sixteen pounds per square inch absolute, (psia) during the 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. Relevant Spacecraft 012 configuration differences existing at 
the time of the accident were also documented with respect to launch, previous Spacecraft 012 tests, 
and the test configuration of another Apollo spacecraft. Documentation of the first of these cases was 
accomplished as an integral part of defining the configuration immediately prior to and following the 
accident. The following conditions were used as the bases for the latter two cases: 
a. Spacecraft 012 configuration during Plugs-In Test at T-I0 (hold), January 25, 1967. This test 
represents the last operation of Spacecraft 012 systems prior to start of the Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test. 
b . Spacecraft 012 configuration during Altitude Chamber .Test at T-I0 minutes (hold), December 
29, 1966. During this test, the spacecraft exterior was exposed to partial vacuum to simulate high 
altitude operation. The C/M interior was pressurized with oxygen to approximately 16 psia during 
final preparations for altitude simulation . Following chamber evacuation, the C/M interior pressure 
was maintained at approximately five and one-half psia . This test was similar to the Space Ve­
hicle Plugs Out Integrated Test in terms of exposure to an oxygen environment. 
c. Spacecraft 008 configuration during Altitude Chamber Test No. 3 at the Manned Space­
craft Center , October 26, 1966. This test also involved exposure to an oxygen environment. Differ­
ences in test configuration between Spacecraft 012 and Spacecraft 008 were identified to determine 
possible relevance to the Spacecraft 012 accident. 
The scope of this Panel's activities in documenting the configuration of the hardware elements 
is schematically represented in Enclosure 1-4. 
Initial efforts were those of compiling all data to identify configuration differences eXlstmg 
at the time of the accident. While compiling these data , the Panel was called upon to supply speci­
fic configuration data to other Apollo 204 Review Board Panels. A total of 34 special reports 
were prepared in response to these requests . These configuration data are included in this report 
to the extent pertinent to the accident. After assembling the necessary source information, the data 
were collated according to hardware elements and conditions depicted in Enclosure 1-4. Data ele­
ments organized in this manner permitted comparative analyses from which significant differences 
could then be identified. 
2. PRESENTATION OF DATA. 
Data assembled during the course of this investigation are summarized in the following paragraphs 
according to the specific conditions and hardware elements considered. 
a . Launch Configuration. The required launch configuration of Spacecraft 012 and its supporting 
systems is identified by basic documentation . This documentation is described as follows: 
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(1) Spacecraft. Released engineering drawings listed in the "Spacecraft 012 Configuration 
Index", January 29, 1967. The individual component parts are identified, by part number, in 
"Spacecraft 012 Indentured Parts List", January 28,1967. Note: Configuration Index and Identured 
Parts List are computer tabulations for which input data was updated continuously prior to the 
accident. These data were retrieved on the dates indicated. 
(2) Spacecraft Interfaces. Interfaces between the__Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle are defined 
by applicable Interface Control Drawings (lCD's): 
(a) "Instrument Unit to Spacecraft Physical Requirements, ICD 13M20408." 
(b) "Instrument Unit to Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter (SLA) Electrical Interface (SIC 
012), ICD 40M37508A." 
Spacecraft-to-ground system interface connections were specified in the "Launch Complex 34 
Checklist, OCP FO-K-10011," and implemented in accordance with the "GSE Functional Inte­
grated System Schematics ." Physical provisions for these connections are defined by detailed space­
craft and GSE drawings. The spacecraft-to-launch vehicle and spacecraft-to-ground system inter­
faces are depicted in Enclosure 1-9, Drawing 1-D- 0056- 2 . 
(3) Ground System. The required configuration of " the spacecraft GSE is prescribed by the 
GSE Functional Integrated System Schematics," according to the particular checkout or servicing 
operation to be performed. "Operational Checkout Procedure, OCP FO-K-0007,'' prescribes the 
sequence of launch operations, referring to the "Launch Complex 34 Checklist, OCP FO-K-10011," 
". for 	detailed GSE connections, operations, and disconnections. The checklist provides only a narrative 
statement of the operations; therefore, it must be used in conjunction with the "GSE Functional 
Integrated System Schematics ." Basic design interfaces between the spacecraft GSE, supporting 
facilities, and remote monitoring and control equipment are defined in numerous lCD's (Reference 
1-8). Configuration requirements of these lCD's are reflected in released engineering data. 
b. Required Test Configuration. Certain of the released engineering orders (EO's) specify that 
they are to be accomplished prior to a test which follows the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test; for example, Flight Readiness Test (FRT) or Countdown. However, explicit definition of total 
spacecraft configuration requirements for the Space Vehicle Plugs Outs Integrated Test did not exist 
in the form of released engineering data. The Operational Checkout Procedure for the Space Vehicle 
Plugs Out Integrated Test, OCP FO-K-0021-1, specified the functional configurations prescribed for 
the test. These functional configuration requirements include " those items required to be different 
from the launch configuration to permit accomplishment of" the simulated launch less the physical 
event. Both the engineering data and the test documentation leave definition of the required test 
configuration to inference as opposed to explicit specifications. 
The test operation involved a procedure wherein all work not accomplished to meet launch 
requirements was reviewed to identify those open items which would constrain accomplishment 
of the test. Therefore, the decision to proceed with the test has been construed by this Panel to 
mean that all recognized constraints were satisfied. This aspect of configuration requirements was 
considered in cooperation with Test Procedures Review Panel, 7, and is discussed further in Ap­
pendix D-7. 
I tems required to be different from the launch configuration for reasons of test conditions and 
procedures are summarized in the following paragraphs: 
(1) Spacecraft. Spacecraft configuration differences authorized by OCP FO-K-0021-1 and en­
gineering orders (EO's) for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test were as follows: 
(a) Open access panels to permit GSE connections. 
(b) Expendables not on board to preclude unnecessary exposure of systems to contamina­
tion or hazards to operation. 
(c) Fuel cells not activated to preclude partial reduction of useful life. 
(d) Electrical circuits to pyrotechnic devices interrupted and shorting plugs installed to 
prevent actual firing during simulated mission sequence. 
(e) Boost Protective Cover installation not completed to permit access to GSE connections. 
(f) Circuits from S/M batteries to S/M jettison controller interrupted. This was to prevent 
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continuous applications of voltage to Reaction Control System (RCS) jet solenoids (simulated 
by load boxes) following simulated Service Module/Command Module separation. 
(g) Installation of test batteries (flight type) to preclude power drain from units assigned 
(by serial number) for the actual mission. 
(h) Those items specifically required to be accomplished as of a planned test subsequent to 
the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. These items are specified by Engineering Or­
ders which are identified as open EO's (See Reference 1-10). 
(2) Spacecraft Interfaces. Differences required for the test operations were: 
(a) Facility air supply through C / M access panel to the space between pressure vessel and 
heat shield to provide humidity control. 
(b) Connection of ground-supplied oxygen in absence of on board supplies. 
(c) Special umbilical interface for water/glycol circulation to prevent disconnection at time 
of umbilical separation in planned mission sequence. 
(d) Connection of isolated power supply to maintain water/ glycol return valve in open 
position (to continue external conditioning) following planned umbilical separation. 
(e) Connections for GSE battery rack to be used as fuel cell substitute following planned 
simulated transfer to internal power. 
(f) Special interfaces for S IC antennas to provide RF link to ground system. 
(g) Connection of RCS load boxes (simulators) to permit testing of flight controls, yet 
preclude exercising RCS jet solenoids . 
(h) Installation of fuse boxes in the electrical interface between the spacecraft and the 
launch vehicle to protect computers in the Instrument Unit from any adverse conditions dur­
ing the test. 
(3) Ground System . The required ground system configuration differences from the launch con­
figuration were those required in support of the interfaces described in paragraph B.3.b(2). The 
ground system and interface configurations are depicted in. the following drawings of Enclosure 
1-9. 
TITLE NUMBER 

SIC / Range/ Launch Vehicle I-D-0056-3 

Interfaces, T-I0, OCP 

FO-K-0021-1 

S / C/GSE Configuration I-D-0056-4 

during T-IO Hold, OCP 

FO-K-0021-1, Electrical 

Launch Complex 34 (LC 34) I-D-0056-7 

ECS Airduct 

S/C / GSE Configuration I-D-0056-8 

during T-IO Hold, OCP 

FO-K-0021-1, Mechanical 

c. Configuration at Time of Accident 
Data prescribing the configuration at the time of the accident were obtained from configuration 
management records as supplied by Panel 6 (Historical Data), witness reports, and special reports 
submitted by other organizations . Pertinent information contained in special reports prepared after 
the accident was verified by this Panel. Panel 1 also prepared documentation of configuration 
elements based upon post-accident inspection in those cases where .complete data were not other­
wise available. These data are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
(1) Spacecraft. 
(a) Documentation: Differences between the launch configuration and the configuration at 
the time of the accident are documented by the following: 
1. "Spacecraft 012 Configuration Verification Record (CVR)," January 28, 1967. 
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This document identifies the work status of all released EO's effective on Spacecraft 012 
which were not accomplished at time of receipt at KSC or were released subsequently. 
The CVR is a computer tabulation of data inputs as of the start of Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test which was retrieved on the date indicated. Enclosure 1-5 is a graph­
ical representation of cumulative EO releases and work status subsequent to delivery of 
Spacecraft 012. While verifying this document, Panel 1 identified several EO's partially 
accomplished at the time of the accident. These EO's are listed in Reference 1-12. Also, 
twenty-two EO's listed in Reference 1-13, were released subsequent to closeout of the CVR, 
and were not accomplished as of the time of the accident. A summary listing of all EO's 
open at the time of the accident was prepared by the Panel and is contained in Reference 
1-10. This listing includes those released for incorporation through normal work schedules 
as well as those constrained for incorporation at a time subsequent to the Space Vehicle 
Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
2. "Spacecraft 012 Test and Acceptance Inspection Report (TAIR)." This document 
consists of several volumes (or books) with entries for each work item intiated on the Space­
craft. Entries reflect the part affected, authorizing documents, entry date, closeout date, 
quality control inspection stamps. Entries pertinent to this Panel's investigation are those 
of "Parts Installation and Removal Records (PIRR's)," and "Temporary Installation 
Records (TIR's)." "Discrepancy Reports /Material Review (DR/MR)" actions, Type A 
"Test Preparation Sheets (TPS' s)" and OCP requirements authorize work on the Space­
craft. The PIRR is used to record any work against a previously installed and accepted 
part or the installation of a new part; for example, removal of a part for rework, removal 
of a part for access, disconnection of mated connectors , etc. The TI R is used to record 
temporary installations which must be removed to meet requirements of the launch con­
figuration . Entries in either of these records constitute open items until such time as the 
affected part is returned to the launch configuration and verified by quality control in­
spection. DR / MR actions result from discrepancy reports which are dispositioned for 
correction by minor form or fit changes under authority of the Materials Review Board. 
Type "A" TPS 's authorize work to be accomplished on the Spacecraft in conformance 
with released EO's. PIRR's and TIR's reflect TPS, DR /MR, or OCP authority. PIRR's 
and TIR's open at the time of the accident were reviewed by the Panel and are listed 
in Reference 1-10. 
3. "Spacecraft 012 Controls Configuration" (switch and valve positions): This docu­
ment was prepared by Panel 1 and is provided as Reference 1-15 . Data presented in this 
document relative to the controls configuration before the accident were obtained from the 
accomplished parts of the OCP. The document also contains comparisons of control config­
urations at other specified times . 
4 . "Crew Compartment Stowage and Loose Equipment Configuration. " Data contained 
in Enclosure 1-8 were compiled from Reference 1-16, 1-17 and .1-18. This enclosure identi­
fies the stowed equipment and materials that were in the Spacecraft at the time of the 
accident. This information was used to configure a mockup of the C/M to portray the 
configuration of Spacecraft 012 immediately prior to the accident. Enclosure 1-6 is a 
photograph of this mockup, less crew couches . Enclosure 1-7 is a picture of the mockup 
with couches and umbilicals installed. The mockup was used by Panel 5 (Origin and 
Propagation of Fire) to study possible fire propagation paths. 
(b) Data Synopsis: Review of the data discussed previously reveals that 80 EO's were out­
standing at the time of the test. Of these, 20 were specified to be accomplished subsequent 
to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test and four were of a nature not affecting con­
figuration. A total of 384 PIRR's / TIR's were open, of which 125 were initiated as require­
ments of the test. The remaining 259 items reflect incomplete status of further work to have 
been accomplished prior to launch. Open items represented by these figures were identified 
through reconciliation of configuration records with witness reports and results of post-accident 
inspection. Procedures for TAl R entries required that removal of a part be documented by 
PIRR, and that installation of a temporary replacement be entered on a TIR. In some in­
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stances, this resulted in two entries against ~ single change action. Many of the PIRR's/TIR's 
were not relevant as they affected items such as Service Module access panels or protective 
covers on external components. Significant items contained in the referenced data are identified 
in two categories: Significant configuration items, and items which may have relevance to 
flame propagation. These items are presented below . 
1. Significant Configuration Items 
a. Investigation of the released engineering and work orders for the installation 
of new debris traps has shown that this work was only partially complete. Engin­
eering Order No . 582252 released the debris trap modification kit. This modification 
prQvides for the replacement of the fish-net type of debris traps with Raschel net 
debris traps. All old-type debris traps were removed. Eleven (11) of twenty-five (25) 
new debris traps were installed prior to start of test. This replacement was docu­
mented on the authorizing TPS. 
b . Flight items installed in other than normal configurations: 
(1) Two 16-mm sequence cameras and a camera power cable were stowed 
loose on the floor of the gas chromatograph installation area., The normal stow­
age position of these items is one camera with cable in Scientific Compartment 
"A" and one camera in Scientific Compartment "G." 
(2) A Dew Point Hygrometer Sensor, 'sensor cable, power cable, and control 
unit, were stowed loose on the floor of the gas chromatograph installation area. 
The normal stowage position of these items is scientific compartment "D." 
(3) The drinking water dispenser was not connected to the hose. 
c. The Spacecraft controls configuration which existed at the time of the accident 
was in accordance with the planned procedure specified in Operational Checkout 
Procedure FO-K-0021-1 with the following exceptions: 
(1) The crewmen's audio center communications controls configuration which 
existed at the time of the accident differed from the planned procedure due to 
the troubleshooting of the communications systems during the' tests. The exact 
configuration of these controls at the time of the accident cannot be determined. 
The configuration as found after the accident would have permitted all three 
crewmen to have two-way communication both within the Spacecraft and to the 
ground. 
(2) The switch labeled "VHF ANTENNA" (Very High Frequency Antenna 
Selector Switch) was specified to be in the "UPPER" position, but ~as changed 
tc "LOWER" per ground personnel request during the communication trouble­
shooting. This action switched the active VHF antennas. 
(3) The switch labeled "S-BAND ANTENNA" (S - Band Antenna Selector 
Switch) was specified to be in the "UPPER" position, but was changed to 
"LOWER" per ground personnel request during the communications trouble­
shooting. This action switched the active S-Band antennas. 
(4) The switch labeled "H20 ACCUM AUTO/MAN/AUTO" (Water Ac­
cumulator Mode Selector Switch) was specified to be in the "MAN" (Manual) 
position, but was changed to "AUTO" (Automatic) during the test per flight 
crew request. In the"AUTO" position, the cyclic accumulator is actuated auto­
matically every ten minutes to remove moisture from the suit loop gases. In the 
"MAN" position, the cyclic accumulators must be cycled by the crew using the 
switch labeled "H20 ACCUM/ON/OFF /ON" (Manual On-Off Switch) as re­
quired. 
(5) The switch labeled "AC INVERTER 2 MNB/OFF" (Inverter Number 
2 Power Switch) was specified to be in the "OFF" position, but was changed 
to "MNB" (Main Bus B) by recorded deviation to the OCP during the teSt. 
"MNB" is the correct position, supplying the Main Bus B power to Inverter 
No.2. 
d. Earth Landing System sequence cover panel assembly in right - hand equipment 
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bay removed on January 23, 1967. Removed per OCP FO-K- 10011 deviation No. 
25 for purpose of connecting Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) connectors. 
(ACE removed prior to Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test). 
e. Cover on connector on Guidance and Navigation . (G&N) computer removed 
to facilitate installation of 100 series test connector cover which was installed for 
testing purposes add would be removed before flight. 
f. Ten connector caps on Power Servo Assembly (PSA) trays were removed on 
December 30, 1966. 
g. Translation Controller ME901 - 0171 - 0204, SI N EAC 1024, installed on left­
hand couch, left-hand side on January 24, 1967. Authorization for installation was 
per Test Preparation Sheet SIC· 566 Step No.3 . Controller was installed to support 
OCP FO-~- 0006 (Plugs In Test) and OCP FO-K-0021-1. 
h . Rotational Controller, ME901-0172-0204 . SIN DAK 1034, installed in left­
hand couch, right - hand side on January 24, 1967. Authorization for installation 
was per Test Preparation Sheet SIC 566 Step No.4. Controller was installed to 
support OCP FO-K-0006 and OCP FO-K-0021-1. 
i . Carbon dioxide absorber elements ME901-0218-0001, SIN 24172 and 24171, 
installed on January 27, 1967, as specified in OCP FO-K-I0011 deviation No. 140. 
Absorber elements are a different configuration than the flight articles (ME901-0218­
0001 as compared with -0021-1). El~ments installed for Space Vehicle Plugs Out In­
tegrated Test did not have by pass provisions and were enclosed in a glass fiber shell 
as opposed to aluminum. 
j. Pyro Panel (No. 150) was temporarily installed prior to the Plugs In Test, 
(OCP FO-K-0006). Panel was not fully installed and was recorded as a temporary 
installation. The panel was out approximately 5 to 6 inches from lower equipment 
bay panel line and was located on aft bulkhead . 
k. Engineering Order (EO 507283) released the requirements for replacing the 
electrical bonding straps for couches with a strap that is less susceptible to damage. 
Two of four existing straps were removed on Parts Installation Removal Records. 
New electrical bond straps (PIN MS 25083-3BB8 and MS 25083-2BB8) were to be 
installed by TPS-SC 012-SC-535, which was not accomplished prior to the Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
I. Gas Chromatograph (PIN R534845-2-A, Serial Number 5) was removed on 
December 30, 1966. Replacement of gas chromatograph was not a constraint to the 
conduct of Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test or Plugs In Test. The power 
and sensor connector for the chromatograph had voltage present, and was placed on 
the shelf of the gas chromatograph compartment. (See Appendix B, Witness Statement 
No. 44) . 
m. The Data Storage Electronic Assembly (DSEA) Recorder (PIN LSC-360-12, 
Serial Number 104) was temporarily installed January 27, 1967. Installation was made 
in accordance with Test Preparation Sheet (TPS SC 012 583, Step IP). The temp­
orary installation of the DSEA Recorder was accomplished to provide a flight con­
figuration for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. The power connector to 
the DSEA was energized during the test. Post-test investigation revealed that the 
power connector was not hooked up . 
2. Items Which May have Relevance to Flame Propagation 
a . Engineering Order, (EO 226756) released at the Contractor's Downey facility 
on January 20, 1967, provided direction to inspect the polyurethane foam (Specifi­
cation MBOI30-039) in specified areas and coat with silicone rubber, (Type II, Speci­
fication MBOI30-019) to meet flammability requirements . This direction was not 
recorded in the CVR as of start of Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test (issued 
at Contractor's Florida Facility on January 27, 1967,) and was not accomplished on 
SIC 012. This item is of possible significance in terms of fuel for the fire and as a 
medium for flame propagation. 
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b . Polyethylene bags were used to cover the hose fitting for the drinking water 
dispenser and the battery instrumentation cable and connectors (2) and transducer, 
which were placed on the aft bulkhead near the batteries. These bags are nonflight 
materials. . 
c. Two Polyurethane pads, approximately 20 x 24 x 2 inches, covered with Velo­
stat, were stowed over the Z-Z couch struts. The pads were placed in the Spacecraft 
to protect the struts, wiring, and aft bulkhead during the planned emergency egress 
at the end of the test. (See Appendix B, Witness Statement Number 3). These items 
were nonflight materials and were not documented by quality inspection records. 
d. Three packages of switching checklists from Operational Checkout Procedure 
FO K-0021-1 (multilith process)· and one package of system malfunction procedures 
(Xerox and Bruning processes), in a manila folder were stowed on the crew couches 
and on the girth shelf. These items were on unqualified paper. While required for 
the test, these items were not documented by quality inspection records. 
e. Nylon protective sleeves were covering all three crewmen's oxygen umbilicals. 
These were nonflight items. 
£. Three GSE window covers were temporarily installed. Covers were installed 
to protect the windows and are nonflight items that were in the Command Module 
(C/M) at the time of the accident. Another such cover for the side hatch window 
was removed by the crew and stowed inside the C/M. Covers are nylon fabric where 
the flight covers are made of aluminized Mylar. 
g. Velcro pile MFL-F-21840A installed to protect Velcro hook. on C/M floor. 
Would have been removed before flight. 
h. "Remove before flight" streamers installed in C/M interior. Represents addit­
ional nonflight items in C/M. 
i. Polyethylene zipper tubing installed to protect hand controller cables. Poly­
ethylene tubing cover is a nonflight item and represents additional material in the 
C/M. 
(2) Spacecraft Interfaces 
(a) Documentation: Configuration of Spacecraft interfaces at the time of the accident is 
defined by the documentation described below: 
l. Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle (SC/LV) interfaces are depicted in Enclosure 1-9, Draw­
I-D-0056-3. Also, details of the SC/LV electrical interface functions are defined in Ref­
erence 1-19. These data are based upon review of lCD's 40M37508A, 13M20408, changes 
thereto, and visual inspection to the extent possible. 
2. Spacecraft / Ground System interfaces are represented schematically in Enclosure 1-9, 
Drawings I-D-0056-3, -4, -7, and -8. Also electrical cable connections and interface funct­
ions are identified in Reference 1-19 . 
(b) 	Data Synopsis: 
Significant interface differences from the required launch configuration were as follows: 
1. The fuel cell battery rack assembly (CI4-395) was electrically mated to the con­
nectors from which fuel cells 1 and 3 would (in flight) supply direct current (DC) power 
to the SIC busses. This was accomplished per Checklist FO-K-I011 and was required due 
to the fact that the fuel cells were not operating in this test. Power was being supplied 
through the flyaway umbilical from a ground power source. At T-O minutes, the umbilical 
would have been dropped to satisfy test requirements. At T-lO minutes, per the Test 
Procedure, OCP FO-K-0021-1, bus power would have been transferred from external 
GSE power to C14-395 battery power (Enclosure 1-9, Drawing I-D-0056-4). 
2. The YOO - 085 cable and a power supply were connected to the SIC water / glycol drain 
and vent shutoff valve S23LVl (Reference I-D-0056-8): This valve must be held open 
by a 28 VDC source in order to maintain water glycol circulation during ground testing. 
During this test, the flyaway umbilical which normally carries the 28 VDC power is dis­
connected at T-O minutes and, the valve would close if not separately powered. 
3. The ground oxygen (02) source was connected to the SI C. Oxygen to the Space­
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craft was supplied (Reference Schematic I-D-()()56-8) from a bottle source through the 02 
Test Set to the 02 valve box in the SIC. This particular configuration was being used for 
the first time at LC 34. 
4 . A thermocouple was ta~d to the oxidizer "A" isolation valve and was connected 
to a GSE meter. During this test, the propellant isolation valves were to be energized for 
a period of approximately 15 minutes. A technician was to monitor the valve temperature 
during the actuation time in the test. 
5 . Seven C / M RCS simulator cables were connected from the simulator boxes to the 
SIC. These cables were connected from the simulator boxes to the RCS Control Boxes 
through C / M access panels. Each of these cables ran beneath the Boost Protective Cover 
(BPC) sections that had been installed surrounding the S IC hatch . Post-test observation 
indicates that the cable interference with the BPC bulged the installed sections of BPC 
such that the hatch section of the BPC could not be installed properly. 
(3) Ground System 
(a) Documentation: The configuration of the ground system at the time of the accident is 
described by the following: 
1. Spacecraft GSE configurations existing at the time of the accident or used earlier 
in the test are depicted in Enclosure 1-9, Drawings I-D-()()56-1 , -4, -5, -7, -8, and -9. 
These drawings were prepared for Panel 1 based upon visual inspection and reference to 
GSE Functional Integrated Schematics for internal detail. The individual GSE models 
used during the test and change actions not accomplished are tabulated in Reference 1-19. 
2 . Configuration of supporting facilities was documented by a report prepared by the 
KSC Launch Facilities Division in support of this Panel's investigation. This report is 
provided as Reference 1-20. Reference 1-21 ~s an inventory listing of miscellaneous items 
found on the service structure platforms after the accident. 
3. Configuration of remote monitoring and control equipments are briefly described 
in Reference 1-20. Reference 1-22, prepared by this Panel, contains further data regarding 
details of the configuration of the Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE), Operations 
Intercommunications System (OIS), and the Mission Control Center, Houston. The overall 
configuration of remote monitoring and control equipment at the time of the accident 
is depicted in Enclosure 1-9, Drawing 1-D-0056-3. The configuration of ACE is shown in 
Enclosure 1-9, Drawing I-D-0060. OIS configuration is shown in Drawing I-D-0062. 
(b) Data Synopsis: Significance of the ground system configuration is summarized as follows: 
1. No further significance is attached to the Spacecraft GSE configuration beyond that 
previously discussed under the heading "Spacecraft/Ground System Interfaces." 
2. The configuration of supporting facilities within the scope of this Panel's investi­
g~tion is not represented as pertinent to the accident. The safety aspects of the facility 
configuration were deferred to Panel 13 (Ground Emergency Provisions Review). 
3 . The remote monitoring and control equipment were configured according to pub­
lished requirements and operational procedures. Analyses of difficulties experienced in the 
communications equipments, as mentioned in Reference 1-22, were referred to Panel 9 
(Design Reviews). 
d. Post-Accident Configuration 
The damage caused by the fire in the Spacecraft is documented by the Apollo 204 Review 
Board Photographic Files and by the work records of the disassembly accomplished by Panel 4 
(Disassembly activities). Panel 1 considered those aspects of the post-accident configuration nece­
ssary to verify certain elements of the configuration existing at the time of the accident and to 
identify changes in control configuration accomplished during the fire . The scope of these con­
siderations was limited to configuration change actions accomplished during and immediately fol­
lowing the fire. Considerations were based upon photographs and visual inspection by members 
of this Panel. The significant post-accident configuration differences are summarized as follows : 
(1) The rotary switch labeled "BMAG POWER" (Body-mounted attitude gyro power switch) 
was found in the " OFF" position , whereas it should have been in the " AC2 MNB" (Alternating 
Current Number 2 and Main Bus B) position. A silhouette pointing to the " AC2 MNB" position 
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indicates the switch was moved to the "OFF" position after sooting occurred. 
(2) Thirty-three circuit breakers which were closed prior to the accident were found "OPEN ." 
The shafts exposed by the circuit breaker"!> opening vary from sooted to clean, giving some gross 
determination of the relative times at which the different breakers opened (Reference 1-15) . 
(3) Two switches labeled " M AIN BUS TIE-BAT A & C and BAT B & C" (Battery A and 
C tie to Main Bus A and Battery Band C tie to Main Bus B) apparently were changed from 
the " AUTO" to the "ON" positions by the crew after the fire was reported . This action placed 
Spacecraft batteries A and C in parallel onto M ain Bus A and batteries Band C in parallel onto 
Main Bus B; in addition to the ground power being supplied. This action was not a planned 
procedure in event of rapid or emergency egress. It could have been taken in an attempt to main­
tain communication or lighting since emergency procedures called for GSE power off. 
(4) The Pad Emergency Egress Procedure specified in the Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist, 
page 15-2 (including planned changes), called for : (a) Turning off the switches labeled "MASTER 
EVENT SEQ CONT PYRO ARM · l and -2, " (Master Event Sequence Controller Pyrotechnic 
Arming Switches); (b) "SM RCS PROPELLANT A, B, C, AND D ," (Service Module Reaction 
Control System Propellant Switches for Quads A, B, C and D) ; (c) Placing the CABIN RELIEF 
VALVE TO "DUMP"; (d) Opening the four circuit breakers labeled " MASTER EVENT SEQ 
CONT ARM A BAT A, ARM B BAT B, LOGIC A BAT A, and LOGIC B BAT B," (Master 
Event Sequence Controller Pyrotechnic and Logic Arming Circuit Breakers) . One of the circuit 
breakers, "MASTER EVENT SEQ CONT ARM B BAT B" was found open. All the other con­
trols listed above are in the pre-accident configu rations. 
(5) The switch labeled " RCS INDICATORS" (Reaction Control System Indicators) was spec­
ified to be in the "SM D" position (Service Module Reaction Control System Quad D), but was 
found in the " SM A" position . OCP FO-K-0021-1 did not specify the normal step of returning 
this switch to the " SM A" position after use (as specified in the Apollo Crew Abbreviated Check­
list and in previous Operational Checkout Procedures) . The crew apparently did this in accordance 
with the abbreviated checklist. This switch selects the inputs to the time-shared RCS displays on 
Panel 12. 
(6) The switch labeled "TAPE RECORDER RECORD / PLAY" was found after the accident 
to be in the "OFF" position (OCP FO-K-0021-1 specified " RECORD"). There is no record of 
the crew deviating from the OCP FO-K -0021-1 specified position. The Apollo Crew Abbreviated 
Checklist specified " OFF" for this switch until immediately prior to launch . The switch might 
have been set to "OFF" per that procedure (without ground coordination) or knocked off inad­
vertently . The Tape Recorder (DSE) would not operate in either switch position until enabled 
by setting the switch labeled " TAPE RECORDER FWD / REV " (Tape Recorder Forward / Reverse 
Selector Switch) to the forward or reverse position (planned just prior to launch) . 
(7) The gas chromatograph power sensor connector was found on the aft bulkhead. This con­
nector was placed on the shelf of the chromatograph compartment at time of crew ingress. 
e . Plugs-In Test Configuration 
The Spacecraft 012 Plugs-In Test, OCP FO-K -0006, was initiated at 4:00 a.m. EST, January 
25, 1967, and was completed at 2:54 a. m. EST, January 26 , 1967 . Aside from test set-up, few 
configuration changes were accomplished between completion of Plugs-In Test and start of the 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test at 7:00 a.m. EST, on January 27, 1967. Configuration 
changes . were identified from Parts I nstalla tion and Removal Records, Temporary Installation 
Records, and Discrepancy Report / Material Review dispositions. The configuration at the time of 
the Plugs-In Test relative to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test is summarized as follows: 
(l) Spacecraft 
Difference in the configuration of the Spacecraft at the time of the Plugs-In Test with 
respect to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test are listed in Reference 1-10. Significant 
differences were as follows : 
(a) Boost Protective Cover (BPC) and splice plate (10 pieces) insta lled for Space Vehicle 
Plugs Out Integrated Test. The BPC was partially installed to accommodate the hatch BPe 
which was necessary for the planned emergency egress exercise. 
(b) Main "A ," Main " B," and the post-landing test ba tteries were not installed (used) 
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during the Plugs-In Test. Jettison controller batteries were used for each test, but were of a 
different serial number. 
(c) Eleven protective dust caps installed on pyrotechnic connectors in the CI M subsequent 
to Plugs-In Test. Caps placed on non-mated connectors to provide protection and prevent 
shorting. 
(d) The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) heater shorting plug was temporarily installed 
in tray 7 for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. This provides heater power from 
the SIC bus rather than from an external source. The installation of this shorting plug rep­
resents a configuration difference from the Plugs-In Test; however, this plug had been used 
previously during the Altitude Chamber Test (OCP FO-K-0034A). The "Launch" configur­
ation also requires that this plug be installed. 
(e) Carbon dioxide absorber elements, PIN ME 901-0128-0001, were installed for the Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. These absorber elements. were not flight configuration. 
(0 The same three crewmen umbilical electrical cables (cobra cables) were used in the 
Plugs-In Test as were used in Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. However, two addit­
ional cobra cables were stowed on board for this test, one of which was used by the Com­
mand Pilot during part of the test. 
(g) Noise-limiter adapters were attached to the cobra cables for the Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test, but not used for Plugs-In. They were check out in the Spacecraft be­
tween the times of the two tests. 
(h) An "octopus cable," (Medical Data Acquisition System cable) was installed for the 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test, but not used for Plugs-In Test. 
(i) Flight crew equipment was not stowed for the Plugs-In Test. 
(2) Spacecraft Interfaces 
Differences in the Spacecraft interface configurations between the Plugs In and Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Tests are identified in Reference 1-19. The significant differences 
were: 
(a) Pyrotechnic Substitute Units were utilized during the Plugs In Test and were dis­
connected during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test in an attempt to provide bet­
ter SIC ground isolation. 
(b) Fuel Cell Battery Substitute Unit was utilized during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out 
Integrated Test. This unit is used to supply SIC bus internal power in the absence of fuel 
cell operation after the flyaway umbilical has been dropped. 
(c) Protective Pressurization Unit was utilized to maintain a pad pressure on the Service 
Propulsion System (SPS) tanks. This unit was disconnected during the Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test in an attempt to maintain better ground isolation. 
(d) Battery Substitute Unit was used during the Plugs In Test. This unit was utilized in 
lieu of the SIC entry and post-landing batteries during that test. 
(e) Water/glycol shutoff valve control cable and associated power supply was utilized during 
the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated· Test. This requirement exists in order to hold the water/ 
glycol return shutoff valve open after flyaway umbilical ejection, such that continuous water­
glycol circulation may be maintained. 
(£) Conditioned air was supplied through the access arm White Room and the open Space­
craft hatch for the Plugs-In Test, therefore not requiring external oxygen supply. An oxygen 
test set was utilized during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. Oxygen was supplied 
from two K bottles through this unit to a facility valve box and then to the Spacecraft. 
(g) GSE access connectors were connected to the Service Module (SI M) during the Plugs­
In Test to monitor fluid system parameters. They were not required for the Space Vehicle 
Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(h) The ACE carry-on test equipment was utilized during the Plugs-In Test. This equip­
ment is located on Level A8 outside the CIM and is connected to the Spacecraft systems 
through cables which run through the hatch and connect to the individual Spacecraft sys­
tems. This equipment was not required for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(3) 	Ground System 
The Spacecraft GSE configuration differences between the Plugs In and Space Vehicle 
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Plugs Out Integrated Test are given In Reference 1-19. No significant differences were identified 
beyond those discussed above under the heading, " Spacecraft Interfaces ." Data presented in Ref­
erence 1-22 reflect that no differences existed in the configurations of the ACE and OIS equipment 
relevant to the accident. 
£. Configuration for Altitude Chamber ,Test 
The final run of the Spacecraft 012 Altitude Chamber Test, OCP FO-K-0034A-l, began at 
6:00 a.m. EST, on December 29, 1966, in the East Altitude Chamber in the Manned Space­
craft Operations Building (MSOB) . The test was completed at 3:30 a.m. EST, December 30, 
1966. At the time of the Altitude Chamber Test, configuration records reveal that sixty (60) re­
leased EO's had not been accomplished. Test Acceptance Inspection Records reflect that three­
hundred-eight (308) work items werc open. These records were reviewed to determine configura­
tion actions accomplished or closed out between the completion of the Altitude Chamber Test and 
the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. Discrepancy Report/Material Review dispositions 
were screened to identify corrective actions that altered configuration and were accomplished in 
this time period. Configuration differences are summarized as follows: 
(1) Spacecraft 
Differences in the spacecraft configuration between the Altitude Chamber Test and the 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test are presented in Reference 1-10. Enclosure 1-8 re­
flects differences in crew equiiment and loose items stowed in C/M. Significant differences 
were as follows: 
(a) Only the inner hatch was installed for the Altitude Chamber Test. Both inner and outer 
~atches were installed and latched, and BPC hatch was in place but not latched for Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(b) Pyrotechnic panel (no. 150) was temporarily installed for Altitude Chamber Test. This 
panel was removed December 30, 1966, and was temporarily installed prior to the Plugs 
In Test (OCP FO-K-0006). The panel was not fully installed, being out approximately 5 to 
6 inches from the lower equipment bay panel line and located on the C/M aft bulkhead. 
(c) Carbon dioxide absorber elements of the correct flight configuration (ME 901-0218­
0021) were installed for the Altitude Chamber Test, instead of the non-flight configuration 
for the Space Vehicl~' Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(d) Command Module interior panel, P /N VI6-441802, covering J -box in left-hand lower 
equipment bay was removed for DR / MR disposition to relieve interference with wire bundle. 
The panel was replaced prior to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out I ntegrated Test. 
(e) Spacecraft oxygen tanks were serviced for the Altitude Chamber Test. 

(£) Hydrogen tanks were pressurized with nitrogen during the Altitude Chamber Test. 

(g) Fuel cell battery substitute unit was not connected for Altitude Chamber Test. Space­
craft was powered by external eSE/facility power. 
(h) DC power bus voltage monitor recorder was installed for Altitude Chamber Test. 
(i) Additional Velcro was installed after completion of Altitude Chamber Test. 
(j) Noise limiters were not installed on cobra cables for Altitude Chamber Test. 
(k) The gas chromatograph was installed for the Altitude Chamber Test. 
(I) The Data Storage Electronics Assemblies (DSEA's) were installed in flight configuration 
for Altitude Chamber Test. 
(m) The Spacecraft TV camera was on during the Altitude Chamber Test, but not for 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test (after crew ingress) . 
(n) Translation and rotation controllers were installed to flight configuration for 
Altitude Chamber Test. 
(0) Floodlight installation was modified subsequent to Altitude Chamber Test. 
(p) Crew equipment stowage was approximately flight configuration for Altitude Chamber 
Test. See Enclosure 1-8 for detailed differences. 
(q) Debris traps were modified subsequent to Altitude Chamber Test. 
(r) All crew couch ground straps were installed for Altitude Chamber Test. 
(2) 	Spacecraft Interfaces 
The Spacecraft/ground system interfaces existing during the Altitude Chamber Test are 
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depicted in Enclosure 1-9, Drawing I-D-0056-6. Significant interface differences relative to Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test were: 
(a) During the Altitude Chamber Test, the A-14-062 Launch Vehicle Substitute Unit was 
installed. During Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test, the Command and Service Mod­
ule/Spacecraft to Lunar Module Adapter (CSM/SLA) configuration was mechanically and elect­
rically mated to the LV. The electrical connection to the Instrumentation Unit (IU) was 
through a separation device . 
(b) RCS engine simulators were used for both tests. The XOO-075 units were used during 
the Altitude Chamber run and the A14-275 units were used for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out 
Integrated Test. 
(c) The external Digital Test Command System (DTCSC 14-231) is utilized at LC 34 
and is not required in the Altitude Chamber. 
(d) The Fuel Cell Battery Substitute Unit (CI4-395) was utilized during the Space Vehicle 
Plugs Out Integrated Test. This unit is used to supply SIC bus internal power after the fly­
away umbilical has been dropped. 
(e) The Mobile Data Recorder was utilized to record SIC DC bus voltages during the 
Altitude Chamber Test. It was not utilized during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test. 
(f) The water/ glycol shutoff valve control cable and associated power supply was utilized during 
the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. This requirement exists in order to hold the 
glycol shutoff valve open after flyaway umbilical eject, such that continuous water-glycol cir­
culation may be maintained. 
(g) The oxygen test set (ZOO-025-401) was used during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out In­
tegrated Test. Oxygen was supplied from one "K" bottles through this unit to a facility valve 
box and then to the Spacecraft. During the Altitude Chamber Test, oxygen was supplied from 
the on board tanks, each of which had been loaded with liquid oxygen (LOX). Oxygen, 
hydrogen, and nitrogen fill, vent, pressurization, and relief lines were connected to the SIC 
during Altitude Chamber operation. 
(h) The Protective Pressurization Unit (SI4-099) was used to maintain a pad pressure on 
the SPS tanks. This unit was disconnected during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test to maintain better ground isolation. 
(i) During the Space Vehicle ~lugs Out Integrated Test, the Launch Escape System (LES) 
tower was installed and electrically connected . During the Altitude Chamber Test, neither 
the LES tower nor the pyrotechnic substitute boxes were installed. 
(j) GSE access connectors were connected to the S/M during the Altitude Chamber Test 
and were not connected during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(k) The access Arm/White Room was mated to the SIC during the Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test. This configuration does not exist in the Altitude Chamber. 
(I) Air was being supplied to a C/M access port to maintain a low humidity condition 
in the space between the C/ M pressure vessel and heat shield during the Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test. 
(3) Ground System 
Configuration of the Spacecraft GSE at the time of the Altitude Chamber Test is defined 
in Reference 1-19. Configurations of the supporting facilities together with the GSE are shown 
schematically in Enclosure 1-9, Drawing I-D-0056-6. Remote monitoring and control equipment 
configurations are described in Reference 1-22. Significant differences in the ground system config­
uration relate directly to the interface differences discussed previously; therefore, further discussions 
are not provided. 
g. Spacecraft 008 Test Configuration 
The Spacecraft 008 Thermal Vacuum Test No. 3 was conducted at the Space Environmental 
Simulation Laboratory (SESL), MSC, from October 26, 1966 through November 1, 1966. The con­
figuration for this test was selected for comparison with the configuration of SIC 012 at the time 
of the accident. A special computer tabulation was obtained to compare' the configuration verifi­
cation records of the two Spacecraft. Copies of the SIC 008 test reports and supporting data were 
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obtained. These data were reviewed and a summary report was prepared (Reference 1-24). Sig­
nificant extracts from the summary report are: 
(1) Spacecraft 008 wire harnesses did not have the modification kit (Teflon wrapping) installed 
which provides additional protection to crew compartment wiring. A special pad protected the wir­
ing on the aft bulkhead during the SI C 008 test. 
(2) Spacecraft 008 had additional wiring that was not in SIC 012 to implement limited remote 
control during unmanned altitude chamber tests . Additional wiring for test instr,umentation was 
installed in SI C 008 . The right-hand CI M window of SIC 008 was utilized for an umbilical 
pressure bulkhead penetration to bring out the additional control circuits and instrumentation. 
'(3) Command Module floodlights of improved configuration were employed on SI C 012, SIC 
008 utilized the basic configuration for all ' thermal vacuum testing . The provisions for portable 
floodlights were established as a requirement from the SIC 008 tests and installed on SI C 012, 
but the portable lights were not aboard for Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
(4) Noise filter adapters for the crewman umbilical electrical cables were not utilized on SI C 
008, but were used on SIC 012 . 
(5) Spacecraft 008 instrumentation and signal conditioners for test monitoring were not flight 
qualified instruments in all cases, but had been tested to the actual test environment. Flight in­
strumentation was installed on SIC 012. 
(6) Design modifications were incorporated in the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) on the 
SIC 012 unit as compared to the SI C 008 ECU. 
(7) A production prototype mission events sequencer was used on SIC 008 , SIC 012 had pro­
duction sequencers that were flight qualified. 
(8) Crew couches were modified for the long duration of thermal vacuum test on SIC 008 . 
Crew compartment stowage and special Teflon covered Sarfoam pads on the aft bulkhead were 
used on SI C 008, differing from the SIC 012 flight configuration. The crew compartment hatch 
on SI C 008 thermal vacuum test run No.3 had the airlock incorporated for scientific experiments . 
(9) Beta cloth over Teflon covering was used extensively on the aft bulkhead (covering the 
special Sarfoam pad) and couches during the Spacecraft 008 test. This is a fire-resistant material. 
Also, fire extinguishers were available inside the crew compartment during the SIC 008 test. 
(10) A large number of differences existed in the GSE and supporting facilities . These differ­
ences were not significant to the Spacecraft 012 accident. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
Review of data presented in this report results in summary findings and determinations as follows: 
L FINDING 
One hundred and sixty-four (164) Engineering Orders (EO's) were not accomplished at the time 
Spacecraft 012 was received at KSC. Six hundred and twenty-three (623) EO's were released subsequent 
to receipt at KSC. Of these , twenty-two (22) were recent releases which were not recorded in con­
figuration records at KSC at the time of the accident. 
DETERMINATION 
Continuing engineering changes indicate progressive development of the Spacecraft configuration 
through the time of the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. At the time of the test , the con­
figuration could not have been complete with respect to the launch configurations. 
2. FINDING 
The required Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test configuration was not explicitly defined by 
design engineering or test documentation. Definition of required test configuration was limited to test 
set-up and controls configurations specified in OCP FO-K-0021-L 
DETERMINATION 
The absence of explicit definition of Spacecraft test configuration requirements relegated such 
definition to the test organization . Further, it is the opinion of this Panel that the lack of timely and 
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explicit design definition of the required test configuration precluded complete assessment of adverse 
configuration aspects as constraints to the test. 
3. FINDING 
Eighty (80) EO's effective on SIC 012 were not accomplished at the time of the accident. Of these, 
twenty (20) were specified to be accomplished subsequent to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test. Four (4) of the open EO's were of a nature not affecting configuration. Three hundred and 
eighty-four (384) Parts Installation and Removal Records (PIRR's) and Temporary Installation Records 
(TIR's) were open, of which one hundred and twenty-five (125) were in compliance with requirements 
of the test documentation. 
DETERMINATION 
It is concluded that test requirements had no defined relationship to the open status of fifty-six 
(56) EO's and two hundred and fifty-nine (259) PIRR's/TIR's. It is the opinion of this Panel that 
all work items and EO's were not closed because of late receipt of changes or further work scheduled 
to be accomplished prior to launch. 
4. FINDING 
Items were placed on board the Spacecraft during preparation for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out 
Integrated Test which were not documented by quality inspection records. 
DETERMINATION 
Procedures for controlling entry of items into the Spacecraft were not strictly enforced. 
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COMMAND MODULE 
SERVICE MODULE 
SPACECRAFT 
LM ADAPTER 
I 
t' " 
I II .
-----.1 
I 
ENCLOSU RE 1 -1 
D·1·21 
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D·1·22 
VIEW OF SPACECRAFT LAUNCH VEHICLE IN SERVICE STRUCTURE 
WITH ACCESS ARMS EXTENDED 
LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM 
ACCESS ARM TO 
SERVICE MODULE 
INSTRUMENT UNIT 
ENCLOSURE 1-2 
D-1-23 
UMBILICAL TOWER 
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VIEW OF COMMAND MODULE MOCKUP INTERIOR LESS COUCHES 
ENCLOSURE 1-6 

VIEW OF COMMAND MODULE MOCKUP INTERIOR, COUCHES INSTALLED 
261-1060 - 67 - 3 ENCLOSURE 1-7 
SPACECRAFT 012 CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
Th~ attached table lists by area the conf iguration of stowage items and other loose equipment for 
the Spacecraft 012 Crew Compartment. Thi s information is gi ven for the pi ann ed launch, Operationa I 
Checkout Procedure (OCP) K-0034A-1-Manned Altitude Chamber Test , and OCP K-0021-1-Plugs-Out 
Test. 
The data for planned launch was taken from the Spacecraft 012 Operational and Experimemtal 
GFE/ CFG Stowage List. Data for OCP's K-0034A-1 and K - 0021-1 were deri ved from the applicable 
Test Preparation Sheets, Part Installation or Removal Reco rds, Temporary Installation Records, Stowage 
OCP's and interviews of ground and flight crew support personnel. In the case of OCP K - 0021- 1 some 
data was 5llso derived from physical inspections of the spacecraft after the incident . 
The data includes all items loose in the crew compartment, installed in stowage containers, car ­
ried on the flight crew's persons, or items subject to removal /displac~ment by the flight crew. It further 
includes all non-flight moterials known to be on board the spacecraft . All items are listed under their 
normal launch stowage locations, except that non· flight items are listed where actually stowed for the 
test. Items stowed in other than normal launch locations or in other than normal launch conditions are 
identified by notes in the "REMARKS" column . 
The "STOWAGE ITEM NUMBER" is a cross index to the Spacecraft 012 Operational and Experi. 
mental GFE/ CFE Stowage List . 
ENCLOSURE 1-8 
D-l ~35 
,.---­
I 
L____ ~:_J 
63 
LEFT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY o 
LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY 
~~ I ',~FE~ ( ).,~ '-."'~ 2jjl ' r// 4 5 G&N 
'II · 7 
15:e r-.I I1~;:;;;;~5KEe~.~.e1,,----r---J
"A" 1[: 9::::JC IO ::J 11 ~t----f~=9~~T-~-r---+--~J 
lill SEC "8" 
" 
CREWCOMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
.se '0". t)l ~ ( .... (7)(0T) 
5T0i':I\GF: 
AREA 
QUPJ'J1'l TY 
PART NUMRF:R NOI-IE NC LATURF. 
STOWAGE 
1Tr:M 
NUMBER 
REMARKSPLAN'!.'F:O 
LAUNCH 
OCP K­
0034A- l 
OCP K­
0021 -1 
1 1 1 1 2012691 G&N Long Eyepiece 5CT 019 
I. 1 1 1 2012719 G&N 5CT Eyepiece 016 
1 1 1 1 1013010 5CT Prism Housing 016A 
1 1 :. 1 2012700 G&N 5XT Eyepiece 017 
1 1 1 1 2012699 SXT Mirror Housing Ol7A 
2J, 1 1 1 50B33100065- 201 G&N Optics Cover 5XT 054 
;'B 1 1 1 5EB33100072- 201 G&N Optics Cover SCT 055 Found on aft bulkhead 
after 0021 -1 
~ ~ - - v16-60151B Food Containe r "A" B14 
4 i 
- -
v16- 601516 Food Contai ner "Bit B16 
1 
- -
Vl6- 601517 Food Container "c" B15 
6 1 - - v16- 601'i14 Food Container "0" B1B 
7 1 - - v16- 601515 Food Container "E" B17 
B 1 "­ - 5EB33100031 - ;>01 Ring 5ight 008 
8/, 1 1 1 5EB33100021 - 207/~v8 16 MM 5eq Cam with Film 001 Stowed .on floor of area 
Bz, LEB for 0021 -1 
BB 1 
" 
1 SEB33100026- 201 16 MM Power Cable 005 5towed on floor of area 
Bz, LEB 
Bc 1 1 - 5EB33100023-201 1BMM Lens 003 
B[; 1 1 
-
5EB33100054-201 2~ MM Lens 202 
BE 1 1 - 5EB3 3100025-201 100 MM Lens 004 
SF 1 1 - 5EB33100051-201 Mirror Mtg Bracket 037 
BG 4 1 
-
5EB33100022- 206 16 MM Magazine 002 -1 s t owed in area 90 , 
crew couch , on 0034A-1 
BH I 1 - SEB33100029- 201 10 MM Camera 006 
81 I 1 
- 5EB3jl00032- 201 250 MM Lens 009 
8J " - - 5EB33100030-201, 
- 202, - 203 
70 MM Magazine 212 
BK 1 1 - 5EB)5100027-201 Exp Dial 011 
8L 1 1 
-
5EB3310002B-201 5potmeter 010 
BM 1 1 - EC30155 Vascular Support 215 
BN 1 1 
-
5EB121 00037 - 201 Binoculars 036 
BN 1 1 - v16-752031 Foam Cushi?n 1015 
BN 1 1 - v16-75205B-4 1 Foam Cushion 1016 
8N 1 1 - v16-753110 Foam 5eparator 10161 
BN 
8z 
S2 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
1 
-
1 
-
5EB33100050- 201 
Non-flight 
Filter (on camera) 
Plastic Dust Cap 
Gas Chromatograph 
053 
On gas chronatograph pyre 
connector 
Not installed on 0021 - 1 
9 1 1 - v16- 334137 Crew Flt Data File Cont . 839 
ENCLOSURE 1 -8b 
D - 1 - 37 
.sc rO ..4 
131'01:IIG;'; 
AR~:!, 
9 
'1 
9 
9 
9 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
II 
II 
II 
11 
12 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
14 
15 
Several 
LEE 
Panels 
A?~ I ~F[~~ ( )<"- ~~ 2 
LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY (CONT.) /Ii ' 'II 4 ; 
'/1 6 
G&N 
7 
~ I ISEC _·b:;::;::;;;:;;:::::;:J\SEECC-:,,:cC'l"·----1r--'1 
"A" C 9:::JC'O::J 12~~-~~~~~~~+--~-~I 
rn SEC "8" 
" 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
1J1~ . ("U 61)( On 
~lIl.r;'J'J 'lOY 
PIM: ':' :I) OCt' K­ ocr K­
LAlJ.iCH Vl) 34A-1 0021 -1 
1 1 -
1 1 2 
1 1 -
1 1 
-
1 1 -
1 1 -
~ 1 -
1 1 -
1 1 -
2 2 -
1 1 -
1 1 
-
~ 1 -
1 1 
-
1 1 -
1 1 -
1 1 -
1 - -
" 
- -8 5 -
7 7 -
1 1 1 
1 1 -
3 j -
1 1 -
1 1 
-
1 1 -
1 1 -
14 1 -
- -
1 
- - -
PART .NlY.·iHr:H NOMENCLA1'\IRE 
SDB33io0044 Landmark Maps 
SDB33100048 sic Sys Data 
SDB33100047 Exper Checklist 
SDB33100045 Star Chart 
SDB3 3100046 Orbital Map 
SDB33100043 Navigation Checkli st 
v16-601125 Tool Horkshelf Dwr 
Vl6-60ll45- 21 Too l "A" 
v16-601480 Tool "E" 
v16-60l 310- 21 Tool "F" 
v16-6011 34-11 Tool "H I! 
v16-601481-11 Tool "J" 
v16-601133-11 Tool Il L" 
v16-601400 Tether 
v16-601241-11 Dwr Assy with Horkshelf 
v16-601404 I-lo rk/Food Shelf 
SEB12100049- 201 Inspec tion Mirror 
EX750 36 Goggles 
EX75037 Mouthpiece 
SEB33100030­ 201, 70 MM Magazine 
- 202 Or - 203 
SEB33100022­ 2u6 16 MM Magazine 
SD511076 MDAS 
SEB42100004-201 Physiological Monitoring KI. t 
14-149 UCD Clarno 
14 - 0207 Urine Receptacle 
! 110 -0::09 Urine Fllter Assy 
v16-6014 21 - 101 R~ptacle Assy Relief Tube 
Vl6-601 526-11 Wrapper Assy Rellef Tube 
14-0112 Towels (Dry Utility) 
Non-flight MOunting Hardware for 
Panel 150 
NOn-flight Whi te Room Tape 
ENCLOSURE 1 -8b 
D - 1 - 38 
S1'O\':AO: 
IT£M REMAR!,,'s 
NUMH f:H 
012F 
012G One docwnent found on 
center couch, on on RH 
girth shelf, area 92 
after 0021-1 
O12H 
0121 
012J 
012B 
803 
80jA 
803E 
803F 
803H 
803.1 
8031< 
803M 
819 
820 
068 
204 
205 
008 
002 
600 
024 
029 
0 35 
034 
861 
876 
031 
In plastic bag taped to 
panel 
Over open ACE connectors 
on 14 panel s &over entry 
battery terminals 
RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
.sc fO .... IJB ( .... ,J)(OT) 
STO\'IAG!': QUAN11 IT STOW~.GE 
AREA PLANl·r·:n LAUtJCH 
OCP K­
0034A-l 
OCP K­
0021-1 
PART mr.·[II!':R NOMF: NCLA1'Ul\E I'l'Et·~ 
NUMBER 
REMARKS 
71 
71 
71 
. 71 
71 
71 
7~ 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
7:.: 
73 
73 
73 
7 3 
73 
73 
73 
73 
73 
73 
73 
73 
7 3 
74 
74 
74 
5 
) 
') 
5 
5 
1 
35 
50 
8 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
7 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
3 
2 
5 
5 
~ 
5 
5 
1 
35 
)0 
8 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
Vl6-611238 
ME192-0039-000l 
ME901-0736-0001 
ME393-0001-0001 
KT503 
102765 
SEB42100011-201 
SEB42100012-201 
14-0228 
SEB42100014-201 
SEB42100013-201 
SEB42100005-201 
v16-611241 
EA35068-1 
Vl6-601419-101 
Vl6-601378-11 
ME399-0001-0001 
ME901-0736-0001 
Vl6-601419- 3 
14-0112 
Vl6-611238 
ME192-0039-0001 
ME901-0736-0001 
ME393-0001-0001 
KT503 
v16-60l538 
v16-601 356 
v16-601263- 51 
Vacuum Cleaner Compartment 
Vacuum Clnr Ref stow BagA 
Vncuum Clnr Debris Bag 
Fecal outer Bag 
Vacuum Clnr Germicide Pouc 
Tie Band 
Medical Accessories Kit Co 
Bio Instrumentation ACC Ki 
Electrodes 
Micropore Disks 
Wet Wipe Towels 
Paste 
Stoma Seal Disk 
Bio In s tr stowage Bag 
Vacuum Cleaner Nozzle 
Nephelometer(Aerosol Parti 
Sanitation Supply Assy 
Inner Fecal Bag 
Germic ide Pouch 
Outer Fecal Bag 
Outer Tie Band 
Dry, utility Towels 
Vacuum Cln Ref stow Bag As 
Vacuum Clnr Debris Bag 
Fecal Outer Bag 
Vacuum Clnr Germicide Pouc 
Tie Band 
Elect Adapters, Sleep 
Adapter-CWG-Elect 
Cobra Cable 
834 
834A 
834B 
834C 
834D 
023 
023A 
023B 
023C 
023D 
023E 
023F 
833A 
le) 201 
8u 
811A 
811B 
8uc 
811D 
031 
834 
834A 
834B 
834c 
834D 
887 
821 
878 - On 0021-1, both spares 
relOOved !'rom s towa~e by 
crew, both found 00 CXloch 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
1 
1 
1 
52 
52 
52 
52 
1 
1 
1 
52 
52 
52 
52 
v16-601112-501 
v16-601112-40l 
v16-601112- 301 
v16-601419-11 
v16-60l378-11 
ME 399-0001-0001 
ME901-07 36-0001 
Sani tatio'n Supplies Compt. 
Box San Sup Storage A 
Box San Sup Storage B 
Box San Sup Storage C 
Sanitation Supply As sy 
Inner Fecal Bag 
Germicide Pouch 
Outer Fecal Bag 
806 
808 
809 
8u 
811A 
811 
811 
ENCLOSURE 1 -8e 
D- 1 - 39 
RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY(CON'T) 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
MSC 'ou 1J11 ( ... " U)(Ol} 
QUANTITYSTO'."AGr' 
PLANNFC> OC P K­AREA LAU:iCH 0')34A-1 
75 52 52 
75 2 2 
75 1 1 
76 1 
7, 
77 1 1 
77A 1 1 
77B 1 1 
76A 2 2 
76A 1 1 
78 
OC P K-
0021 -1 
PAAT NUMRE:H NOMENCLA TIJRE 
STOWAGF: 
ITEM 
M.iMRF:R 
V16-60l I.l9- 3 
V16-6011 20- 51 
V16-601120-61 
V16-601519 
Outer Tie B.nd 
Cover 
Cover 
Aux FO:ld Camp RIlEB 
8110 
810 
807 
81 3 
2 
V16-6J1 391 
SOB3310~0L.l 
SOB33100~L. 2 
Crew FIt Data File Contain 
Sys Eng Checklist 
Mission Log & Oct. 
8L.~ 
012C 
012E 
1 LS C- 36J- 12 OSEA (Voice Re cord er ) 
1 DSEA Adapter Cable 
8 Non-flight PlAstic Dust Caps 
REMAR KS 
Found on LH And center 
couches after 0021-1. 
I nstalled in alternate 
p:lsition - Prtmary 
i nstallation position 
taped vi th "Boat Tape" 
on 0021-1. 
Not con~ected on 0021-1 
-On pyro and c ircuit 
interrupter connectors 
ENCLOSURE 1 -8c 

D - 1 - 40 

FORWARD BULKHEAD, SIDEWALL 
AND HATCH 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
MiC JO'" IJ n ( ..... 11)(01) 
STO,;AGE QUAN1'ITY ST(MAGE 
AREA PLANIIED LAUNCH 
OCP K­
0034A-l 
OCP K­
0021 -1 
PART NUMBER NOMF.NCLATURE ITEM 
NUMBER 
REl-tARKS 
41 
4lA .1 1 1 
41P 1 1 1 
41C 1 1 
41D 1 1 
43 1 
46 
46 1 1 
46 1 1 
46A 1 1 
461' 2 2 
46c 16 16 
46D 2 2 
II6E 2 2 
4(F 3 3 
46c 1 1 
46H 1 1 
461 1 1 
46J 2 2 
46K 2 2 
46 1 1 
46A 1 1 
46P 2 2 
461. 1 1 
46D IN IN 
46E 3 3 
46F 1 1 
46c 1 1 
47 1 1 
47 1 1 
47 1 1 
47A 1 1 
2014764 - 011 
2014764 -021 
Vl6- 334100 
1011787- 1 
14-0104-02 
Vl6-601371 -101 
SEB40100011-201 
SEB401 00010- 201 
20538 
SE!l4 01 00021-001 
SEB40100021-002 
SEB40100021-003 
SEB40100020-201 
2588218 
2588254 
2555952 
SEB40l00004-201 
SEB40l00001- 201 
SEB40100013-201 
SEB401000l2-20l 
SEB40l00022-20l 
SEB40100052-201 
SD840100048-201 
SEB40l00058-20l 
281SSAR 
ME28l-0023-000l 
Vl6-601372-10l 
SE!l4 0100017-201 
SEB40100016-201 
LHFEF--Loose Parts Compart . 
Short IBndhold 
Lone: IBndhold 
LEP Rot Cont Mount 
G/N Long Eyere11ef Eyepiece 
Set 
Metering vater Dispenser 
RHFEF-Stov. Area ­
9Jrv i val Ki ts 
Con ta iner 9J rvi val Kit A 
Ru cksa ck No. 1 
Rucksa ck 
Combination 9Jrvival Assy 
Desa I ter Ki t Tablets 
Desal ter Kit Process lllg 
Mending Kit 
9Jnglasses 
Pad i 0/ Beacon Assy 
Padlo/Beacon Spare lllttery 
Padio/Peacon CaHe Assy 
r.Bchete 
r.Bchete Shea th 
Ru cksack No. 2 
Rucksack 
\eter Container 
\eter Container 
\eter 
\eter Container Stoppers 
Medical Kit 
Filler r.Bterial 
Sea \eter Pump 
Container 9Jrviva1 Kit B 
Illcksack No. 3 
Ill cksack 
013 
014 
fljl 
018 
Not connected to hose on 
0021 -1. Hose f i t t1 ng 
covered ty plastic beg 
409 
847 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025A 
025R 
025R 
025B 
025B 
025" 
025F 
025B 
025B 
838 
8) 8 
025C 
025C 
ENCLOSURE 1 - 8d 

D-1-41 

FORWARD BULKHEAD, SIDEWALL 
AND HATCH (CONT.) 
GULKHEAD 
(FBI 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
_sc fOUl on (IIU 61)(01) 
STOHAGc: QUANTI'l"{ 
AREA PLANNED 
OCI' K­ OCP K­
LAUNCH 0034A-1 0021-1 
47P 1 1 
47C 1 1 
470 3 3 
47E 6 6 
47F 3 3 
47G 3 3 
47H 1 1 
471 3 3 
47J 3 3 
471< 3 3 
48 1 1 
50 1 1 
51 1 1 
53 1 1 
'55 1 1 
52 
54 1 
60 
48 1 1 
48 15 10 
48 6 6 
48 3 3 
48 45 45 
MDC 1 
PART NUHllER NOMENCLATURE 
SEB40100031-201 Li fe Raf t K1 t - 3 I1ln 
SEP40100030-201 Life Raf t Inflati on Assy 
SE1340100023-201 Sea Anchor 
SE1340100005-201 Sea Dye I1lrker 
SEFli0100002- 201 &In Bonnet 
SE1340100014-201 lanyard 
SEB40100015- 201 M:>orine lanyard 
SE1340100055-001 Pad 
SE1340100053-201 Strap Assy 
SEFli0100054 - 201 Strap Ass y 
Vl6-601373-101 Conta iner Survival Kit C 
Vl6-771339- 21 Left Side Viev Wi ndov Shad 
Vl6-771341-11 Shade-LH Rendezvous 
Vl6-771340- 21 Shade- -ha tch 
Vl6-771339-21 Rt . side Viev Windov Shade 
Vl6-601484 Tool hB" Wren ch Assy 
Vl6-771341-12 Shade--RH Rendezvous 
MEB01-0090-0023 CM TV Camera 
SEFli0100031-201 3 Ml.n Li fe Raft 
SE1342100015-201 Urine Storage IllIg 
EC30108-1 Urine Re ceiver 
SEB 42100001-201 Cuff Stovage IllIg 
EC30094 Roll on Cuff 
Non-flight FDAI Cover 
ENCLOSURE l·8d 
D· 1- 42 
STOWAGF; 
ITEM REMARKS 
NUMBER 
025C 
025C 
02~~ 
025C 
025C 
025C 
025C 
025C 
025C 
025C 
849 
867 -GSE Nylon cove rs instaUe6 
865 in l ieu of a1umini7ed 
864 mylar flight vindov 
867 covers on vindovs in 
areas 50, 51, 53, a nd 
55· Ha tch vindov cover 
(53) removed by c rev 
after ingress and stoved 
somevhere in the space-
c raft. 
803 
866 
826 
-Removed from FDAI by 
Ccmmand Pilot a nd placed 
on aft bulkhead after 
crev ingress . 
AFT BULKHEAD 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
o s< fOUl n n (W'" 61)(OT) 
QUAN11 rvS1'0\':ACE 
PLAf'{N!-:D ocr K­ OCP K­ PART NUHREHARE~ LAUNCH 0034A- 1 0021-1 
21 
21 1 1 EC 3000h-l 

21 

-
1 1 SEB42100025- 201 
22 
22 
-
1 1 1 ME901- 0090- 0023 
22 1 11 ME901- 0090- 0023 
:3 1 1 v16-601418- 501 
24 
24 
-
1 1 v16- 331092- 51 
24 
-
Vl6-601416 
24 
-3 3 
1 1 v16-601 211-1 31 
24 
-
1 1 Vl6- 601506 

2) 

2';A 

-
1 1 A1991-000 

2)B 

l 
1 11 Al991- 000 

25C 
 1 1 1 A1991 - 000 
A201 2- 000 2 ~ 3 3 3 
2') A2011 - 000 

26 

3 3 3 
1 1 Vl6- 6012ll-141 
26 1 1 v16- 331126-71 
27 
-
6 SEB3310oo68 
27 
- -
1 1 SEB3 3100029- 201 
27 
-
1 1 SEB3 3100031- 201 
27 
-
1 11 ME 331-0017- 0032 
27 4 - SEB33100022- 206 
28 
-
SEB33100022- 206 
28 
- -9 
2 1 1 434- 0097- 002 
28 1 1 v16- 753103 
jO 
-
EC30115 

29 

-9 9 
1 1 SEB12100047-201 
31 
-
4 4 SEB1 2100018-201 
-
rbn- fl ight 
Installation of 
fl ight material 
A-H 
IN- -
16 16 ME901- 0218-0021 
-
, 
4 4 ME901-0218- 0021J,K -
L,M,N ME901-0218-0021 
ME901-0218- 0021 
3 3 -
-
3 -P,RbU ME901 - 0218- o021 
D-E 
AA- D -
1 N:ln- flight- -
NOMENC J .A'l'1.IR£ 
In~light Exer ciser 
Inflight Exerc iser FIJ Llch 
TV Optics Container 
TV Zoom Lens 
Fecal Cannister 
PeA Stowage Bag 
Crew Waste Basket 
Crew Restraint 
Pad Fecal Cannister 
SkLlll Cap Assy 
SkLlll Cap Ass.' 
SkLlll Cap Assy 
Head Set 
Helmet Stowage Container 
Sleep Restraint 
PeA Stowage Bag 
70 MM Film Pack 
70 MM Camera 
Ring Sight 
COAS 
16 MM Magazine 
16 MM Magazine 
COAS BLllb 
16 MM C6JJlera Brac ket 
Pen Lights 
Tool Ki t 
PPK 
Velcro pile covering vel c r 
hook over large portion of 
aft bulkhead 
Li OH Cartridges 
LiOH Cartridges 
Li OH Cartridges
LiOH Cartridges
LiOH Cartridges 
Battery Instrumentation 
Cable & Transduce r 
STOWACF: 

ITf.M 

NUMRF:H 

227 

~28 
827 
828 
860 
801 
855 
856 
882 
042 
042 
042 
049 
043 
857 
802 
060 
006 
007 
850 
002 
002 
8)OA 
1003 
032 
os8 
033 
868 
868 
~~ 
868 
REMARKS 
-Installed to protect 
velcro hook. 
- Stowage cannisters not 
installed on 0021- 1 
- Stowtd in ~lastic bag 
on aft bLll head 
ENCLOSURE 1 -Be 
D- 1 - 43 
CREW COUCHES 
CREW COUCHES GIRTH SHELF 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOwAuE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
_sc , ... o n (U. 17 ) ( D1) 
~U~.N ' I 'J1,,{ STOWAGE~wO":",G >' 
NOME NCLA1'UHF.PART NiJ1·:KF:H I TEMOCP K­prAl:1 ~': D OC I' K-
ARl :A 00? 1- 1 NUMBER(k13I<1\ - 1LA lJ1'I CH 
Vl6-601 47 2- 152 
Co uc.he 
11Cre l1 2 
Vl6- 601472- 161 
2 
22 2 
Vl6-601 47 2- 171 
2 
1 1 
Vl6-60l472- 181 
3 
22 
Vl6- 601 47 2- 191 
3 
11 
Vl6-60l47 2- 201 
3 
1 1 
Vl6-601472- 211 
3 
1 1 
v16- (,01472- 221 
3 
33 
v 16- 60l472- 231 
1 
11 
v16- 601 494 
2 
1 1 
Vl6-601495 
1 
22 
V..6-601496-1 
1 
11 
VlG- 601496- 2 
1 
1 1 
ME901-0257- 0007 
1 
11 
ME901- 0257-0009 
1 
11 
ME901- 0257 - 0011 
1 
11 
ron- fli ght 
ron- fli ght 
9;, 
19 3 
ro n- fli ght 
92 
1 
ron- flig ht 1 
v16- 531750- 2 
81 
11 181 
Non- flight1 
1 
8 3 
1 181 
RMK- 100A11 
Vl6-880207 -21 
84 
11184 
Vl6-880207- 11 
84 
11 
1 
85A 
2 2 
6 EC33203 
85B 
6 
EC33203 
86 
11 
v16- 331128 
Vl6- 331160 
1 1 
1 
89 
187 
v16- 5317)Q-1 
90 
1 
111 
SEB 33100021-207/21190 
Couch Pad As sy 
Co uc h Pad · Assy 
Co uch Pad Assy 
Couch Pad Assy 
Couch Pad Assy 
Co uch Pad Assy 
Co uch Pad ASBY 
Couch Pad Assy 
Co uch Pad Ass y 
Hire Run Co ver 
Hire Run Cover 
Hi re Run Cover 
Hire Run Cover 
Res traint As sy 
Re straint ABSY 
Restrai nt As sy 
DCP K- 0021-1 Checklist 
OCP K- 0021-1 Checklist 
OCP K-0021-1 Checklist 
Malfunc tion Pro cedure s 
I:b c ume nt 
Ann Re s t, . c rew couch 
Tub ular Co ve r 
Ro tational Con t rolle r 
Emergency Medi cal Kit 
Translation Cont . Mtg Bitt 
Translation Coat. Adapter 
Translation Controller 
Tissue DiBpenBer 
Tissue Dispenser 
TV ClII!\era Mtg Bitt 
16M-! Camera Mta Bkt 
Arm Rest, Crew Couch 
16 Ko( Seq c-ra 
879 
879 
879 
879 
879 
879 
879 
879 
879 
880 
880 
880 
880 
881 
881 
881 
871 
022 
869 
8 30 
870 
030 
030 
8 5 
8 53 
870 
001 
REMAR KS . 
- Found on LH co uch after 
0021 - 1 - Mul ti l ith 
Pro cess Paper 
- Multlllth process paper 
- Multilith process paper 
- Zerox and Brunill8 pro­
ce s s paper in mani l a 

f older.• 

- On rotational hand con­
troller barnen 
- Co ntainer on.l.y stowed on 
0021-1 
• B~wed on floor of area . 
~7 i n LEB for 0021- 1,~ 
... )o6..ded nlll!azine ~r 00 ­
ENCLOSU RE 1-Sf 
D-l-44 
I 
CREVY COUCHES 
Tl, 
,., 
... 
CREW COUCHES GIRTH SHELF(CON'T) 83 
- - -­
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
.sc '0'". nn (.... "HOI) 
STOWACF. ~lJf.N'j11'Y 
AREA PLANNED OCP K­ OCP K­LAUNCH OO )4A-l OO?I-l 
90 1 1 -
90 1 1 -
90 2 - -
~O I - -
90 1 - -
')0 J 1 -
'j'J ;, <' -
'j0 
" 
;' 
-
91 1 1 -
9) 1 1 -
96 1 - -
96 1 - -
97 1 - -
98 1 1 1 
98 1 1 -
100 - - 1 
101 - - 2 
PART NUMl\EH NOMF.NCLATURF. 
SEB331000;5 - 201 70 MM Super Wide Angle CBIII 
SEB33100056- 201 ) MM Lens, 16MM Camera 
SEB33100030- 201, 70 MM Film Magazine 
- 202 or - 203 
SEB33100069-203 
SEB331000jO-:'02 
v16-75423~ 
SEB331000jO­ 201 
EL30170 
ME280-0008-0001 
v16-601501-11 
v16-771358 
v 16-420394 
v16-752080 
v16- 5317) 0-2 
lbn-flight 
lbn-fltght 
Interference Filter 
Filter 
Vol "c" Foam Cushion 
Haze Filter (on camera) 
GogglES Assy 
Senso r Unit-Temp Evaporator 
'fuol "p" Handle Ext . 
Floodlight 
Floodlight Cable 
Camera Br kt ( 5051) 
Arm Rest, Crew Couch 
Rotational Controller 
Dust Cap 
Foam Ru.bber Pads 
ENCLOSUR E 1 -Bf 
D - 1 -45 
S'l'OWAGF. 
ITI:M RF.WJ;!"..f. 
NUMBF:H 
048 
045 
212 
2~J9 
230 
888 ' 
Oj 3 
" 31AAJ, 
. H0:lP 
- St owage bag onLY ctowed 
for 0021 - 1 
871 
-Plastic - on SCS junctlo 
bo x connec tor 
-COvered wi th velostat, 
c lean room tape, lll"id 
over Z-Z struts 
CARRIED ON CREWMEN 
CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE AND LOOSE EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION 
lis e IO~"" n n (1.. 0 P\( 01) 
S'l'O'.: iI.C: . QUM;'l'J'J'Y STO',:IIGr: 
AH.:.~.rl rlJ\r: ' ::- : ~) LAUi'ICH 
OCf' K­
003'111 ­ 1 
OCP K­
002J - 1 
PANT Nln·~!-\r.H NOMF. NC LA1'UP.-': lTEt~ 
IMIMRF:R 
REt-lAR KS 
3 3 
3 3 
15 15 
3 3 
3 3 
)3 
3 3 
3 3 
1 1 
3 3 
33 
6 6 
66 
11 
2 2 
3 pr 3 pr 
3 pr 3 pr 
33 
33 
3 pr 3 pr 
3 pr 3 pr 
1 1 
3 3 
- -
3-
3 3 
3 
3 
15 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
6 
6 
1 
2 
3 pr 
3 pr 
3 
3 
3 pr 
3 pr 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
A ~936-0JO 
A 1912-003 
RFB-OP-4-3-OO 2 
EC ;'1115 
SEB12100033- 201 
SE131 2100034-201 
SEB40100095-201 
14-0105 
RFB-OP-4-3-003 
SEBl2100029-001 
SEBl210003Cl- 201 
SEBl210Cl031- 00l 
SEBl2100032-202 
CSD 20542 
EC 30190 
A-1901-OO1 
A-1902-001 
EC 30045 
Non-flight 
Non-flight 
Pressure Garment Assembly 
Constant Wear Garment 
Passive Dosimeter 
Penlights 
Sunglasses 
Sunglass Puch 
Life Vest 
Urine Collection Device 
Pocket Dosimeter 
Chronograph 
Watchband 
Marking Pen 
Mechanical Pencil 
Scissors 
Scissors 
Glove Inserts 
Wrist Dams 
Neck Vent Dams 
Neck Dams 
Heel Plates 
Sole Plates 
Shroud Cutters 
Combination Knife 
Rs t ch et 'Wrench 
Personal Watchband 
Bioinstrumentation System 
1 per crewnan 
401 
400 
1 per crewnan 
402 5 per crew:nan 
403 1 per crewnan 
404 1 per cre\6lan 
404A 1 per crewnan 
405 1 per creWllan 
406 1 per cre\lllan 
414 ~n Senior Pilot 
415 1 per crewnan 
416 1 per cre-..nan 
417 2 per cre-..nan 
418 2 per crewman 
421 ~n Command Pilot 
419 ~n Senior Pilot and Pilot 
1 pair per crewman 
1 pair per crewman 
1 per cre-..nan 
1 per crewman 
1 pair per crewnan 
1 pair per crewman 
422 ~n Senior Pilot 
1 per creWlan 
~n Command Pilot 
1 per crewnan. 
407 1 per cre\llll8n 
ENCLOSURE 1-89 
D - 1 - 46 
ATTACHMENTS: 

Drawing No. 

I-D-OO 56-1 
I-D-OO 56-2 
I-D-0056-3 
I-D-OO 56-4 
I-D-0056-5 
I-D-0056-6 
I-D-0056-7 
I-D-0056-8 
l-D-0056-9 
I-D-0060 
I-D-0062 
SPACECRAFT/ GSE INTERFACE DRAWINGS 
Title 
SC / GSE Status During T-IO Hold - 0021 
SC / GSE Configuration During T-IO Hold - 0007 
SC Range / Launch Vehicle Interfaces T-IO - 0021 
(2 sheets) 
SC / GSE Configuration During T-IO Hold - 0021 
Electrical 
LC-34 EPS / GSE Electrical (General) 
Altitude Chamber SC/ GSE Configuration - 0034A 
LC-34 ECS Airduct 
SC / GSK Configuration During T-IO Hold - 0021 
Mechanical 
LC-3 4 ECS Water Glycol/Oxygen GSE 
ACE-Si C Uplink (Command) Configuration T-IO 
Minutes OCP-K-0021 (Sheet 1 of 2) 
ACE-SI C Downlink (Monitor) Configuration T-IO 
Minute s OCP-K-0021 (Sheet 2 of 2) 
AS-204 Astro Comm Circuits 
ENCLOSURE 1-9 

D-1-47 

SPACECRAFT AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 

CONFIGURATION DURI NG T-IO HOLD 

ELECTRICAL POWER STATUS 
MAIN BUSS POWER ---------------------------~--- EXTERNAL 
BATTERY BUSSES - ----------- -- -------- - ---~-- - -- E~TRY BATTERIES 
BATTERY RELAY BUSS EXTERNAL 
PYROTECHNIC BUSSES ARMED 
LOGIC BUSSES -------------- - ------------------- ARMED 
EMERGENCY DETECTION SYSTEM BUSSES - - ----------- ARMED 
SERVICE MODULE JETTISON CONTROLLERS ----------- OPEN CIRCUIT TO 
SM BATTERIES 
NON-FLIGHT CONDITIONS 
CONDITIONED AIR WAS BEING BLOWN I~O COMMA~~ MODULE BASE AREA 
CRYOGENIC TANKS EMPTY 
NO PROPELLANTS. HELIUM, OR NITROGEN ON BOARD 
WATER GLYCOL RETURN SHUT OFF VALVE (SM) HELD OPEN BY EXTERNAL 
POWER 
PYROS SHORTED, CONNECTORS TIED BACK 
COMMAND MODULE OXYGEN SUPPLIED THROUGH ONE UMBILICAL LINE 
I-D-0056-1 
ENCLOSURE 1-90 
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U(~MII314..? 
11-. D75MII314.3 VI~ 1 I5742 WIPI STRAP 
GROUND ~ 075M06860 , 77 ~ 
POINT BAy I I AI4·01~ 
JII WI120 PI J\5 
JIO I W1I2E> PJ 515J3 
I WI123 515J2 
J5 WII22 C14-316 [ P80 S28
'---- I J6 D-­JI JeO 
I J2 ALL CB'S T 'NAsAT0- I VERIFIED OFF
r-----+--Il J3 ExCEPT (82 
UBE> I I WHICH COULD , 
..---------f1J5 NOT 8£ 
D75M06861 . 77 I 1 ' SCE RTAINEO 
b-_____J--I--qJ4 
- ACE EN CLOSURE L--- -.JI '--_____ 
200 FT LEvEL OF UMS TOWER 
C~ r I ~ L4:," .. ,,;::' .,," 
WIQ42 P52 J S7A2,-w25 ITVI84 
L..­
r 
ACE ROOM 
8lKHO PLATE 
J 
, 
 ill DETAI L 
sIc FLYAWAY 
UMB ILICAL 
A 
QUAD A{SI9 I PI 
NI ? - 824100 PI P I W0431 PI7 
SI9AI P2 b..:."-"'------' 
PI ~ P5 
QUAD B{'9A2 {SOIW3 J30 N17- 82410& P I PI W0318SM IIS02W3 J31 
SI9A2 P2 .... P3 
PI8'9A3 PI_ - P5 
IJI6 {SOIW3 J33 N17- 82410& PI PIQUAD C SM 1'10319 ~ C14-551 
502'113 J34 Pl9 IJI9{ 
P2 .... P3519A3 
P5 

{SOIW3 J~E> 
 N-17 - 8241 0<". PI PI W0430QUAD D SMr", S02W3 J37 
SI9A4 P2~ 
I 
SjM 
Q) DETAIL 
Llc 34 
NOTE : THIS PLUG NOT CONNECTED AS 
OF 2/4/ ~7 Sic - GSE CONFIGURATION DURING T -10 HOLD -0021 ELEe. 
[HIClE JACK 
M 
(AL 
NEeT 
~ 
514 -053 k- SWINCl 
TRIM UN IT 
TWO AN TEN NA HATS 
ONE (1) VHF S-BAND 
LOCATED + Z 
ONE 0) vHF (-BAND 
LOCATED - Y 
ill A14,019 CONNECTEQ 
ACE UP t DOWN LINK 
PANEL 
INDICATOR 
cl M RCS 
OUT 
THERMOCOUPLE ro CI M RCS OxEXTERNAL POWER WITH WES(R TEMP/CHECK MODEl 386H015 
ON BOARD Tv SIMULATORSACE ( AI4-27S- II)AIR DUCT DISCONNECTED - PLATFO RW:lt.8 
H20 GLYCOL - BUBBLE TRAP 
ARM -~ POWER S~PPLY TO H20 GLYCOL 
AI4-27S ' 21 f5\RETURN SHUTOFF 'LOCAL CONTROL ePLAHORM""7 
FOUR Res QUAD \::!/ S/C CONNECTOR T IED BACK WITH NO POWER 
WIG ~;~,~~~~~ dM SIMULATORb VOO-DBS CABLE CONNECTED fROM zavac TO S2~L.'!1~ ~ -­ATTACH EO TO 
UNIT ~ I 
(V2 4 WAS CLOSED) LPLATFORM ". 
@C I4-395FUEL CELL SUBSTITUTE 
LEAD ACID BATT(RIE5 ISOLATED FROM ST~UCTuR£ 
S/( CONTROL -NO CURRENT r PLATFORM*5 
28 voe cst PWR TO THIS~~ THROUGH 
T IU 
I U UWB 1L ICAL 
II 
2BVOC } 0 
STAGE" PWR ON EXTERNAL LV LV - ES£ 
(BUSS 6091, 6092,6093) 
II o BALL POWER 
2B voc - FACllITY (GS E/ s C) AC,CS5/4 - 121l 514 - 019R S(QU(NCIAL RELAYROOMBOTH CIRCULATlNC, POSIT-ION INOlCAT ION C l ~ -3410 VOL TAGE 
e 
~ 
~ 
M::>TE5: 
3. ,9t< 
SE;
2, 0 
, 
/, 0TA 
r, 
7 
____ _ 
-----
ONE v) VHF C-BANO 
LOCATED - Y 
CD A14 · 019 CONNECTED 
ACE UP t DOWN LIN K 
EXTERNAL POWER 
OIS 
ON BOARD TV 
1-'----'-11 ACE 
1'" I I-' 
AI4-275-21 
FOUR Res QUAD 
S/M SI MULAT0'Q) 
TO 5/c THROUC,H THIS 
IU UMBILICAL 
} 
I U 
THE RMOCOU PLE 
PANEL 
INDICATOR 
cl M RCS 
"00-004 \.-f C CUI'® RETURN 
sic CONNECTORfS--C1 __ YOO-065 
Lie 34 
Sic - GSE CONFIGURATION DURING T-IO HOLD -0021 ELEC 
TWO ANTENNA HATS 
ONE ltl VHF S-8AN D 
LO CATED + Z 
200 n _____ 
S I4 - 140 

WiG CANISTER 

ATTACHED TO I-L§Ql.T. ,E~ 

U NIT~I 
(V24 WAS ClOSfO) 
28 voe C.S f PwR 
26VDC 
STAG E PWfl ON EXTEF('NAL LV/LV - ESE 
(BUSS 609 1, o1J'32, 6093) 
o BALL PoweR 
2B VDC - FA(llIT V{GSE/ s C) 
$ 14· 121 ~ $ 14· Ol9R AGCS SEQUfN( IA t F('ELAYROOMBOTH CIRCU LATING 	 POSIT ION INOICAT IONC 1-4 ·34& 
VO LTAGE 
clM 
C0573P467 [ J I 
elM bn. 
$---------{ • J 4 
CO~W3P495 
TO C/ M RCS ox 
WI TH w£8ER TEMP/ CHECK MODH 386H 
SIMULATORS 

(AI4- 275 - II) _ PlATFORM" 6 

28 voe POWER SUPPLY TO H20 C,LVCOL 
SHUTOFF - LOCAL CONTROL PLATFORM"", 

TIED BACK WITH NO POWER r-

CABLE CON"'E5 TED FROM 2eVDC TO S21L:,'1 ....I.~'-
LPLATFOR M "I> 
~8 fT LE VE..L\ 
===- --~O~~___~ 
@ (. 14 - 395fUEL CELL SUBS TIT UTE 

LEAD A( 10 BATTER I ES ISOLATC:O FROM ST~UCTU RE 
 CI4 - 395 si N 2 
si c CONTROL-NO CURRE NT 
 r PLATFORM"'S 
 CLOSED 
C14-395 ~N I 
3 . 	 A'a /TEMS SHOWN W/T,;,I/N COIVJNJ,IlNO M ()[)(I£e /iNO/OP 
ScRm::c MOOI/c.E h'#O/c::lR EU /lRc R:)R ReF CW'c.Y. 
2. 	 (1) DEPICTS VMB /L.!C/it.. ~c.Y- A'WA'Y W),l/C),l /s 
ONLY Gse- CONNECTED m ~c OVR/N'G t../iVA.CA­
TcPM/N..9L COUNTDOWN. 
I. 	 (1) TNRI/@ O£,P/CT ELEC TR/ C A'c. GEe CON'NeC TeO 
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M:lTES: 
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\\..-LAY 
ACE' rlOw 
SENSOR ME"AS. 
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AI4 - 2 7 5 -4 Res S IMULATORS ' PER BOX 
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TO GND OR TO ACE. 
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P2 W002' 
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Cl4 - 548PI W0026 
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I J3 
P3 
P , WOO2S 
P3 	 ,J3 
NOTE . ALL C14-275 ( I RCUIT BREAKERS ON 
@ DETAIL TO JI FLYAWAY 
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~ """ ~ '" ""~"''',,' "" Me. 
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FUEL CELL NO.1 
OUTPU T 
Nl6 - 850105-11 
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SMJC BAT A (-) TERM 
SMJC BAT B (-) TERM 
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_WI .. 
TO 51>1-091 
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~ P£IIt:TllATDI S tl67 
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LOll v[NT TO LOll LCWI ""'LV[ .. 
lQI( fiLL 
TO Gttz 
VAlli[ .. 
TO AM-OIl 
I­
25' - 10" 
33'-6" .1 
AIR LOCK 
_-==:=::::::===:::I§~ " " .11 
CIRCULAR 
STAIRWAY 
, .... +16' - 3" 
PLATFORM 
3 
_ +5' -10" 
PLATFORM 
2 
'" 
;' '" 
;'/ 
./ 
0' - 0" MSOB FLOOR \ ./ 
4-- -2' - 6 " 
PENTRATI 
/l4aPLATFORM 
LUNAR PLANE - 6' - 31" 
\/ 
;' 
;' 
., 
ALTITUDE CHAMBER 
VENE~RATIO /Ie''" 
./ 
./ W I G 
;' SUPPLY 
6 · 
RETURN 
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SPACECRAFT/GSE CONFIGURATION 
0034A 
I'[N[TIIAT ION- Il= .TO AM·OII 
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::: .~~I 
.~ TO 
-•• ~.~!>
.­
~.J :!.... 
< 
---: 
~ ~>~...~ ~ 
,...f­
-
L...­
-
PEN£1 
#61 
....:::] 
<;> 
S/M 
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PLATFORM 
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25' - 10" 
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SPACECRAFTlGSE CONFIGURATION 
0034A 
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E. SUPPORTING DATA 
LIST OF 	REFERENCES 
The following documents arc rderell ceu in this report and <lre availahle lrom the Apollo 204 Review 
Board, General File . 
Number R eferen ce 
1-1 	 "Spacecraft 012 Configllr:llion Index". Jan. 29, 1%7 , ;\Jorth ..\merican :\viation, Inc . 
Process Datil RC'!,<lrl \:(), 1;4H7-lfi; Pand 1 Referen ce 0Jo, 1· j) ·nO()(i 
" Spacec raft 012 Ind ent ured Parts Lis,", .Jan , 2H, I'jh7. :\onh ,\merican ,'\v,<ltion. Inc . 
Process Data Report '.:0 , l i487-14; Panel I Reference No, I -U-()()07 , 
1-:3 	 "Apollo Intcrhce Document , Instrument L' ll it I() SfJacecJ'<.lft Ph ysical }{cqw J'l ',nents", 
Saturn ! Apollo ,\\ccilanicai Integration Panel. IC D I :~ \1 2().IIIH P;lnel I Reference \:0, 
I·D -009i , 
1-4 	 "Interface Control Document Definition ot S;ltlll'l1 S \ ·204 , and ,\fJollo c::, / ( : 012 Elect ­
rical Interface" , Apollo S;-tturn Electrical Pa nel. leO 40 \1 :37.')()HA; Panel 1 Referen cc 
No , I-D-OO% , 
1 -.') 	 " l.<.lunch ComfJlex 34 Checklist , H)-I-:. IOdl1 Oct , 2,') . 19!ih , :'\onh .\mcrican Avia­
tioll , Inc. ; ( Pan el 7 f) ;] ta), 
1-0 	 "GS E Functional Integ ra t("d System SdH'lTl .. .; ('~, SP;I(' ('(J'dft Ol:l i« 014 , l::TR I.C-34 " , 
North American Aviation, Inc, Oocumem No , C; I t · l)()OC) I 2; Panel I Reference No, 1. 
D-0094, 
1-7 	 " L aunch Countdown , Preliminary Revinv Ilocumcll l. FO- K·OOO/" . ran , 17 _ 1967, 
North America n Aviation , Inc.; Panel I Reference :.Jo , I-D-OI()!) , 
1-8 	 " Inter-Center Interface Conlrol Oocl1mc fli l .ng ' , :"\lonlhlv Puhlication. ,\'iarshalJ Space 
Flight Center , NASA; Panel 1 Referen c (: ~!' . [) -()102 , 
1-9 	 " Space Vehicle Plugs Out IntC'gratcd Te:; t , r:O · K·()(J21·1 " . J an, 25 , J.%7, North .-\m­
erica n Aviation, Inc ,; ( Panel 7 Data), 
1-10 	 " Summary of Spacecraft Configur?llun Diiferences ' , Apollo 204 Review Board, Spacccra ft 
and GSE Configuration, Panel 1 Reference:'--io I ·O·009R , 
I-II 	 "Spacecraft 012 Configuration \'cli fi ca t ion Record (CVR )" , January 2H. 19m, North 
American AviatlOll, Inc" Florida ; Facility CVR ; Panel I Reference No, 1-D-002, 
1-12 	 " List of EO 's Partially Accomplished Spacerrilft 012 at Time of Accident " , Panel 
Reference No . I · D-O()20 , 
1-13 	 "EO's Outstanding Against S I C 012 ;\;01 ill Florida FaCili ty C\'R Tab Run", Panel 
1 Reference No , l -O -0024 , 
1-14 	 " Spacecraft 012 Test and Acceptance In spr(, IJ.m Prport (TAIR i", ( ranel 0 Dat a) 
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1-15 " Spacecraft 012 Controls Configuration", Panel 1 Reference No. 1-0-0058. 
1-16 "Comparison of S IC 012 Operational and Experimental GFE /CFE Stowed Equipment 
for K-0034A-1 and K-0021-1, Letter from CF22/Team Leader, Apollo 204. to Chair­
man, Panel 1, February 21, 1967. Panel 1 Reference No. 1-0-0099. 
1-17 " Items on 
1-0­011. 
Crew at Ingress", R. A. Mitchell, February 6 , 1967, Panel 1 Reference No . 
1-18 "Initial Report on S IC Configuration", February 1, 1967, by W. F . Edson and C . O. 
Gay; Panel 1 Reference No. 1-0-0003. 
1-19 "S /C /GSE Configuration Comparison", Panel 1 Reference No. 1-0-0093 . 
1-20 " Support Operations Investigation. AS-204 Incident , Panel No. 1 GSE and Spacecraft 
Configuration". submitted by Chief, Launch Facilities Division, KSC, Panel 1 Refer­
ence No . 1-0-0095. 
1-21 "I nventory of Levels A:6, 1\-7 , 
Panel 1 Reference No. 1-0-0101. 
A-8 (L(; ::\4 Service Structure)", February 23 , 1967, 
1-22 " Report - Test Configurations of Remote Test Monitoring and Control Equipments", 
Panel 1, March 9, 1967; Panel 1 Reference No . 1-0-0091. 
1-23 "Crew Abbreviated Checklist - Mission 
Spacecraft Center; (Panel 7 Data) . 
AS-204", January 23, 1967. NASA Manned 
1-24 "Summary Comparison, S IC 008 Thermal Vacuum Test No . 3 and S IC 012 Plugs 
Out Test (OCP-K­0021)" , March 10, 1967, Panel 1; Panel 1 Reference No . 1-0-0092. 
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TEST ENVIRONMENTS PA N EL 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 20'1 Revicw Board cstablishcd thc Tcst Envi ronmcnts Panel , ~. Thc task assigned for 
accomplishment by Panel 2 was prescrihcd as follows: 
Provide history . of all test environments encountcred by this Spacccraft on a major asscmhly. 
total assembly basis which arc germain to validation of systcms from fire hazard standpoint. In· 
c1ude appropriate qualification tcsting of systems and suhsystcms. Particular emphasis should he 
placed on qualification tests in pure oxygen with regard to prcssurcs , tcmperaturc, time of cx· 
posure, and simulation of equipment malfunction. Indicate any deficiencics in this test program 
related to the subject problem. Also, include comparison with previous tcsts of appropriate flight, 
housc, or boilerplate spacecraft. Any' problems encountered relatcd to fire hazard shall bc docu­
mented. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP 
The 	assigned task was accomplished by the following mcmbcrs of thc Tcst Environments Panel: 
Mr. W. F. Hoyler, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Ccnter (\1SC), ':\ASA 
Mr. B. J . McCarty, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. C. F. Key, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) , NASA 
Mr. C. O . Baker, North American Aviation , Inc. (NAA) 
Mr. A. E. Toelken, North American Aviation , Inc. ( l\'AA) 
Mr. H. J . Dunham, General Electric Company (GE) 
Mr. C. M . Nolen, General Electric Company (GE) 
2. 	COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER 
Mr. G. C. White, Jr., NASA Headquarters, was assigned to monitor the Test Environments Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. GENERAL PROCEEDINGS 
This Panel planned and implemented a review of all tests for histories pertinent to the investiga· 
tion. Attention was focused primarily upon oxygen test histories of the crew compartment systems , and 
arcing and shorting problems experienced during those tests. However, all cnvironments were reviewed 
for rationale used in original derivation , substantiation by ground and flight veh.icle tests. and margins 
imposed when implemented into component level tests. The other environments were examined as possibly 
being germain to the cause of the accident from an indirect standpoint. These reviews included the 
vibration, heating, and humidity environments. 
The qualification tests were reviewed at MSC and involved examination of more than lOOO docu· 
ments. The vehicle level tests were reviewed at l\' AA , Downey, California, and included a review of 
another 500 or more related documents . Summaries of these efforts were reviewed by the Panel at 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to seek out any test program deficiencies. 
Other related oxygen fires which have occurred in and out of the Apollo Program were investi­
gated to detennine areas of similarity. 
The difference in qualification, or component level tests, and flight vehicle tests should be pointed 
out before the discussion of testing which follows. In the qualification tests, the component is subjected 
to design limit conditions sequent ially and / or simultaneously, is essentially worn out by the end of its 
test program, and is never flown. In vehicle level tests, a considerable amount of functional testing is 
261- 106 0 - 67 - 5 	 D-2-3 
performed, but always under nominal conditions, rather than design limit conditions. 
2. OXYGEN TEST HISTORY 
Summaries of oxygen test history are given by Enclosure 2-1, for Spacecraft (S/C) 008, 009, 011, 
and 012, and by Enclosure 2-2 for component level tests. Details of these histories (References 2-4 and 
2-5) are in the Apollo 204 J.3..eview Board General File. 
The Certification Test Specification (CTS), SID 65-1210, recognized that ground operations would 
involve short duration high pressure oxygen exposure. It specified 14.7 pounds per square inch absolute 
(psia) pressure of 95 per cent oxygen for four hours, and 21 psia with 14.7 psia partial pressure oxygen 
for two hours. Although few subsystems experienced this requirement in the component level tests (En­
closure 2-2), most cabin subsystems were exposed to this environment in the SIC 008 tests (Enclosure 
2-1). About half of the components of the Environmental Control System were tested to the MIL­
STD 810 exposure proof test, which is a somewhat more positive test against fire hazards than is 
oxygen explosure per se. 
The original CCOH «combined contaminant, oxygen, and humidi ty) test was established in early 
1965. It was unrealistic. being based upon MIL-STD 810 which is established as an accelerated test 
of the atmospheric conditions an aircraft would experience under years of service in sea coastal re­
gions. The Apollo SIC is maintained in a controlled atmosphere during manufacture and at KSC. Be­
cause of this. early in 1966. the test was established as being 8 hours of salt spray. 50 hours of dry 
oxygen exposure at 5 psia. and 120 hours of humid oxygen exposure. Cold-plate mounted equipment was 
temperature cycled during the humid oxygen exposure. 
Nearly all of the cabin electrical equipment was subjected to the CCOH test, or to the MIL­
STD 810 explosion proof test. Some were not actually tested, but were qualified by being similar in 
design to another tested component. 
3. VEHICLE TEST COMPARISON 
During SIC 008 testing, the cabin equipment was exposed to approximately 18 hours of oxygen 
exposure (6.5 hours unmanned, 11.5 hours manned) at concentrations of 90 per cent or higher and 
pressure of one atmosphere or greater. SIC 012 experienced 8 hours and 30 minutes of manned test­
ing under similar oxygen concentrations and pressures. Neither SIC 009 nor 011 were subjected to 
oxygen concentrations above 75 percent during either ground testing or flight. 
4. ETHYLENE GLYCOL LEAKS IN COMMAND MODULE 012 
Command Module (C/M) 012 experienced water/ethylene glycol leaks and spillages. This is re­
ported in detail by Panel 8. Panel 2, concerned that the connectors had been broken open during 
the cleaning process, recommended test requirements to Panel 16 to verify the effectiveness of the clean­
ing techniques. 
5. ARCING AND SHORTING PROBLEMS 
The evaluation of anomalies considered relevant to possible causes of, or contributors to, a fire 
was focused on C/M 012 checkout and test experience, and the certification test program. All discrep­
ancy and failure records at NAA and KSC were reviewed to identify arcing and shorting anomalies. 
The review included both resolved and unresolved anomalies so that the corrective action planned or 
taken could be reassessed. The significant anomalies were then classified as either likely or remotely 
possible candidates relative to possible bearing on a spacecraft fire. 
Although many hundreds of records were reviewed in the course of this anomaly investigation, 
only those considered most significant are included in this report. Enclosures 2-4 and 2-5 summarize 
these anomalies encountered during certification testing and C/M 012 testing, respectively. 
6. 	EQUIPMENT USED FOR TEST ONLY 
C/M 012 was configured with some equipment which was installed for test only. This equipment, 
D-2-4 
necessary to monitor test. parameters or permit system operation, etc., during ground tests, would be 
replaced with flight hardware or removed prior to launch. However, investigation disclosed some equip­
ment of this nature remained in the crew compartment during manned ground tests. Equipment fall­
ing in this category was reviewed for aspects of test history and failures which might reflect a possible 
cause of the accident. Two of the items of this type which were on C/M 012 and perhaps relevant 
to the accident were the Elapsed Time Indicators and the Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) canisters. 
Elapsed Time Indicators (ETI) required to measure the total operating time of selected subsystems 
were installed on 15 units of cabin equipment. By virtue of their requirement to record total operating 
time on limited life equipment, they remain installed at all times until just prior to flight. Test history 
of the ETl's indicated that in one case a fire hazard existed. An ETI on the Caution and Warning 
System had failed by shorting and was found distorted and cracked due to excessive heat. Subsequent 
examination of C/M 012 absolved the ETI as an area of concern. 
LiOH canisters installed in the Environmental Control System (ECS) were being utilized for test 
only. This type canister had previously failed certification tests due to powdering of LiOH pellets under 
vibration. 
Equipment which was not required to be on-board during flight did not receive the intense and 
repeated scrutiny imposed on flight hardware. This was recognized by restricting the use of non-flight 
hardware. 
7. OTHER OXYGEN FIRES 
Data and documentation on four non-Apollo manned experiments In which there were fires were 
accumulated and reviewed. Failure and trouble reports on two Apollo ECS explosions and one Apollo 
ECS fire were reviewed. This review was summarized (Enclosure 2-6) and forwarded to PanelS. 
8 . ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS 
Environments, other than oxygen exposure, were reviewed to seek out any possible deficiency that 
may have contributed indirectly to the accident. 
a. Temperatures 
Temperature requirements were derived from wind tunnel data and heat transfer analyses, 
then later substantiated and/or modified by ground vehicle test data (S/C 008), and flight data. 
Flight data from SIC 009 and 011 boost conditions indicate Service Module (S/M) shell temper­
atures of about 2000F which is within the 4000F design temperature. 
The SIC 008 vehicle was tested in a vacuum chamber, with solar heat generators and cold 
walls, to verify orbital temperature distribution. These tests confirmed that the equipment in the 
C/M will experience temperatures in the +30°F to +90°F range. The equipment is qualified to 
temperatures from +5°F to +145°F. 
b. 	Acceleration 
Acceleration test levels were defined on the basis of maximum conditions expected during 
boost, entry, and abort. The peak acceleration during ascent occurs just prior to first stage separ­
ation and is 4.9 g along the x axis; lateral accelerations are much lower (1.85 g maximum at 
lift-off). The peak acceleration for the mission occurs during abort or entry, and is expected to be 
10 g. Test conditions are typically 6 g along each of 3 mutually perpendicular axes for S/M 
equipment and 20 g for C/M equipment. Acceleration levels experienced during the S/M 011 
flight were well within expected limits. 
c. Vibration 
In this area of testing for the effect of repeated stresses there are trade - offs between the level 
of stress introduced by .... ibration and the number of times stresses of a given level are repeated. 
Thus, a given level for a given time may be a proper simulation of a higher level for a shorter 
time period and may give a more useful answer than the latter. These facts are reflected in the 
qualification test program for the 012 Spacecraft components. 
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(1) Apollo Program Testing 
The vibration levels for qualification testing of components were originally established on 
the basis of data from other programs. These data were used to define a spectrum of flight vibration 
levels which would be expected along each axis of the Spacecraft throughout the frequency range 
of 20 to 2000 cycles per second. The components were qualified by subjecting them to a random 
vibration throughout this frequency range at the expected flight level. The length of these tests, 
which was 15 minutes along each axis, was several times the expected duration of vibratory exci­
tation during atmospheric flight. Some component vibration tests were conducted using electro­
magnetic shakers and the remaining components were tested with acoustic excitation. 
Ground test Service Module 006 and Service Module and Command Module 007 were 
acoustically excited in a reverberation chamber at a level which corresponded to the estimated 
external vibration levels which would be applied to the complete Spacecraft in actual flight. These 
tests showed that the interior vibration levels which were experienced by the components were high­
er than the originally established criteria. New criteria, corresponding to the levels obtained in 
these ground tests on 006 and 007, were established and all components were requalified to this 
higher expected flight level. The duration of the new component qualification tests was decreased 
to one-third, that is, from 16 minutes per axis to 5- 113 minutes per axis. The 5 -J 13 minutes dur­
ation is still three times the amount of time the Spacecraft will experience significant vibration levels 
during the ascent flight out of the atmosphere. 
The flight test data from Spacecraft 002, 009, and 011 verified the flight vibration level 
criteria used in the ground tests of 006 and 007. 
Components used in flight spacecraft are given flight acceptance vibration testing which 
is like the qualification testing except that the vibraton level is 25 per cent of the expected flight 
level and the duration is only about one (1) minute. 
No complete flight spacecraft, including 012, was given flight acceptance vibration tests. 
(2) Vibration Test Philosophy 
There are two basic philosophies regarding flight acceptance vibration testing. Some be­
lieve that flight acceptance vibration tests are an essential tool in verifying that a component or 
system of proven design (proven in qualification testing) does not have workmanship defects. Others 
believe that flight acceptance vibration tests of actual flight hardware may degrade the equipment 
and produce incipient failure. This possibility of potential degradation of flight equipment is very 
real. A dilemma is presented, therefore, in deciding how to best insure reliability of flight hard­
ware and to balance the risk of having undetected defective hardware against the risk of creating 
an incipient failure in the acceptance test. This dilemma is particularly acute in manned flight 
programs. 
At the component level, this risk was balanced on the Gemini program by acceptance 
testing at 75%of the expected flight level and on Apollo by acceptance testing at 25% of the flight 
level. Both programs tested the components for a duration of one (1) minute in each axis. The 
reduced levels and durations of the tests were such that defective items would likely be noted but 
the risk of creating incipient failure was minimized. In Gemini one complete flight spacecraft (No.2) 
and the first manned flight spacecraft (No.3) were subjected to 75% flight level vibration testing. 
This testing revealed no design or workmanship deficiencies. At that time, it was decided to elim­
inate testing of the follow-on Gemini Spacecraft. In Apollo, no complete spacecraft intended for 
flight has been given vibration acceptance tests . 
d. Shock 
Shock levels for the C / M and S/M were determined analytically and then modified by flight 
and landing impact test vehicles. There are no significant flight shock levels for the S/ M and the 
Service Module / Lunar Module Adapter (SLA) . The C/M equipment is tested to shock levels of 
78 g's. The maximum shock level measured was 75.8 g's on the main display console during 
drop number 104 on S IC 2S-1, which represented a "worst-case" water drop. 
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e . Test Levels on Two ECS Components 
As typical examples, the following are some of the specific environmental test levels imposed 
on two Environmental Control System components during the qualification test program: 
Service Module Command Module 
(Nitrogen Regulator Used (Oxygen Flow Restricter 
as Typical Componen t Utilized as Typical 
Component) 
Temperature o - 2000 F Fluid flow governed temperature 
extremes on this i tern, rather than 
the cabin atmospheric temperature 
Vibration 0.1 g2/c ps 
90 - 250 cps, decreasing 
to 0.012 at 2000 cps 
0.06 g2/ cps, 
80 - 400 cps, decreasing 
3 db-oct. to 2000 cps 
Acceleration 7 g's along the longitudinal axis 20 g's, 5 minutes per axis 
Shock Not applicable 78 g's (ECS equipment also 
receives tumbling abort shock 
test) 
f. Results of Environmental Review 
In reviewing the environments, and the manner in which they were implemented into tests, 
it appears there is a fundamental difference in philosophy in the way Apollo and Gemini programs 
treated the vibration environment. 
There are two prevailing philosophies concerning acceptance vibration. Some feel that vibra­
tion is a very effective acceptance "tool" for exposing defective workmanship. They feel that flight 
hardware should be acceptance tested at expected flight level vibration for a short period, but 
only if the equipment is qualified to flight levels for long periods. Others feel that if the flight 
equipment is vibrated at flight levels for acceptance, it will be degraded. 
In the Gemini program the former philosophy prevailed . Equipment was qualified to greater 
than flight level vibration for 15 minutes per axis, which permitted several one minute acceptance 
vibration tests. The Apollo program qualifies equipment to vibration for only 320 seconds per 
axis, which permits only li.mited high level vibration acceptance tests. 
High level vibration acceptance tests expose amplitude sensitive faults in wiring connectors, 
such as cold solder joints. These faults , if not exposed and corrected, can eventually be manifested 
as failures by subtle combinations of other environments, such as pressure-temperature . 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. 	FINDING 
All crew compartment equipment was not tested to be explosion proof. 
DETERMINATION 

There was insufficient testing of possible ignition sources. 
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2. FINDING 
Crew compartment equipment of C/M 012 was exposed to water ethylene glycol contamination. 
Untested cleaning techniques were employed for that equipment discovered to be wet. 
3 . FINDING 
Some of the C/M cabin equipment exhibited arcing or shorting during either certification or SIC 
012 testing. There is no positive way to determine from the records reviewed whether SIC anomalies 
(possibly caused by a short or an arc) are reviewed by systems engineers and the test conductor prior 
to a test. 
DETERMINATION 

Review of possible ignition sources prior to manned testing was inadequate. 

4. FINDING 
Not all equipment installed' in C/M 012 at the time of the accident was intended to be flown. 
Some components were installed for test purposes only. 
DETERMINATION 

The suitability of this equipment in the C/M for this test was not established. 

5. FINDING 
Non-certified equipment was installed in the C/M at the time of the accident. The "cobra cable" 
PIN V16-601263 and "T" adapter PIN V16-601396 are examples. 
DETERMINATION 

The suitability of this equipment in the C/M for this test was not established. 

6, FINDING 
The design required the mating and demating of "hot" electrical connectors as normal crew pro­
cedure. Changing to a spare "cobra cable" is an example. 
DETERMINATION 

The practice of breaking "hot" electrical circuits introduces fire initiation hazards. 

E. SUPPORTING DATA 
This section contains the following Enclosures to which Section C refers: 
Enclosure 
2-1 Vehicle Test Summary 
2-2 Summary of oxygen test history of component level tests 
2-3 Not Used 
2-4 Summary of significant certification test anomalies involving possible ignition sources 
2-5 Summary of significant C/M 012 anomalies involving possible ignition sources 
2-6 Summaries of other oxygen fires 
2-7 Glossary of terms 
2-8 List of References 
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SUMMARY OF OXYGEN TEST HISTORY OF COMPONENT 

LEVEL TESTS 

Total Equipments in Cabin by Subsystem which Use, Control or Distribute Electricity 
SUBSYSTEM NUMBER NUMBER RECEIVING EXPLOSION TEST 
Pyro Devices 2 0 
Sequence Systems 6 0 
Environmental Control 
System (ECS) 
68 32 
16 
Received MIL-STD 810 
Explosion Proof Test 
Qualified by Similarity 
Crew Equipment 3 0 
Stabilization & Control 
System (SCS) 
12 11 Received 02 Test at 14.7 psia 
Guidance & Navigation 
(G&N) 
19 18 Received 02 Test at 14.7 psi a 
Instrumentation 12 0 
Communi cations 32 14 Received 02 Test at 14.7 rs ia 
Electrical 47 0 
Displays and Cont. 14 0 
Subtotal 215 
GFE 15 3 
1 
Received MIL-STD 810 
Explosion Proof Test 
Received O2 Test at 14.7 psia 
TOTALS 230 96 
35 	 Equipments received MIL-STD 810 Explosion Proof Test 
44 	 Equipments received Oxygen Tests at 14.7 psia. 
G&N Oxygen Test duration was 22 hours. All other Oxygen Tests were 4 hours duration. 
Remaining equipments received oxygen tests at 5 psia pressure, with duration varying from one 
hour to 640 hours. Most of the ECS components were tested for 640 hours. 
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SUMMARII'.S OF OTIlER OXYGEN FIRES 
A review of one unmanned and lour manned experimcnts in which thcrc wcrc fircs shows that the 
exact ignition source in four of thc fires was undetermincd. Thcy wcre believcd to be electrical in 
nature . The only fatalities occurrcd in thc two accidents in which therc was a flash firc. In all five 
fires, inadequate safety precautions had been taken to either prcvcnt or cxtinguish thc firc or to protec t 
the occupants. 
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, SEPTEMBER 9, 1962 
A fire occurred in the Space Cabin Simulator at Brooks Air Forcc Basc on Scptemhcr 9, 19fi2 . 
Test conditions were 1) Jlsia 100 perc('III oxygen and the tcst had bcen in progress fourtcen days 
at the time of the fire. The odor removal system uscd activated charcoal and the Carhon Dioxide 
(C02) removal system had an aluminum cover and consistcd of a ."iOO·pound bcd of a mixture of HI)­
percent calcium hydroxide and 20 -perce nt barium hydroxide. Thc Environmcntal Control Systcm cir­
culated cabin air progressively through the hydroxide , the charcoal, through thc temperaturc controller 
(electric heater and refrigerant evaporator coil), then through an a luminum duct to the circulation fan. 
From the fan , ducts distributed air over thc area bchind the electronic test panel (cyclomotor). The 
air then leaked through openings in the panel back into thc cabin. 130th occupants worc pressure suits 
and one was aslcep. Immediately upon noticing a glow behind the cyclomotor, onc occupant awokc 
the other, grabbed a C02 extinguisher, and fought the fire un til he (olla psetl Irom smoke inh ala tion. 
The awakened occupant immediately opened his face platc with the apparent intention of donn ing an 
oxygen mask , but he collapsed from smoke inhalation before he could get a mask or assist in cxting­
uishing the fire . Both occupants were treated for smoke inhalation and neither received burns. Therc 
was no flash fire and damage was confined to the end of the chamber in thc vicinity of the cyclo­
motor. Photographs of the aluminum duct immediately downstream of the temperature controller show 
definite signs of an implosion- explosion in the duc t with a three-inch to four-inch diameter hole 
burned through one duct wall at the center of the imploded area. This was never fully clarified during 
the investigation and testimony revealed insufficient fuel had been consumed (burned) in the vicinity 
of the hole to melt the aluminum. Testimony also revealed . that a small explosion could have occurred 
in the duct without being heard by either of thc helmeted occupants. The investigating board con­
cluded that the most likely source of ign ition was a short or arc in an undetermined electronic com­
ponent behind the cyclomotor panel. 
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, JANUARY 31,1967 
A second fire occurred on January 31, 1967, in the same Brooks Air Force Base facility described 
in the first accident. Test conditions were 7.2 psia 100 -perce nt oxygen. The test was in the first day 
of a planned 67-day test to study hematology of 16 rabbits. Two men had been in the simulator 12 
minutes at the time of the fire, which was fatal to both. Both men suffered second and third degree 
burns over 90 percent of their ' bodies. An outside observer witnessed a flash fire which engulfed the 
chamber. A final report by the investigating. board is at present unavailable and details of the facility 
design , and its differences with the design at the time of the 1962 fire, are therefore also unavailable. 
However, progress reports of the investigating board have provided the foliowing information . Examina­
tion of the blower motor after the fire showed that the impeller was binding against the motor case 
and application of power to the motor resulted in blowing the fuses. Relationship of the motor mal­
function to start of the fire has not yet been determined. The motor was downstream of the C02 
absorbent bed. A short has been positively identified in an unspecified electrical fixture . The unanimous 
opinion of the investigating board and its observers-advisors and consultants is that the most probable 
cause of the fire was the existence of a combustible atmosphere within the chamber. The combustible 
atmosphere is believed (by the board) to be primarily hydrogen and possibly included hydrocarbons 
as a result of the animal experiment. Experiments conducted on-site have conclusively shown that the 
C02 absorbent reacted with water and aluminum and generated hydrogen. The ducting and the C02 
absorber materials are the same as at the time of the 1962 fire ; i.e., 80 percent calcium hydroxide and 
20 percent barium hydroxide in aluminum ducting. There is evidence of intensc heat in the C02 ab­
sorbent bed and intense exothermic chemical reactions were present in the air conditioning ducl. This 
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can 'be explained by an additional reaction which would have resulted from aluminum and iron oxide 
being reacted in the presence of a hydrogen-oxygen flame which can cause fusing of metals such as 
stainless steel, chromium, and other metals. This is known as a "thermite reaction" and the AF Ma­
terials Laboratory has determined that it can be initiated at 2352"F, the reactants being stainless steel 
and oxygen. The reaction is self-sustaining and reaches a temperature of 2550 to 2650"F. The reaction 
is suppressed in the presence of steam or about 35 percent C02. A possible source of the initiating 
temperature is the burning tape which was around the top of the C02 absorber filters. This tape can 
initiate the oxygen/ stainless steel reaction in three seconds in 14.7 psia oxygen, but its burning tempera­
ture is as yet unknown in 7 psia oxygen. The C02 fire extinguishers were not removed from their 
holders and examination of the three oxygen regulators show no indication of malfunction. Ignition 
sources were considered by the investigation board to include an arc from an electrical short, an elec­
trostatic spark, a friction spark, spontaneous oxidation, heated surfaces (particularly those which might 
have been in the C02 absorbent bed), heated surfaces from friction or hot wire, the electrical motor 
downstream of the CO2 absorbent bed, clothing which might have ignited on contact with a heated 
surface or as a result of spontaneous oxidation, or ignition of a sponge, chair cushion, or rabbit fur 
from either an electrostatic discharge or spontaneous oxidation. A short in a lighting fixture wire was 
determined to be the most probable source of ignition. 
NAVY EXPERIMENTAL DIVING UNIT, FEBRUARY 16,1965 
A fire occurred in the decompression chamber of the Navy's Experimental Diving Unit (EDU) 
at Washington, D.C. on February 16, 1965. Conditions at the time of the fire were 28-percent oxygen 
36-percent nitrogen, and 36 -percent helium at a total pressure of 55.6 psia (92 feet depth) or an 
oxygen partial pressure of 15 .6 psia. About eleven minutes after entering the chamber (via a lock) 
from an adjacent chamber at 126 psia (250-foot depth) one of the divers reported the fire . Two ob­
servers at a viewing port observed a fire four inches in diameter and two feet high coming from the 
C02 scrubber immediately prior to a flash fire which engulfed the entire chamber. During the next 
minute, chamber pressure rose to 130 psi a (260-foot depth). Attempts to rescue were unsuccessful and 
both occupants died. The CO2 scrubber was portable and was designed for use as an emergency 
device for submarine atmosphere control and consisted of a tub containing six cylindrical tubes. The 
center tube contained the fan motor and outer tubes contained four C02. absorbent canisters and 
one filter element. Flow of chamber air through the scrubber was down through the four absorber 
canisters and up and out throug·h the filter unit. The absorber elements consisted of a cylindrical metal 
can with metal screens on each end. The metal cylinder and screen materials are unidentified. The 
absorber chemical was the same as that in use at the time of both Brooks' fires; i .e., 80 percent cal­
cium hydroxide and 20-percent barium hydroxide. The "tub" which housed the entire scrubber assembly 
was made of an unidentified metal. The filter element was made of convolute~ IJaper _(probably Kraft) 
cylinders supported on the inside by a perforated metal (iron) cylinder and at the ends with stamped 
aluminum covers cemented to cardboard rings which are in turn cemented to the convoluted paper. 
Each unused unit weighs 2.1 pounds of which paper and cemented end rings comprise 1 pound. In­
vestigation determined that primary use for this filter was in hydraulic systems and in the fuel systems 
of jet aircraft, and that common practice is to test every single filter element by immersion in an 
organic liquid and, while submerged, blow air through the filter to see if flaws existed at the seals 
of the paper. Tests were performed on two unused filter elements identical in design to the accident­
involved filter. An acetone extraction on one showed that it probably contained about 0.3 to 0.4 pounds 
of kerosene-like liquid. This is consistent with the filter specification which lists maximum dry unit weight 
at 1.8 pounds. This also shows that the dry weight of the paper and end rings is 0.7 pound, arrived 
atbysubtractingtotalwieghtof metal (2.1-1.0= 1.1) from the 1.8 pounds total dry weight. A second filter 
was placed in a C02 scrubber, witho~t C02 absorbent installed and operated for 2 hours. From this 
test, it was determined that the volatile liquids would be removed from the filter in 5 to 10 hours 
depending upon temperature and flow rate through the unit. The accident-involved filter was one of 
two supplied with the scrubber which had 1-1/2 to 2 years of intermittent use and the time logged on 
each filter is unknown. The used filter not involved in the accident had no "hydrocarbon" odor and an 
acetone extraction of the paper revealed a weight loss of only 10.2 percent compared to 36 percent loss 
on an unused filter. Samples from the used filter and an unused filter were subjected to high-frequency 
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discharge (Tesla coil) in' a stream of oxygen. The unused filter ignited easily and the flame spread 
rapidly whereas the used filter required .'i 10 7 seconds of continuous discharge, ignited at the edge of 
the paper, and did not burn readily. From these tests, it was concluded that most or all of the easily 
ignitable material (hydrocarbon) had been removed from the filter by use prior to the EDU fire and 
that a rather strong ignition source would have been required to ignite it. A bench test of the scrubber 
motor after the fire showed that it ran at a reduced speed and rapidly overheated, the condition being 
caused by faulty operation of the centribgal throw-out switch which resulted in the motor running on 
starting windings. The EDU had no provisions for odor removal (such as activated charcoal). The fire 
caused extensive damage including complete consumption of untreateed cotton terry-cloth bath robes 
and about twelve feet of flexible air conditioning duct made of fabric-covered spiral wire. Untreated 
cotton mattresses with flame-proof covers were partially consumed. About five feet of the rubber on the 
unarmored electric cord to the portable scrubber was consumed as was rubber of armor-covered cables 
directly above the C02 scrubber. A simplified calculation by Naval Research Laboratory personnel 
showed that the pressure rise experienced during the fire would have caused a 761°F temperature rise 
and that the temperature rise would require the burning of only about l.1 pounds of cellulosic material, 
i.e., cotton or perhaps wood-based paper in the filter. The investigation concluded that the most pro­
bable cause of the fire was the overheated scrubber motor causing spontaneous ignition of the filter 
element in a high-oxygen atmosphere. Fire extinguishing equipment consisted of a bucket of sand and 
a bucket of water, neither of which was used . 
NAVY AIR CREW EQUIPMENT LABORA TORY, NOVEMBER l7, 1962 
A fire occurred in the Navy 's Air Crew Equipment Laboratory (ACEL) on November 17, 1962. 
Test conditions were 100 percent oxygen at 5 psi a and the fire occurred on the 17th day of the test. 
The fire started on the insulation of the ground wire to a light fixture. The ground wire was loose 
and an arc ignited the insulation. One of the four occupants tried to smother the fire with a towel 
which also ignited. Further attempts with an as bestos blanket resulted in ignition of the blanket and 
clothing worn by occupants. Subsequent attempts by all four to extinguish fire on the clothing of others 
resulted in the ignition of the clothing of all four, generally on the sleeves and pants legs. One occu­
pant's hand caught on fire. All occupants escaped in about 40 seconds after first report of the fire 
and all were treated for first and second degree burns over 15 to 20 percent of their bodies. Immedia­
tely after exit of the occupants the door was closed, the chamber taken to 80,000 feet and purged for 
20 minutes with C02 to extinguish the fire. There was no flash fire and there were no extinguishers 
in the chamber. 
APOLLO ECS FIRE AT AIRESEARCH TORRANCE FACILITY, APRIL 28, 1966 
A fire occurred in an unmanned qualification test of the Apollo Environmental Control System at 
Torrance, California, on April 28, 1966. Test conditions at, and 23.5 hours prior to the fire, were 100 
percent oxygen at 5 psia. Prior to bringing the test up to 5 psia, the test had included 2456 hours 
at lO - 4 millimeters of mercury (Torr). The investigating board concluded that the most probable cause 
of the fire was failure of a commercial quality strip heater used to add heat to the steam duct. The 
strip heater used polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation and the manufacturer's temperature rating was 
167°F continuous, 190"F maximum in air. There was a sharp bend in the heater strip bear ing against an ECU 
power lead splice at the heater strip entry into asbestos tape wrapped over the steam duct in the test set-up. 
Under high temperature conditions, the heater tape wire was demonstrated to extrude through the PVC 
insulation and a fire was initiated under simulated test conditions. Three other ignition causes were 
considered as possibilities. Strip heaters of the same type' as above, but covered with aluminum foil, 
were on the potable water and dew point line sensor. Deterioration of insulation could have caused a 
short between one of the wires and the aluminum foil. Dew point measurements within the cabin showed 
that some metal surface temperatures were such that water could have condensed on them causing 
arcing on open terminal strips, unpotted connectors, or the 400-cycle unit, igniting adjacent materials. 
One of the ECU high pressure oxygen check valves , which use an elastomeric (DPR) seal, was severly 
damaged and it was theorized that high pressure " impact " of the 900 psia oxygen could have ignited 
the EPR. AiResearch ran a series of 3000 psi impact tests without ignition, and although the test re­
sults were not absolutely conclusive, it was concluded that this was the least probable of the possible 
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causes presented. Other damage caused by the fire included excessively burned insulation of the test 
set-up wiring, fusing and burning of ECU wire harness , and burned polyurethane foam insulation on 
the oxygen and water-glycol lines. The investigating board concluded that, although 16 components had 
malfunctioned prior to and during the test and 18 had failed due to damage by the fire, the ECS quali­
fication unit was not the direct cause of the fire. Also, test equipment and materials were improper for 
the environment, there was no fire detection or extinguishing equipment, and there were no emergency 
procedures. The board also concluded that improvement in the selection of some materials used in the 
ECS and the Apollo Command Module (C / M) could be made to control fire . Also, the C /M electri­
cal circuits and wiring have potential hazards from arcing or direct short circuits . Also concluded 
was the fact that AiResearch procedures and documentation were inadequate, that quality control (QC) 
personnel were provided inadequate direction and that a NASA Test Readiness Review might have 
precluded the incident. The board recommended that all action necessary be taken to preclude initia­
tion of a fire in the C /M with special emphasis on adequacies of wire bundle derating, circuit breakerI 
wire compatibility, and elimination of all possible nonmetallic materials in contact with wire bundles . 
The board also recommended the imposition of nonmetallic materials specification requirements on all 
contractors and other suppliers of flight equipment, and to strengthen the materials selection and applica­
tion program. 
APOLLO ECS EXPLOSION AT AIRESEARCH , APRIL 13,1965 
An explosion occurred in an unmanned qualification test of the Apollo ECS at AiResearch on 
April 13, 1965.The explosion occurred after 127 hours of a planned 141·hour test. Conditions were corro­
sive contaminants, oxygen, and humidity (CCOH) per qualification test procedure SS-1224-R, para­
graph 6.8. Failure reports were prepared for four components; a sensor (P IN 820110-1), a fan (P IN 
826310-2-1), a valve (PI N 850028-1-1), and an absolute pressure transducer (P IN 837044-1-1). The ex­
plosion was determined to be the result of polyurethane foam swelling underneath a water tank causing 
a suspended electrical immersion heater to touch the bottom of the tank. Sufficient localized heat was 
generated to ignite the oxygen-saturated foam. Electrical connections did not indicate evidence of short­
ing and it was noted that all units were operable after the test was aborted. Corrective action included 
use of Teflon sheets in place of polyurethane foam and neoprene to isolate the uni ts electrically, connec­
tion of the unit mounting frame and tank to a common ground, potting of heater leads, installation 
of a commercial submersion heater in the water tank by welding a boss. 
APOLLO ECS EXPLOSION AT AIRESEARCH, JULY I, 1964 
An explosion occurred in unmanned qualification test in the explosion proof chamber at AiResearch 
on or about July I, 1964. The test had been in progress 30 minutes and test conditions were in accor­
dance with explosion proof test SS-1218·R, paragraph 6.9.2. A cabin air temperature sensor, PI N 
820100·1, was damaged to the extent that the glass bead around the thermistor was bubbled and pitted 
from the heat. Conclusion as to the cause of the explosion was that the insulation around the heater 
coil broke down from heat inside the explosion chamber while the explosion proof test wasin progress. 
Corrective action was to retest the sensor for temperature versus resistance per SS·1113·R, revision l. 
paragraph 4.2. The senSor was retested, witnessed by NAA and Air Force QC, and released for future 
testing on July I, 1964 
D· 2·26 

CC 
APS 
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cps 
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CTR 
DR 
db 
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ECU 
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FR 
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GT 
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IMU 
LB 
LiOH 
LM 
MA 
MEK 
MIL STD 
MSC 
MSOB 
NA 
N2 
OCP 
O2 
PI N 
PSIA 
QD 
SI C 
SLA 
SI M 
SI N 
TORR 
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VDC 
WIG 
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Quick Disconnect 
Spacecraft 
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS· 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
Analyze data obtained immediately prior to and during the fire incident including digital, ana­
log, voice communications, photography, etc. Data should display significant events as they occurred 
with precise time tag. Time histories of all continuous or semi-continuous recorded parameters, cor­
relation of parameter variations and events shall be recorded as well as interpretation of the results 
of said analysis. Where pertinent, normal expected variations shall be compared with those ac­
tually obtained. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP: 
The 	assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Sequence of Events Panel: 
Mr. D. D. Arabian, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. H . Creighton, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. W . Jewel, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. W. Eckmeier, North American Aviation (NAA), Kennedy Space Center 
Mr. A. Tischler, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Dr. M. Faget, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA, Board Member, was assigned to mon­
itor the Sequence of Events Panel. 
3. PANEL CONSOLIDATION: 
Panel 3 served as a separate Panel from January 31, 1967 through February 23, 1967. The Panel 
was dissolved on February 23, 1967 and merged with Panel 18. This merger was accomplished to 
better support the Apqllo 204 Review. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SYSTEM 
a . The engineering data used in the determination of the sequence of events was obtained from 
the spacecraft instrumentation system and is presented in Enclosure 3-1. This system consists 
of the following main elements: 
(1) The instruments in the Command Module which measured about 400 items such as volt­
ages , temperatures and pressures. 
(2) A signal processing system in the Command Module which converts the physical parame­
ters measured into a form suitable for transmission. 
(3) The hard-line and radio transmission links which carry the converted data to the ground. 
(4) The ground system which provides permanent tape records of the data obtained and also 
provides the various kinds of real-time displays of the data required to conduct the test. 
(5) The instruments in other parts of the Space Vehicle and Ground Support Equipment 
systems. These instruments provide data to the ground recording stations in a similar manner 
as for the Command Module. 
(6) A communications network for voice transmission between the various groups associated 
with the tests inCluding the Command Module crew. 
Enclosure 3-2 is a simplified schematic of the data system in use in Spacecraft (SIC) 012 
and on the ground during the Plugs Out Test and shows the general elements within the Space­
craft and the radio and hard-line links to the main ground stations at John F. Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). Data were also transmitted from the KSC ground stations to other sites such as 
the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) and to the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) 
in Houston. 
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b. Because of the large number of measurements which are made in the Command Module, and 
in the other systems in the Spacecraft, it is impossible within the present state-of-the-art to provide 
continuous information on each measurement made. This is true for both ground tests and space 
flight operations. A system is used, therefore, which provides periodic sampling of each measure­
ment. The sampling system used is the Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) system. This system takes 
samples of each measurement a predetermined number of times each second . The sampling rate 
varies from 200 per second on parameters which are expected to vary rapidly sometime during 
test or flight operations to one per sec:ond for parameters not expected to vary rapidly . The fi­
nal record, therefore, provides samples of data from each measurement permitting a near contin­
uous record to be constructed . This may not be possible if rapid variations in the measured quan­
tity occur. Rapid variations between sampling times are not recorded . However, a change may 
be detected when the parameter is sampled even though the actual initial variation of the param­
eter, or the precise time the variation occurred, cannot be determined. This condition may provide 
clues to the nature of events that are not fully recorded. 
c. The signal processing equipment in the Command Module converts the sampled data into a 
binary code. This code consists of "words" each of which are eight "bits" long. The Com­
mand Module PCM system transmits 6400 "words" per second and, therefore, 51,200 "bits" 
per second. 
Each " word" corresponds to a particular value of the parameter being measured. Such 
a " word" is also called a " count." The full scale range of each measuring instrument is di­
vided into 254 " counts . " A change, however, in a "count" (or " word"), does not necessarily 
correspond to a real change in the parameter being measured . This effect is obtained because 
"noise" is inherent in information transmission and processing system. The " noise" can cause 
changes in "counts_" Careful examination of records is required to distinguish between 
real chang'e~ in magnitude of the parameters being measured and apparent magnitude changes 
which are due to " noise. " This result is particularly true when the " noise" produces a one 
"count" change between two adjacent measurement levels. In general, a one "count" change 
does not reflect a real change in level of the measured parameter, particularly if one "count" 
fluctuations have occurred for an extended period. 
2. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
a. On the morning of January 27, 1967, a test of SIC 012 commenced. The purpose of the test 
was to verify systems operatiori in a simulated launch and to exercise countdown procedures in 
preparation for actual launch. The test was identified as a Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test OCP FO-K-0021-1 in which the spacecraft would be dectrically disconnected from the Ground 
Support Equipment (GSE) by removing the umbilical connectors normally disconnected at the 
time of launch. 
b . Spacecraft power buses were energized at 12:55 GMT(7:55 a.m. EST) and subsystems were 
activated and checked in preparatiQn for crew ingress which occurred about five hours later at 18:00 
GMT. At the time the Spacecraft Commander changed from the closed-loop ventilator to the 
Environmental Control System (ECS), he stated there was an odor like "sour milk" in the suit circuit 
loop. Ingress of the Pilot and Senior Pilot continued and at 18:20 GMT, the countdown was 
held for Bendix support personnel to obtain a gas sample from the suit circuit loop for later anal­
ysis of the odor. The countdown then continued at 19:42 GMT with the normal suit circuit 
checks, cabin switch checklists, hatch installations, and cabin purge with oxygen followed by the 
leak check of the sealed cabin. During the cabin leak checks, the Emergency Detection System 
(EDS) which monitors critical functions within the launch vehicle and indicates to the crew when 
an emergency situation exists, was checked. By 21:50 GMT, the EDS and the cabin purge and 
leak checks were finally completed. The boost protective cover which provides thermal protection 
to the spacecraft outer surface during launch could not be properly latched _in place; however, 
the test continued until 22:30 GMT when a hold of the countdown Was called for a communi­
cations problem. The crew became aware of the problem, a "live mike" condition, at 22:26:48 
GMT, and a series of trouble-shooting exercises was conducted, such as interchanging the com­
munications cables (Cobra Cables) that cOnnect the astronauts' microphones and earphones to the 
communications equipment within the Spacecraft, and checking the effect of various communication 
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mode selection of the communications system. The "live mike" condition continued to exist after 
the troubleshooting exercises and the cause for this condition had not been determined by the 
time of first voice indication of fire . Another communication problem appeared after trouble­
shooting; it was in the ground station and involved the distribution of the various voice links. Short­
ly after the troubleshooting period, decision · was made to proceed with the simulated static firing 
of the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters while communications were still possible. By 
23:04 GMT the ground station worked around their problem by patching Spacecraft communi­
cations to Black 3, a specific communications loop. All test personnel were switched to this loop. 
By around 23: 13 GMT the static firing exercise was completed. Voice check was made between 
the crew and the ground. The communications from the crew to the ground were somewhat gar­
bled. At 23:22:27 GMT, the ECS engineers noted an appreciable depletion of the oxygen purge 
tank . The Command Pilot had his face plate open which accounted for the change and by about 
23:23 GMT the face plate was closed. Still plagued by poor communication, Astro Communi­
cation Console CAST suggested the crew switch to S-band voice link; a communication check with 
each of the crew was acceptable. However, some undefined difficulty with the communications 
between the Spacecraft and the ground still existed. 
c. At 23:28:00 .GMT the count was holding at T-IO minutes and resumption of the count was an­
ticipated momentarily . All the systems being monitored through the PCM system by systems 
engineers showed normal operation (particularly the electrical and ECS) at this time. Sixteen 
personnel were standing by at the various floor levels of the gantry to provide technical support 
as required . Those with specific functions ·to be performed at T-O were positioned in the vicinity 
of assigned stations. Movement was reportedly negligible and no work was being performed on 
the flight or ground support hardware. Seven persons were posi tioned within the Saturn S- IV-B 
aft interstage monitoring assigned communication channels. or otherwise engaged in support co­
ordination. The only known anomaly within the Spacecraft was the "live microphone" which 
was picki~g up the rhythmic cadence of the Command Pilot's breathing sounds representative 
of a man at rest. In addition, the Senior Pilot's biomedical parameters showed normal resting 
levels. During this period, voice transmissions from the Spacecraft confirmed this impression of 
a relaxed situation. The termination of the last relaxed conversational transcript from the Space­
craft occurred at 23:30:02 GMT. 
d. At 23:31:04 .7 GMT, the crew call of fire was received over the voice loop. The series of 
events during the minute preceding the fire call was extracted from an after-the-fact review of 
the data and observation by personnel involved with the test. 
At about 23:30:40 GMT, random sounds other than the normal breathing from the Command 
Pilot were evident on the "live mike." The sounds were similar to those obtained by tapping 
or brushing a microphone. The frequency of the noise occurrences was much greater than noted 
earlier in the test when the mike was "live." The noises subsided several seconds before the 
crew call of fire. Throughout the one-minute period before the crew call of fire, the oxygen 
flow to the suit circuits continually increased and reached the upper flow limit of the measuring 
system at about 23:30:59 GMT. During this period the torquing signals to the Inertial Measuring 
Unit showed fluctuations which were an indication of movement of the Spacecraft. In addition, bio­
medical data indicates a slight increase of activity by the Senior Pilot. This indication subsided 
within the one-minute time period. An assessment of the noises on the voice loop, increasing 
oxygen flow to the suit circuits, torquing signal variations to the Inertial Measuring Unit and Sen­
ior Pilot slight increase in activity between about 23:30 :40 GMT and 23:30 :59 GMT show that 
crew activity within the Spacecraft occurred. During the period when the crew was active, the 
open channel of the gas chromatograph showed fluctuations commencing at about 23:30:50 GMT. 
This fluctuation may have· also indicated crew activity because of the antenna characteristics of 
the disconnected cable. At about 23:30:55 GMT a momentary dropout of the data being · trans­
mitted from the Spacecraft occurred. The C-band beacon also showed an interruption at this 
time. The AC voltages on the three phases of inverter Number 2 showed a transient, as did 
one of the phases which supplied power to the hand controller. 
e. About six seconds before the call of fire by the crew, all systems appeared to be at a steady 
or quiescent state, except for the high oxygen flow to the suit circuits The crew call of fire 
occurred at 23:31 :04.7 GMT. 
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There were two voice transmissions from the Spacecraft. The first transmission, believed to be that 
of the Command Pilot, at 23:31 :04.7 GMT reported "a fire in the cockpit." This transmission 
ended at 23:31:10 GMT. The second and last transmission , believed to be the Pilot's, started 
at 23:31 :16.8 GMT and ended at 23:31:21.8 GMT. This transmission reported "a bad fire" 
followed by two garbled phrases. Coincident with the call of fire, immediate and marked in­
crease in the biomedical measurements from the Senior Pilot occurred. The magnitude of these ­
readings continued to increase until loss of data from the Spacecraft. Those systems sensitive 
to the Spacecraft movement, including the launch vehicle accelerometers, showed increasing in­
dications of Spacecraft movement. These indications continued until loss of data, which occurred 
at 23:31 :22.40GMT (6:31 :22.40 p.m. EST). 
The witnesses on station to support the test heard the call of fire. A muffled explosion was 
heard next, followed by two loud whooshes of escaping gas as the Spacecraft cabin ruptured from 
the internal pressure increase caused by the fire . Flames shot from open access panels. Astronaut -
helmet, ann and back movements were observed through the cabin window. The light intensity 
from within the cabin increased, and flames filled the view through the window. 
f. Ground power was switched from the Spacecraft at 23:32:46.4 GMT. However, internal bat­
teries had been switched_on the main buses by the crew at about 23:31 :13 GMT so that removal 
of ground power did not deenergize the electrical systems within the Spacecraft. Between 23:31:15 
GMT and 23:33:00 GMT repeated attempts were made by the pad crew to enter the smoke-filled 
White Room to rescue the astronauts from the Spacecraft. The fires external to the Spacecraft 
continued to burn as hatch removal progressed. At about 23:36 GMT the hatch was removed 
and at approximately 23:43:00 GMT, three physicians arrived from the blockhouse. 
g. Detailed events from about one minute prior to the fire to the time when ground power was 
switched from the Spacecraft, are shown in Enclosure 3-3 . . (Ground power was removed from the 
Spacecraft after loss of all data transmission from the Spacecraft.) The recorded data from the 
onboard instrumentation, the ground instrumentation, and the voice transcripts were used to es­
tablish the events of the enclosure. 
- ... 
3. DATA INDICATION 
Some of the more significant data obtained just prior to the crew call of fire is shown in En­
closure 3-4. These data cover a period of one minute before the call of fire until loss of the data 
signals. The data shown include various parameters indicating Spacecraft motion, the "live mike" 
audio noises on the Command Pilot ' s S-band, oxygen flow rate into the suit loop, biomedical indi­
cations from the Senior Pilot, AC bus 2 transient and associated effects on the C-band operation and 
VHF telemetry carrier and the gas chromatograph signal monitor. Each of these subjects is discussed 
in the Report of Panel 18. 
D. FINDING AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING: 
The data recorded -' from the Spacecraft and ground instrumentation system during the Spacecraft 
Plugs Out Test were found to be valid except for three brief dropouts which occurred around 
23:31 :17.4 GMT, 23 :31 :21.0 GMT and 23:31:21.4 GMT. All onboard data transmission ended at 
about 23:31:22.40 GMT. 
2. DETERMINATION: 
The onboard instrumentation system functioned normally prior to and during the initial phases 
of the fire . There were no indicated malfunctions in any of the instrumentation sensors during 
this period. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
-­I­
1. Enclosure 3-1 Sequence of Events, Final Summary Report 
2. Enclosure 3-2 Flow of Data Information from SIC and Ground Support Equipment 
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3. Enclosure 3-3 Sequence of Events 
4 . Enclosure 3-4 Data Indications 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report contains the sequence of events from about one minute prior to the crew call of fire 
to loss of data . The basic data pertinent to the sequence of events are presented in direct-write recorder 
form. Abrief discussion of the data indications for each system is given . The analysis of these data 
indications are presented in the final report of Panel 18 where additional data is presented to support 
the discussion. 
CR Cathode Ray 
AC Alternating Current 

DC Direc t Current 

ECS Environmental Control System 

TVC Thrust Vector Control 

PCM Pulse Code Modulation 

VHFI FM Very High Frequencyl Frequency Modulation 

MTVC Manual Thrust Vector Control 

.,. 	 WI G Water -Glycol 
SIC Spacecraft 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
OAT Over - All Testing 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
SRP Senior Pilot 
EDS Emergency Detection System 
HFLT Houston Flight 
BPC Boost Protective Cover 
CMD Command Pilot 

SM-RCS Service Module -Reaction Control System 

ACE SIC Acceptance Checkout Equipment Spacecraft 

ACE Acceptance Checkout Equipment 

LOS Loss of Signal 

KSC Kennedy Space Center 

ECA Electronic Control Assembly 

ECU Environmental Control Unit 

SPS Service Propulsion System 

FI C Fuel Cell 

G&N Guidance and Navigation 

PIPA Pulse Integrating Pendulous Accelerometer 

LEB Left Equipment Bay 

FHS Forward Heat Shield 

CSM/ SLA Command Service Module/ Saturn LM Adapter 

LES Launch Escape System 

DSEA Data Storage Electronic Assembly 

MCCH Mission Control Center Houston 

GMT Greenwich Mean Time 
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PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge 
PSIA PoUnds Per Square Inch Absolute 
S/ V Space Vehicle 
NRZ PCM Non-Return to Zero Jlulse Code Modulation 
TPS Test Planning Sheet 
EPS Electrical Power System 
EDU Coupling Display Unit 
ADA Angular Differen tiating Accelerometer 
CW Continuous Wave 
MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
MOLC ACE Open Loop Communication Station 
CAST Astro Communicator Console 
PLT Pilot 
MSTC Manned Spacecraft Operations Building Spacecraft 
Test Conductor .." 
CGSS Cryogenic Gas Storage System 
PUGS Propellant Utilization Gaging System 
SM-A Service Module Quad A 
SM-D Service Module Quad D 
SM Service Module 
MDAS Medical Data Acquisition System 
VDC Voltage Direct Current 
CG Gas Chromatograph 
C &W Caution and Warning 
PTT Press to Talk 
VHF/ AM Very High Frequency/ Amplitude Modulation 
CCW Counterclockwise 
RFI Radio Frequency Interference 
CSM Command Service Module 
T/ R Transmit/ Receive 
2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS PRIOR TO THE START OF THE FINAL TEST 
a . SC ARRIVAL TO START OF PLUGS OUT TEST 
August 26, 1966 Command Module arrival at KSC . 
September 14 Start of combined systems test 
(OCP-FO-0035). 
Semptember 17 Spacecraft (S IC) power-down for 
trou bleshooting. 
September 19 SIC power-up for OCP-FO-K0035 . 
September 23 SI C power-down for OCP-FO-K-0035 
trou bleshooting. 
September 27 OCP-FO-K0035 ECS leak checks. 
September 29 Remove electronic control assemblies (ECA) 
because of water glycol (WI G) leak . 
September 30 Reinstall ECA's. Environmental control 
system water glycol leak corrected. 
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October 1 
October 7 
October 8 
October 10 
October 11 
October 12-13 
October 14-15 
October 18 
October 19 
October 21 
October 27 
October 28 
October 29 
October 31 
November 1 
November 3 
November 4 
November 5 
November 6 
November 8 
November 9 
November 11 
November 12 
November 13 
November 14 
November 15 
SIC power-up and completed 

OCP-FO-K-0035. 

W I G spill during transducer change. 

Remove all ECA's because ofWI G wetting. 

Install new ECA's. 

Manned sea level run of flight crew 

altitude chamber test, OCP-FO-K-0034 

started. 

Manned sea level run discontinued due 

to bent pins in CM-SM umbilical. 

PCM replaced due to suspected bad 

transistors . 
Manned seq level run performed. 
Unmanned altitude run performed. 
First manned (flight crew) altitude run 
aborted at 13,000 feet due to inverter 
no. 1 failure. Inverter replaced. Shorted 
input transistor. (Had not gone through 
the screening process.) Replacement was 
of modified and screened type. 
First manned (flight crew) altitude run 
completed . 
Second manned 9back-up crew) 
altitude run initiated but scrubbed due 
to 02 regulator failure. 
Decision received to change ECU. 
Inverters no. 2 and no. 3 removal started. 
(These two were of the unmodified type.) 
ECA 's removed for water glycol drain. 
Demate CSM to pressure test service 
propulsion system (SPS) tanks. 
Installed Yaw Axis ECA . 
CI M moved to integrated no. 1 stand. 
ECU removed. 
SPS tank removal from SI M started . 
Install roll and pitch ECA's. 
New inverter installed complete. 
Fuel cell (F / C) flO . 2 W I G pump replaced 
due to leak . 
Start SPS tank pressure testing at Pad 16. 
02 panel with new 02 regulator installed. 
Installation of ECU initiated. 
Installation of SPS tanks initiated. 
Drain of fuel cell water-glycol completed. 
F/ C W I G fill initiated. 
New SPS fuel tanks received. 
Leak check of ECU completed. 
Installation of SPS tanks completed . 
Power-up SIC to support ECS checks. 
Move SI M to Pad 16 for SPS installed 
tank pressure checks. 
G&N computer , SIN 123, removal 
in work to install flight program memory. 
ECS WI G servicing started. 
Install SI M in al~itude chamber. 
ECS WI G servicing complete . . 
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November 16 
November 17 
November 19 
November 20 
November 21 
November 22 
November 25 
November 26 
November 27 
November 29 
November 30 
December 1 
December 2 
December 3 
December 14 
December 16 
December 19 
December 21 
December 27 
December 28 
December 29 
December 30 
January 3, 1967 
January 4 
January 6 
January 7 
G&N computer installed temporarily to 
perform PIPA test. Corrosion noted on 
pins. Must be removed. 
G&N PIPA test complete. 
Computer SI N 123 removed . Will install 
new computer SIN 124 .due to corrosion 
on pins of SI N 123. 
CSM mate started. 
Installation of new G&N computer SIN 
124. Held up by broken bolt. 
CSM mate complete. 
Air in ECS W?G system. Must be re­
serviced. 
ECS WIG drain started. 
Broken bolt in computer removed. Com­
puter removed. Computer removed. 
Computer bolts found to be too soft. 
02 panel removed and -5 02 regulator 
installed. 
G&N computer SI N 124 installed. 
ECS WI G reservicc complete. 
W IG leak in lower equipment bay (LEB) 
repaired. 
SI C power·up and conduct OCp· 
FO·K-0034. 
Test scrubbed due to WIG leak 
in ECU . 
Decision made to remove ECU. 
Drain WIG system. Repair WIG leak 
in LEB. 
Removed ECU and shipped to 
AiResearch (A I R). 
Started ECU installation . 

Completed installation of forward heat 

shield (FHS) . 

Completed ECU installation. 

Started WIG servi<;ing per OCP­

FO·K-5518. 

Completed WIG servicing. 

Initiated manned (back-up crew) sea level 

run OCP·FO-K-0034A. 

Manned sea level run completed . 

Unmanned altitude run completed. 

Started manned (back-up crew) altitude run. 

Manned altitude run completed . 

Remove ·CSM from altitude chamber for 

SPS nozzle installation and SLA mate. 

Start CSM/SLA mate 

New quads "A" and "0-" installed due 

to minor damage in original quad en­

gine nozzle. 

Moved to LC·34 and mated to launch 

vehicle. 

Launch vehicle pull test completed. 
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January 10 Solenoid valve on cyclic accumulator no. 
January 11 
January 12 
January 13 
January 14 

January 15 

January 16 

January 17 

January 18 

January 20 
January 21 

January 23 

January 24 
January 26 
January 27 
3. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
a. START OF PLUGS OUT TEST TO 23:30:00 GMT 
replaced. 
Perform OCP·FO-K-0039 GSE 
interface test. 
Start circuit interrupter test. 
Main DSKY replaced due to burned out 
light on numeral. 
Removed panel 31 and replaced suit 
pressure meter. 
Circuit interrupter test completed . 
Start combined systems test 
OCP-FO-K-0005. 
Start FIC cryogenic loading test, 
OCP-FO-K -4736. 
OCP-FO-K-0005 completed. 
Launch escape system (LES) 
mate completed . 
SIC powered up for trouble shooting. 
OCP-FO-K-4736 completed. 
Electrical mate, OCP-FO-K-0004, 
started and completed. 
Plugs in, integrated test, OCP-FO-K-0006 
dry run without HFLT started i),nd com­
pleted . 
Potting of panel no . 12 initiated . 
02 purge valve on F IC no . 1 replaced . 
Potting on panel no . 12 reheated . Still 
not properly cured. Installed for test. 
Circuit interrupters betwe~n CM/ SM 
opened in search of missing test spacer 
which prevents damage to the o-ring in 
the connector during test (not found in 
interrupters) . 
Repair pyro battery wire. 

MCCH interface test , OCP-FO-K-004S, 

started and completed . 

Pyro connector repaired . 

Water flush test completed. 

SIC power-on troubleshooting III work. 

YAW ECA replaced due to electronic 

anomaly and new one retested. 

Started replacing DSEA connector . 

OCP-FO-K-0006 completed. 

DSEA connector replacement completed. 

Plugs out, OAT, OCP-FO-K-0021-1 

started . 

The following is the time line for plugs out, OAT, OCP-FO-K-0021-1, January 27, 1967: 
12:55 GMT SIC bus power up . 
13:20 GMT SIC subsystems activation and systems test. 
14:50 GMT ECSsystems test started. 
16:00 GMT T-3 hours and hold for 1 hour for ECS. 
ECS had trouble with 02K bottle hookup 
through GSE into pneumatically operated 
disconnect at service module. 
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17:00 GMT 	 ECS test completed. 
17:05 GMT 	 Started pre-ingress switch checklist. 
18:00 	GMT Command Pilot ingress. When Command 
Pilot changed over from the closed loop 
ventilator to SIC ECS, he said there 
was an odor in the systems like Hsour 
milk." Contiaued with Pilot and Senior 
Pilot ingress. 
18:09:56:5 	GMT SRP hooks up to communications cables 
after ingress and biomed data becomes 
available. 
18:30 	GMT Begin hold for odor in suit loop . Bendix 
support called for to supply evacuated 
" watermelon " to take samples of suit 
circuit loop. Sample taken during hold. 
19:25 	GMT Picked up count and performed suit circuit 
checks. 
19:40 	 GMT Post-ingress switch checklist performed si­
lently by f1ight crew. 
19:45 GMT Inner hatch installed and started cabin 
purge and leak check . 
20 :00 GMT Start emergency detection system (EDS) 
test. 
21:00 	 GMT EDS test complete. Start abort request 
checks. 
21:15 GMT 	 Abort request checks complete . 
21:50 GMT 	 Cabin purge and leak check complete. 
. Start outer hatch and boost protective cover 
(BPC) -installation. Could not properly 
latch BPC hatch. 
22:40 	 GMT Hold for communications problems. 
Proceed with terminal count functions where 
communications allowed. 
22:45: 15:5 GMT SRP disconnects his communication 
cables and gives to CMD. This is done 
in an effort to isolate the communications 
problem. 
22 :45:28 	GMT CMD hooks uP' to SRP cables and runs 
communications check. 
22:46:45 :9 GMT 	 CMD disconnects from SRP cables. 
22:46:51:2 	GMT SRP reconnects to communications cables 
and re-establishes biomed data. 
22:47 :33 	 GMT CMD reconnects to his own communi­
cations cables. 
22:53 	 GMT Approximate time CMD replaced cobra 
cable. 
23 :10:00 GMT 	 Start simulated SM-RCS static fire . 
23 :15:00 GMT 	 Complete static fire. 
23:20 	 GMT Completed all terminal count functions 
up to transfer to internal power. Hold 
at T -lO minutes for communications 
problems. 
b . 23:30:00 	GMT TO LOSS OF DATA 
Figure 3-1 shows the significant sequence of events time line as gathered from the recorded 
data . Figures 3-2 through 3-8 represent the actual recorded data . 
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The illustrations contained in this section ale direct replOductions of the direct-wlite recordings 
made thIOugh the ACE SIC glound station decommutator. No smoothing techniques have been 
employed. However, dCI ing the last 5 seconds before final LOS three additional losses of data 
occurred. At these times the PCM wavetlain lecoveled as much as a second before the ACE 
decommutatol was able to reacql'ile synchronization. In order to provide information dCling 
the pOi tion of this time when the wavetrain was available but the decommctator not in synchro­
nization, manual data leduction was employed. 
4. SYSTEM 
a. INSTRUMENTATION 
(1). 	INSTRUMENTATION CONFIGURATION 
Deviations from standald launch configulation wele as follows: 
(a). The transducel for measuring battery compartment manifold pressure, CC0188P (0 to 
21.3 psia), was not installed in the port in the manifold. However, the instrument was 

electrically connected and stowed, and in this configulation pIOvided a measure of cabin 

pressure. 

(b). Battel!es A and B case temperature measurements, CC0178T and CCOI79T, were 

not connected. 

(c). SIM - adaptel separation monitor A, SSOI20X, was inopelative at the time of the 

test. Refer to SIC DR No. 932. 

(d). The gas chIOmatograph was not installed. 

(e). Elapsed time indicatOis were installed on the PCM packages, the central timing equip­

ment and the signal conditioning equipment. These indicatOis Were to be removed 

pi ior to flight. 

(2) SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION 
(a). The engineering data used fOi the detel mination of the sequence of events was ex­
tracted via the spaceclaft instrumentation system. The mechanism fOi accomplishing this 
task involves sensing SIC physical parameters, converting the parameters into varying 
direct current electrical signals, sequentially sampling the signals and then converting these 
signals into binary coded words which are transmitted for recording and display (see 
Figure 4.1-1). The basic hardware used includes sensors, signal conditioners, and the pulse 
code modulation system. 
(b). The pulse code modulation system (PCM) samples the val ious sensors and signal 
conditioners in the SIC and encodes the infol mation for transmission. The PCM basically 
is a number of electronic input switches and an encodel, all of which al e controlled 
by a programmer. The input switches, thlOugh plOgrammer control, are sampled se­
quentially with each sample period being 15 microseconds. The voltage passed thlough 
the switch dUi ing the sampling time is then converted by the encoder into an 8-bit, binary 
word of 156.25 microseconds duration. This results in each switch being sampled se­
quentially in 156.25-microsecond time increments. The number of times per second each 
input switch is sampled is controlled by the programmer. Programmed sampling rates 
are 200, lOO, 50, lO and 1 samples per second. The end result of this operation is a 
serial stream of data consisting of 6400 eight-bit binary words per second. The serial word 
stream is then transmitted to an area to be decoded, recorded and displayed (see 
Figure 4.1-2). 
(c). A list of all active instrumentation parameters which were being monitored during 
OCP-FO-K-0021, S/V Plugs Out Integrated Test, is presented in Table 4.1-2 and an 
explanation is given in Table 4.1-1. 
(3). COMMENTS ON DATA 
Data quality was good except for three confirmed dropouts of the onboard PCM system at 
the following times (all GMT): 
23:31:17.398 to 23:31:17.659 
23:31 :21:0l8 to 23:31:21.284 
23:31 :21.383 to 23: 31 :21.519 
0-3-37 

These dropouts were confirmed by prime frame count readouts of computer tabulations and strip 
chart recordings made from available data sources. Measurements with sampling rates of one and ten 
per second did not show good data on strip charts for one full second following the 23:31:17.398 
GMT dropout, because after system recovery · at 23:31:17.659 GMT the PCM prime frame counter 
picked up one count. Data are read from a digital frame dump in this period by reading the prime 
frame count and subtracting one for proper prime frame identification. 
(a). DATA SOURCES 
Four data sources were available (See Figure 4.1-2): 
1. 51.2 kilo-bit bi-phase hard line data (SjC PCM) 
2. 204.8 kilo-bit interleaved data (SjC and GSE PCM's) 
3. 51.2 kilo-bit NRZ PCM data via the SjC very high frequencyjfrequency modu­
lated (VHF jFM) transmitter (SjC PCM) 
4. 51.2 kilo-bit NRZ data via the SjC S-band transmitter (SjC PCM) . The VHF jFM 
and 41.2 kilo-bit bi-phase hardline sources were used here for data purposes since 
those sources showed fewer dropouts and bit errors than the interleaved data, and 
since trouble with the ground stations made data from the S-band link practi­
cally unusable. 
(b). CABIN PRESSURE FROM BATTERY MANIFOLD PRESSURE 
The pressure sensor for the battery manifold pressure measurement, CCOI88P, was 
electrically connected to a signal conditioner. The sensor was not mounted . to the battery 
manifold to avoid possible damage to the sensor during battery removals and installations. 
The port of the battery manifold in which the sensor was to be mounted was plugged. 
The sensor and coiled wire were wrapped in a plastic bag and stowed in an area under 
the battery mounting shelf between the shelf and the floor of the SjC. In this configur­
ation, the instrument sensed cabin pressure. The upper limit of the sensor, 21.3 psia, 
was reached at 23:31: 18.518 GMT. 
(c). BATTERY CASE TEMPERATURES 
The battery Aand B case temperature measurements, CC0178T (battery A) and 
CC0179T (battery B), were not active. The sensors are installed only on flight batteries, 
and since test batteries were used, no sensors were available. The signal conditioners 
for these measurements and associated wiring were installed. The two sensor connectors 
were packed in individual plastic bags, the wire coiled and stowed in the same area 
with the battery manifold pressure sensor. The output of the two measurement points 
was reviewed and found never to deviate from a full scale reading which, in this case, 
is normal. 
(d). DATA DROP-OUTS 
At 23:30:54.85 GMT a drop-out of the detected PCM signal from the SjC VHF jFM 
transmitter was noted. However, the hardline signal from the PCM system showed no 
change in any way; this is confirmed by all playback data from the hardline sources. 
Thus, no data interruption at this time was experienced. 
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TABLE 4.1-1 

MEASUREMENT IDENTIFICATION 

The measurement identification consists of seven characters: two letters followed by four numbers 
and one letter. 
Discrete number 
Functional System Code Measurement Classification 
(Structures) (Strain)\Tr
Module code 

-- CA9099S 

The first letter (module code) designates the measurement location by module. 
A Adapter 
B Booster 
C Command module 
L Launch escape tower 
S Service module 
The second letter (functional subsystem code) denotes the subsystem within which the measurement 
originates. 
A Structures 
C Electrical power 
D Master events sequence controller 
E Earth landing sequence controller 
F Environmental control 
G Guidance and navigation 
H Stabilization and control 
J Crew equipment 
K Flight technology 
P Service propulsion 
R Reaction control 
S Launch vehicle emergency detection 
T Communications and instrumentation 
Characters three through six are numbers assigned sequentially or grouped for clarity within each 
system. The seventh character, a letter, denotes measurement classification as follows: 
A Accelera tion N Camera 
B Phase P Pressure 
C Current Q Quantity 
D Vibration R Rate 
E Power S Strain 
F Frequency T Temperature 
G Force V Voltage 
H PositionjAttitude WTime 
J Biomedical X Discrete event 
K Radiation Y Acoustical 
L Velocity Z pH-acidity 
M Mass 
261-1060 - 67 - 8 D-3-41 
TABLE 4.1-2 ACTIVE PCM MEASUREMENTS FOR SIC 012 
SUBSYSTEM STRUCTURES 
SAMPLE DATA RANGE 
MEAS. ID MEASUREMENT DESCRIPTION RATE LOW HIGH UNITS 
C A1502 T TEMP SIDE HS BOND LOC A 1 S IS -260 +600 DEG F 
C A1505 T TEMP SIDE HS BOND LOC B 1 SIS -260 +600 DEG F 
C A1509 T TEMP SIDE HS BOND LOC C 1 S IS -260 +600 DEG F 
C A5480 T TEMP AFT HS LOC I -A 1 SIS -100 +4000 DEG F 
C A5481 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 1-B 1 SIS -100 +4000 DEG F 
C A5482 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 1-C 1 SIS -100 +1600 DEG F 
C A5483 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 1-D 1 SIS -100 +1000 DEG F 
C A5484 R FLUX AFT HS LOC 1-4 1 S IS 0+150 B/ +l50 B/ F/ S 
C A5490 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 2-A 1 SIS -100 +4000 DEG F 
C A5491 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 2-B 1 SIS -100 +1600 DEG F 
C A5492 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 2-C 1 SIS -100 +900 DEG F 
C A5493 T TEMP AFT HS LOC 2-D 1 SIS -100 +1000 DEG F 
C AS494 R FLUX AFT HS LOC 2 1 SIS 0 +100 B/ F/ S 
S A2361 T TEMP SECT 6 IN SURF 1 SIS -100 +200 DEG F 
S A2364 T TEMP SECT 3 FUEL TANK SURF 1 S IS -100 +200 DEG F 
S A2365 T TEMP SECT 6 FUEL TANK SURF 1 SIS -100 +200 DEG F 
SUBSYSTEM ELECTRICAL POWER 
C C0l75 T TEMP STATIC INVERTER 1 1 SIS +32 +248 DEG F 
C C0176 T TEMP STATIC INVERTER 2 1 SIS +32 +248 DEG F 
C C0177 T TEMP STATIC INVERTER 3 1 S IS +32 +248 DEG F 
C C0178 T TEMP BATTERY A CASE 10 S IS 0 +250 DEG F 
C C0179 T TEMP BATTERY B CASE 10 SIS 0 +250 DEG F 
C C0188 P PRESS BATT COMPARTMENT (MANIF) 10 S IS 0 +20 PSIA 
C C0200 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 1 PHASE A 10 S IS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0201 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 1 PHASE B 10 SIS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0202 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 1 PHASE C 10 S IS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0203 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 2 PHASE A 10 SIS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0204 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 2 PHASE B 10 S IS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0205 V AC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS 2 PHASE C 10 SIS 0 +150 VAC 
C C0206 V DC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS A 10 S IS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0207 V DC VOLTAGE MAIN BUS B 10 SIS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0210 V DC VOLTAGE BATTERY BUS A 10 S IS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0211 V DC VOLTAGE BATTERY BUS B 10 S IS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0212 V DC VOLTAGE POST LANDING BTRY 10 SIS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0213 F FREQUENCY AC BUS 1 PHASE A 1 SIS +380 +420 CPS 
C C0214 V DC VOLTAGE BATT CHARGER OUT 10 S IS 0 +45 VDC 
C C0217 F FREQUENCY AC BUS 2 PHASE A 1 S IS +380 +420 CPS 
C C0222 C DC CURRENT BATTERY A 10 SIS 0 +ioo AMP 
C C0223 C DC CURRENT BATTERY B 1 S IS 0 +100 AMP 
C C0224 C DC CURRENT POST LANDING BTRY 10 SIS 0 +100 AMP 
C C0232 V DC VOLTAGE BATTERY RELAY BUS 10 S IS 0 +45 VDC 
S C2060 P N2 PRESSURE F/ C 1 REGULATED ISIS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2061 P N2 PRESSURE F/C 2 REGULATED 1 S IS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2062 P N2 PRESSURE F/ C 3 REGULATED 1 S IS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2066 P 02 PRESSURE F/ C 1 REGULATED 10 SIS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2067 P 02 PRESSURE F/ C 2 REGULATED 10 S IS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2068 P 02 PRESSURE F/ C 3 REGULATED 10 S IS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2069 P H2 PRESSURE F/C 1 REGULATED 10 SIS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2070 P H2 PRESSURE F IC 2 REGULATED 10 SIS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2071 P H2 PRESSURE F/C 3 REGULATED 10 S IS 0 +75 PSIA 
S C2081 T TEMP F/C 1 COND EXHAUST 1 SIS +150 +250 DEG F 
S C2082 T TEMP F IC 2 COND EXHAUST 1 SIS +150 +250 DEG F 
S C2083 T TEMP F/C 3 COND EXHAUST 1 SIS +150 +250 DEG F 
S C2084 T TEMP F IC 1 SKIN 1 SIS +20 +550 DEG F 
S C2085 T TEMP F IC 2 SKIN 1 SIS +20 +550 . DEG F 
S C2086 T TEMP F IC 3 SKIN 1 SIS ' +20 +550 DEG F 
S C2087 T TEMP FC 1 RADIATOR OUTLET 1 SIS -50 +300 DEG F 
S C2088 T TEMP FC 2 RA DIATOR OUTLET 1 SIS -50 +300 DEG F 
S C2089 T TEMP FC 3 RADIATOR OUTLET 1 SIS -50 +300 DEG F 
S C2113 C DC CURRENT F/ C 1 OUTPUT 10 SIS 0 +100 AMP 
S C2114 C DC CURRENT F IC 2 OUTPUT 10 SIS 0 + 100. AMP 
S C2115 C DC CURRENT F IC 3 OUTPUT 10 SIS 0 +100 AMP 
S C2120 X FUEL CELL 1 BUS A DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2121 X FUEL CELL 2 BUS A DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2122 X FUEL CELL 3 BUS A DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2125 X FUEL CELL 1 BUS B DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2126 X FUEL CELL 2 BUS B DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2127 X FUEL CELL 3 BUS B DISCONNECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S C2139 R FLOW RATE H2 F/ C 1 10 SIS 0 +0.2 LB / HR 
S C2140 R FLOW RATE H2 F/ C 2 10 SIS 0 +0.2 LB /HR 
S C2141 R FLOW RATE H2 F/ C 3 10 SIS 0 +0.2 LB / HR 
S C2142 R FLOW RATE 02 F/ C 1 10 SIS 0 + 1.6 LB / HR 
S C2143 R FLOW RATE 02 F/ C 2 10 SIS 0 + 1.6 LB / HR 
S C2144 R FLOW RATE 02 F/ C 3 10 SIS 0 +1.6 LB / HR 
S C2160 X PH FACTOR WATER CONDITION F/C 1 10 SIS NORMAL HIGH EVENT 
S C2161 X PH FACTOR WATER CONDITION F/ C 2 10 SIS NORMAL HIGH EVENT 
S C2162 X PH FACTOR WATER CONDITION F / C 3 10 SIS NORMAL HIGH EVENT 
S C2323 X FUEL CELL 1 SHUT OFF MON 10 SIS CLOSE OPEN EVENT 
S C2324 X FUEL CELL 2 SHUT OFF MON 10 SIS CLOSE OPEN EVENT 
S C2325 X FUEL CELL 3 SHUT OFF MON 10 SIS CLOSE OPEN EVENT 
SUBSYSTEM MASTER EVENTS SEQUENCE CONTROLLER 
C D0002 X LES ABORT INITIA TE SIGNAL A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0005 V DC VOLTAGE PYRO BUS A 10 SIS 0 +40 VDC 
C D0006 V DC VOLTAGE PYRO BUS B 10 SIS 0 +40 VDC 
C D0023 X CM-SM SEP RELAY CLOSE A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0024 X CM-SM SEP RELAY CLOSE B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0037 X ELS SEQ START RLY CLOSE A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0038 X ELS SEQ START RLY CLOSE B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0044 X BOOSTER CUT-OFF SIG A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0062 X LES ABORT INITIATE SIGNAL B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0105 X LES ABORT INITIATE SIGNAL B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
CD 0105 X TWR JETTISON A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C DOI06 X TWR JETTISON B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0120 X CANARD DEPLOY A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0121 X CANARD DEPLOY B 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0125 X ADAPT I SM SEP INITIA TE A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0126 X ADAPT ISM SEP INITIATE B 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0127 X ADAPT SEPARATION A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0128 X ADAPT SEPARATION B 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0130 X HAND CONTROLLER INPUT A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0131 X HAND CONTROLLER INPUT B 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0132 X EDS ABORT LOGIC IN NO 1 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0133 X EDS ABORT LOGIC IN NO 2 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C DOl34 X EDS ABORT LOGIC IN NO 3 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0135 X EDS ABORT LOGIC OUT A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C DOl36 X EDS ABORT LOGIC OUT B 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0140 X DIRECT ULLAGE ON A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0141 X DIRECT ULLAGE ON B 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0170 X RCS ACTIVATE SIG A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C D0171 X RCS ACTIVATE SIG B 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0173 X CM RCS PRESS SIG A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0174 X CM RCS PRESS SIG B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0200 V DC BOLTAGE LOGIC BUS A 10 SIS +22 +37 VDC 
C D0201 V DC VOLTAGE LOGIC BUS B 10 SIS +22 +37 VDC 
C D0230 X FWD HS JETTISON A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0231 X FWD HS JETTISON B 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0315 X EDS ENABLE A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C D0316 X EDS ENABLE B 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C DI006 X LES MOTOR INITIATE A 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
C DI007 X LES MOTOR INITIATE B 10 S I S OFF ON EVENT 
D-3-43 
SUBSYSTEM EARTH LANDING SEQUENCE CONTROLLER 
C EOOOI X DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY CLOSE A 
C E0002 X DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY CLOSE B 
C E0003 X MAIN CHUTE DEPL-DRG REL RLY A 
C E0004 X MAIN CHUTE DEPL-DRG REL RLY B 
C E0007 X BARO SW LOCK-IN RLY CLOSE A 
C E0008 X B.-\RO SW LOCK-IN RLY CLOSE B 
C £0035 P BAROMETRIC PRESS STATIC REF 
C E0321 X MAIN CHUTE DISCONNECT RELAY A 
C E0322 X MAIN CHUTE DISCONNECT RELAY B 
10 S IS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 S IS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 S IS OFF 
10 S IS OFF 
I SIS 0 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
SUBSYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
C FOOOI P PRESSURE CABIN 
C F0002 T TEMP CABIN 
C F0005 P PRESSURE C02 PARTIAL 
C F0006 P PRESS SURGE TANK 
C F0008 T TEMP SUIT SUPPLY MANIF 
C F0009 Q QUANTITY WASTE WATER TANK 
C FOOIO Q QUAN POTABLE H20 TANK 
C FOOl2 P PRESS SUIT DEMA ND REG SUPPLY 
C FOOlS P PRESS SUIT COMPRESSOR DIFF 
C F0016 P PRESS GLYCOL PUMP OUTLET 
C F0017 T TEMP GLYCOL EVAP OUTLET STREAM 
C FOO18 T TEMP GLYCOL EVAP OUTLET LIQUID 
C F0019 Q QUANTITY GLYCOL ACCUM 
C F0020 T TEMP SPACE RADIATOR OUTLET 
C F0025 P PRESS PUMP PACKAGE INLET 
S F0030 Q QUANTITY H2 TANK 1 
S F0031 Q QUANTITY H2 TANK 2 
S F0032 Q QUANTITY 02 TANK 1 
S F0033 Q QUANTITY 02 TANK 2 
C F0034 P BACK PRESS GLYCOL EVAPORATOR 
C F0035 R FLOWRATE ECS 02 
C F0036 P PRESS OUTL£T 02 REG SUPPLY 
S F0037 P PRESS 02 TANK 1 
S F0038 P PRESS 02 TANK 2 
S F0039 P PRESS H2 TANK 1 
S F0041 T TEMP 02 TANK 1 
S F0042 T TEMP 02 TANK 2 
S F0043 T TEMP H2 TANK 1 
S F0044 T TEMP H2 TANK 2 
C F0120 P PRESS H20 AND GLYCOL TANKS 
C F0135 R FLOW RATE MAN INLET TO SUIT I 
C F0136 RFLOW RATE MAN INLET TO SUIT 2 
C F0137 R FLOW RATE MAN INLET TO SUIT 3 
C F0148 P DP SUPPLY AND RETURN MAN 
C F0153 T TEMP COMPRESSOR INLET 
C F0184 T TEMP C02 ABSORBER OUTLET 
C F0245 T TEMP 02 REG INLET 
C F0326 P PRESS POTABLE H20 TANK DRAIN 
C F0327 P PRESS WASTE H20 TANK DRAIN 
C F0481 T TEMP CP BR 1 INLET 
C F0482 T TEMP CP BR 1 OUTLET 
C F0483 T TEMP CP BR 2 INLET 
C F0484 T TEMP CP BR 2 INLET 
C F0549 P DIFF PRESS COLDPLATE BR I 
C F0550 P DIFF PRESS COLDPLATE BR 2 
S F0665 T TEMP SPACE RADIATOR INLET 
I S IS 0 
I SIS +40 
I SIS 0 
I S IS +50 
I SIS +20 
I SIS 0 
I SIS 0 
I SIS 0 
I SIS 0 
I SIS 0 
I S IS +20 
I SIS +25 
1 SIS -10 
I S IS -50 
50 S IS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 S IS 0 
I SIS 0 
10 SIS +0.25 
I SIS +0.2 
I S IS 0 
1 SIS +50 
1 S IS +50 
1 SIS 0 
1 SIS -325 
1 SIS -325 
1 S IS -425 
1 SIS -425 
I SIS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 SIS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 SIS +90 
1 S IS -50 
1 SIS 0 
1 S IS 0 
1 SIS +40 
1 S IS +40 
1 SIS +40 
I SIS +40 
I S IS 0 
1 SIS 0 
1 SIS +60 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
+15 PSIA 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
+17 PSIA 
+ 125 DEG F 
+30 MMHG 
+1050 PSIA 
+95 DEG F 
+100 PCNT 
+90 PCNT 
+17 PSIA 
+1 PSID 
+60 PSIA 
+95 DEG 
+75 DEG F 
+100 PCNT 
+100 DEG F 
+75 PSIA 
+25 LB 
+28 LB 
+320 LB 
+320 LB 
+0.25 PSIA 
+ 1.0 LB/HR 
+150 PSIA 
+1050 PSIA 
+ 1050 PSIA 
+350 PSIA 
+80 DEG F 
+80 DEG F 
-200 DEG F 
-200 DEG F 
+50 PSIA 
+25 LB/HR 
+25 LB/HR 
+25 LB / HR 
+0.8 PSID 
+200 DEG F 
+200 DEG F 
+150 DEG F 
+50 PSIA 
+50 PSIA 
+150 DEG F 
+150 DEG F 
+150 DEG F 
+150 BEG F 
+2.0 PSID 
+10 PSID 
+ ISO DEG F 
SUBSYSTEM GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 
C GOOOI V COMPUTER DIGITAL DATA 40 BITS 
C GIIOI V -28 VDC SUPPLY 
C GlllO V 2.5 VDC TM BIAS 
50 S IS 
10 S IS 
I S IS 
0 
0 
-35 
+5 
VDC 
VDC 
D-3-44 
C Gl503 X IMU +28 VDC OPERATE 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G1513 X IMU +28 VDC STANDBY 10SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G1523 X AGC +28 VDC 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G1533 X OPTX +28 VDC 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G2110 V IGA TORQUE MOTOR INPUT 10 SIS -8 +8 VDC 
C G2112 V IGA IX RES OUTPUT SINE IN PHASE 10 S IS 0 +50 DEG 
C G2113 V IGA IX RES OUTPUT COS IN PHASE 10 S IS 45 DEG 135 DEG 
C G2117 V IGA SERVO ERROR IN PHASE 100 SIS 0 0.5 VRMS 
C G2140 V MGA TORQUE MOTOR INPUT 10 SIS -8 +8 VDC PSA 
C G2142 V MGA IX RES OUTPUT SINE IN PHASE 10 SIS -45 +45 DEG 
C G2143 V MGA IX RES OUTPUT COS IN PHASE 10 SIS 45 135 DEG 
C G2147 V MGA SERVO ERROR IN PHASE 100 SIS 0 0.5 VRMS 
C G2170 V OGA TORQUE MOTOR INPUT 10 S IS -8 +8 VDC 
C G2172 V OGA IX RES OUTPUT SINE IN PHASE 10 S IS -45 +45 DEG 
C G2173 V OGA IX RES OUTPUT COS IN PHASE 10 S IS 45 135 DEG 
C G2177 V OGA SERVO ERROR IN PHASE 100 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G2206 V IGA CDU IX RES ERROR IN PHASE 10 A IS -8 +8 VRMS 
C G2236 V MGA CDU IX RES ERROR IN PHASE 10 SIS -8 +8 VRMS 
C G2266 V OGA CDU iX RES ERROR IN PHASE 10 SIS -8 +8 VRMS 
C G2300 T PIPA TEMP 1 SIS 125 135 DEG F 
C G2301 T IRIG TEMP 1 SIS 128 137 DEG F 
C G2302 C IMU HEATER CURRENT 1 SIS 0 +5.000 AMP 
C G2302 C IMU BLOWER CURRENT 1 SIS 0 +5.000 AMP 
C G3102 V SXT TRUN MOTOR DRIVE IN PHASE 10 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G3112 V SXT SHAFT MOTOR DRIVE IN PHASE 10 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G3133 V SCT TRUN MOTOR DRIVE 10 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G3141 V TRUN CDU 16X RES ERROR IN PHASE 10 S IS -50 +50 MVRMS 
C G3200 V TRUN CDU MOTOR DRIVE IN PHASE 10 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G3220 V SHAFT CDU MOTOR DRIVE IN PHASE 10 SIS -5 +5 VRMS 
C G4300 T AGC TEMP MONITOR 1 S IS 20 220 DEG F 
C G5000 X PIPA FAIL 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5001 X IMU FAIL 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5002 X CDU FAIL 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5003 X GIMBAL LOCK WA RNING 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C GS005 X ERROR DETECT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5006 X IMU TEMP LIGHT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5007 X ZERO ENCODER LIGHT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5008 X IMU DELAY LIGHT 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5020 X AGC ALARM 1 (PROGRAM) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5021 X AGC ALA RM 2 (AGC ACTIVITY) 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5022 X AGC ALARM 3 (TM) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5023 X AGC ALA RM 4 (PROG CK FAIL) 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5024 X AGC ALARM 5 (SCALAR FAIL) 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5025 X AGC ALA RM 6 (PARITY FAIL) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5026 X AGC ALA RM 7 (COUNTER FAIL) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5027 X AGC ALARM 8 (KEY RELEASE) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5028 X AGC ALARM 9 (RUPT LOCK) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT . 
C G5029 X AGC ALARM 10 (TC TRAP) 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G5030 X COMPUTER POSER FAIL LIGHT 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C G6000 P IMU PRESSURE 1 S IS 0 25 PS.-:'f' 
C G6020 T PSA TEMP 1 TRAY 3 1 SIS 10 250 DEG F 
C G6021 T PSA TEMP 2 TRAY 2 1 SIS 10 250 DEG F 
C G6022 T PSA TEMP 3 TRAY 4 1 SIS 10 200 DEG F 
SUBSYSTEM STA-BILIZATION AND CONTROL 
C H0024 R. PITCH RATE 50 SIS -25 +25 DEG /SEC 
C H0025 V PITCH MAN ROTATION CONTROL 50 SIS -4 +4 VAC 
C H0034 H PITCH POS FEEFBACK IN 50 SIS -10 +10 DEG 
C H0047.C PTV DIFF CLUTCH VOLTS COMBINER 50 SIS -800 +800 MANP 
C H0050 R PITCH RATE ERR AMP OUT 100 SIS -6 +6 DEG/SEC 
C HOO67 V P INTEGRATOR/ATT ERROR SUMMING 10 SIS -2.5 +2.5 VDC 
C H0074 V MTVC PITCH RATE 50 SIS -25 +25 DEG/SEC 
C H0075 H PITCH SCS ATT ERROR 10 S IS 0 +10 VRMS 
C H0087 X +PITCH / +X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 200 S IS ON OFF EVENT 
C HOO88 X -PITCH/+X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 200 SIS ON OFF EVENT 
D-3-45 
OFf EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
OFF ON 
ONN EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
+25 DEG/SEC 
5.0 VRMS 
+8.5 VDC 
+800 MAMP 
+6 DEG/SEC 
+2.5 VDC 
-25 DEG/SEC 
10 VRMS 
OFF EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
800 CPS 
+25 DEG/SEC 
+5 VRMS 
1600 CPS 
5 VDC 
+6 DEG / SEC 
+25 VDC 
lO VRMS 
OFF EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
OFF EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
+-3K FT/SEC 
+12 
160 DEG 
+12 VAC 
+12 VAC 
+12 VAC 
+12 VAC 
ON EVEl'IT 
ON EVENT 
+5 OHM 
+5 MV 
-5 MV 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
ON EVENT 
+5K PSIA 
+200 DEG F 
+300 PSIA 
+200 DEGF 
C H0089 X +PITCH/-X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C HOO90 X -PITCH/-X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H0100 X G-N DV MODE CONTROL 
C HOlOl X G-N ATT MODE CONTROL 
C H0102 X G-N ENTRY MODE CONTROL 
C H0103 X MONITOR MODE CONTROL 
C H1024 R WAW RATE 
C H1025 V YAW MAN ROTATION CONTROL 
C Hl034 H YAW POS FEEDBACK IN 
C H1047 C YTV DIFF CLUTCH VOLTS COMBINER 
C HlOSO R YAW RATE ERR AMP OUT 
C H1067 V Y INTEGRA TOR/ATT SUMMING 
C H1074 R MTVC YAW RATE 
C H1075 H YAW SCS ATT ERROR 
C H1087 X +YAW/+X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H1088 X -YAW/+X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H1089 X +YAW/-X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C Hl090 X -YAW/-X SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C HllOO X SCS DV MODE CONTROL 
C Hll01 X SCS ATT MODE CONTROL 
C Hll02 X SCS ENTRY MODE CONTROL 
C Hll03 X SCS LOCAL VERTICAL MODE 
C Hll04 X MTVC MODE CONTROL 
C H2015 V COMBINED AG SMRD 
C H2024 R ROLL RATE 
C H2025 V ROLL MAN ROTATION CONTROL OUT 
C H2026 V COMBINED RG SMRD 
C H2030 T COMBINED ATTTITUDE GYRO TEMP 
C H2050 R ROLL RATE ERR A MP OUT 
C H2070 H ROLL ATTITUDE ERROR AMP OUT 
C H2075 H ROLL SCS ATT ERROR 
C H2087 X +ROLL/+Z SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2088 X -ROLL/+Z SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2089 X +ROLL/-Z SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2090 X -ROLL/-Z SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2091 X +ROLL/+Y SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2092 X -ROLL/+Y SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2093 X +ROLL/-Y SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H2094 X -ROLL/ -Y SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 
C H3185 X -05G MANUAL SWITCH 
C H3186 V DV REMAINING POTENTIOMETER OUT 
C H4100 H RESOLVER SIN OUT PITCH ATT 
C f[4101 H RESOLVER COS OUT PITCH ATT 
C H4102 H RESOLVER SIN OUT YAW ATT 
C H410 H RESOLVER COS OUT YAW ATT 
C H4104 H RESOLVER SIN OUT ROLL ATT 
C H4105 H RESOLVER COS OUT ROLL ATT 
C H4320 XSPS SOLENOID DRIVER OUT 1 
C H4321 X SPS SOLE~OID DRIVER OUT 2 
SUBSYSTEM CREW EQUIPMENT 
C J0002 J PNEUM SLECTOR SW OUTPUT SIG 500 SIS -5 
C J0066 J EKG AXIS 1 SEL SW OUT SIG 200 SIS 0.1 
C J0067 J EKG AXIS 2 SEL SW OUT SIG 200 SIS 0.1 
C J0210 X SEL SW POSITION ASTRO 1 10 SI S OFF 
C J0211 X SEL SW POSITION ASTRO 2 10 SIS OFF 
C J0212 X SEL SW POSITION ASTRO 3 10 SIS OFF 
SUBSYSTEM SERVICE PROPULSION 
S POOOI P HE TANK PRESS 10 SIS 0 
S P0002 T HE TANK TEMP 1 SIS -100 
S P003 P PRESS OXIDIZER TANKS 10 SIS 0 
S POO05 T TEMP OXIDIZER ENG FEEDLINE 10 SIS 0 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
10 SIS 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
50 SIS -25 
50 SIS 0 
50 SIS -8.5 
50' SIS -800 
50 SIS -6 
10 SIS -2.5 
50 SIS -25 
10 SIS 0 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
lO SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS 0 
50 SIS -25 
50 SIS 0 
10 SIS 0 
1 SIS 0 
50 SIS -6 
10 S'/ S -25 
10 SIS 0 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS ON 
200 SIS OFF 
200 SIS OFF 
200 SIS OFF 
200 SIS OFF 
200 SIS OFF 
10 SIS OFF 
10 SIS 0 
10 SIS -12 
10 SIS 0 
10 SIS -12 
10 SIS -12 
10 SIS -12 
10 SIS -12 
50 SIS OFF 
50 SIS OFF 
S POOO6 P PRESS FUEL TANKS 10 S IS 0 +300 PSIA 
S P008 T TEMP FUEL ENG FEEDLINE 10 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
S POOO9 P PRESS MAIN VLV ENG OXIDIZER IN 10 S IS 0 +300 PSIA 
S POOlO P PRESS MA IN VLV ENG FUEL IN 10 S IS 0 +300 PSA 
S P0020 T TEMP CHAMBER OUTER SKIN 1 1 S I S 0 +500 DEC F 
S P0022 H POSITION FUEL/OxiDIZER VLV 1 10 S I S 0 +90 DEC 
S P0023 H POSITION FUEL/OXIDIZER VLV 2 10 S I S 0 +90 DEG 
S P0024 H POSITION FUEL /OXIDIZER VLV 3 10 S IS 0 +90 DEG 
S P0025 H POSITION FUEL/OZIDIZER VLV 4 10 S I S 0 +90 DEG 
S P0045 T TEMP ENG VLV BODY 1 S IS 0 +250 DEG F 
S P0048 T TEMP ENG FUEL FEEDLING 1 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
S P0049 T TEMP ENG OX FEEDLINE 1 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
S P0050 T TEMP NOZZLE CUTER SKIN 1 1 S IS -25 +2500 DEG F 
S P0054 T TEMP 1 OX DIST LINE 1 S IS 0 -250 DEG F 
S POOSS T TEMP 2 OX DIST LINE 50 S IS 0 +250 DEG F 
S P0057 T TEMP 1 FUEL DISTLINE SO S I S 0 +250 DEG F 
S POOS8 T TEMP 2 FUEL DIST LINE SO S IS 0 +250 DEG F 
S P0060 T TEMP INJECTOR MAN 10 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
S P0600 P ENG VLV ACT SYS TENK PRESS PRI 1 S IS -25 +2500 DEG F 
S P0601 P ENG VLV ACT SYS TANK PRESS SEC 10 S IS 0 +5000 PSIA 
S P065S Q QUAN OX TANK 1 PRI-TOTAL A UX 1 S IS 0 +16K LB 
S P0656 Q QUAN OX TANK 2 1 SIS 0 +16K LB 
S P06S7 Q QUAN FUEL TANK 1 PRI-TOTAL AUX 1 SIS 0 +8K LB 
S P06S8 Q QUAN FUEL TANK 2 1 S I S 0 +8K LB 
S P0661 P PRESS ENGINE CHAMBER looS I S 0 +lS0 PSIA 
S P2054 T TEMP GIMBAL ACTUATOR CASE (YAW) 10 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
S P20S5 T TEMP GIMBAL ACTUATOR CASE (PITCH) 1 S IS 0 +200 DEG F 
SUBSYSTEM REACTION CONTROL 
C ROool P HE PRESS TANK A 1 SIS 0 +5K PSIA 
C R0002 P HE PRESS TANK B 1 S IS 0 +SK PSIA 
C ROOO3 T HE TEMP TA NKS A 1 S I S 0 +300 PEG F 
C ROOO4 T HE TEMP TANK B 1 S IS 0 +300 DEG F 
C R0005 P PRESS FUEL TANK A 10 SIS 0 +400 PSIA 
C ROOO6 P PRESS FUEL TANK B 10 SIS 0 +400 PSIA 
C ROOll P PRESS OXIDIZER TANK A 10 SIS 0 +400 PSIA 
C R0012 P PRESS OXIDIZER 10 S IS 0 +400 PSIA 
C R2201 T TEMP OX VLV CCW ENG SYS A SO S IS -SO +2S0 DEG F 
C R2202 T TEMP OX VLV -Y ENG SYS A 10 S IS -SO +2S0 DEG F 
C R2203 T TEMP OX VLV +Y ENG SYS B 1 S I S -SO +2S0 DEG F 
C R2204 T TEMP OX VLV -P ENG SYS B 1 S I S -SO +250 DEG F 
C R220S T TEMP OX VLV -P ENG SYS A 50 S IS -SO +250 DEG F 
C R2206 T TEMP OX VLV CW ENG SYS B 1 S IS -50 +250 DEG F 
C R4S61 T TEMP CCW ROLL ENG OUT WALL T3 SYS A SOO S IS 0 +1000 DEG F 
C R4S82 T TEMP CCW ROLL ENG OUT WALL T3 SYS B SO S IS 0 +1000 DEG F 
S RSool P HE PRESS TANK A 1 S IS 0 +SK PSIA 
S RS002 P HE PRESS TANK B 1 SIS 0 +5K PSIA 
S RS003 P HE PRESS TANK C 1 SIS 0 +5K PSIA 
S R5004 P HE PRESS TANK D 1 SIS 0 +SK PSIA 
S R5013 T HE TEMP TANK A 200 S IS 0 +lS0 DEG ~: 
S R5014 T HE TEMP TANK B 200 S IS 0 +150 DEG F 
S RSOlS T HE TEMP TANK C 100 S IS 0 +150 DEG F 
S RS016 T HE TEMP TANK D 1 S IS 0 +150 DEG F 
S RS055 Q QUANTITY SN RCS PROP BITS 1-8 10 S I S 0 +70 LB 
S R5056 Q QUANTITY SN RCS PROP BITS 9-14 10 S IS 0 + 140 LB 
S R5065 T TEMP ENGINE PACKAGE Al 1 S IS 0 +300 DEG F 
S R5066 T TEMP ENGINE PACKAGE Bl 1 SIS 0 +300 DEG F 
S RS067 T TEMP ENGINE PACKAGE Cl 1 SIS 0 +300 DEG F 
S RS068 T TEMP ENGINE PACKAGE D1 1 SIS 0 +300 DEG F 
S RS729 P A HE MANIFOLD PRESS 10 SIS 0 +400 PSIA 
S RS733 P A OXIDIZER MANIFOLD PRESS 100 S IS 0 +300 PSIA 
S R5737 P A FUEL MANIFOLD PRESS 100 S I S 0 +300 PSIA 
S R5776 P B HE MANIFOLD PRESS 10 S IS 0 +400 PSIA 
S R5784 P B FUEL MANIFOLD PRESS 100 S IS 0 +300 PSIA 
S R5817 PC HE MANIFOLD PRESS 10 S IS 0 +400 PSIA 
S R5821 P D HE MANIFOLD PRESS 100 SIS 0 +300 PSIA 

S R 5822 PC FUEL MANIFOLD PRESS 100 SIS 0 +300 PSIA 

S R5823 P D FUEL MANIFOLD PRESS 100 S IS 0 +300 PSIA 

S R5830 P D HE MANIFOLD PRESS 10 S IS 0 +400 PSIA 

S R7128 T TEMP IN] HEAD +Y ENG SYS B 50 S IS 0 +500 PSIA 

S R7134 T TEMP IN] HEAD CCW ENG SYS A 50 SIS 0 +500 

SUBSYSTEM LAUNCH VEHICLE EMERGENCY DETECTION 
B -SOO I6 x LAUNCH VEH BUIDAN CE FAIL A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0020 X LAUNCH VEH RATE EXCESSIVE A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0030 X ENG NO lOUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0032 X ENG NO 2 OUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0034 X ENG NO 3 OUT A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0036 X ENG NO 4 OUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0038 X ENG NO 5 OUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0040 X ENG NO 6 OUT A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0042 X ENG NO 7 OUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0044 X ENG NO 8 OUT A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0060 X LIFT OFF SIGNAL A 10 S IS OFF ON EVENT 
B S0061 X LIFT OFF SIGNAL B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C S0080 X EDS :-\BORT REQUEST A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
L S0090 X TOWER PHYS SEPAR.--\T ION MON A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
L S0091 X TOWER PHYS SEPARATION MON B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C SOl00 X CM -CM PHYS SEPARATION MON A 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C S0101 X CM-SM PHYS SEPARATION MON B 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S S0120 X SM / ADAPTER PHYS SEPARATION 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
S S0121 X SM I ADAPTER PHYS SEPARATION 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C S0150 X MASTER CAUTION-WARNING ON 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
SUBSYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND INSTRUMENTATION 
C T0012 X TAPE MOTION MONITOR OPER 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C T0013 X TAPE MOTION MONITOR RAND D 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C TOOlS V SIG COND POS SUPPLY VOLTS 10 SIS 0 +35 VDC 
C T0016 V SIG COND NEG SUPPLY VOLTS 10 SIS 0 -35 VDC 
C T0017 V SENSOR EXCITATION 5 VOLTS 10 SIS 0 +8 VDC 
C T0018 V SENSOR EXCITATION 10 VOLTS 10 SIS 0 +17 VDC 
C T0055 V TV CA MERA TARGET VOLTAGE 10 SIS 0 +500 FT LMB 
C T0089 C-BAND XMTR OUTPUT MONITOR 10 SIS 100 1300 PRF 
C T0098 F C-BAND DECODER OUT 10 SIS 100 1300 PRF 
C T0108 K GAS ANALYX IX -SU IT AND CAB IN 10 SIS 0 5 VDC 
C T0120 X PCM BIT RATE CHANGE 8 BIT 1 SIS DIGITAL 
C T0125 V PCM HI LEVEL 85 PERCENT REF 10 SIS 0 50 VDC 
C T0126 V PCM HI LEVEL 15 PERCENT REF 10 SIS 0 5.0 VDC 
C T0127 V PCM LO LEVEL 85 PERCENT REF 1 SIS 0 .040 VDC 
C T0128 V PCM LO LEVEL 15 PERCENT REF 1 SIS .040 VDC 
C TOl41 X CTE TIMING MCDE MONITOR 10 SIS OFF ON EVENT 
C T0142 F CENTRAL TIMING GMT 32 BIT 10 S IS DIGITAL 
C T0147 V S-BAND REC AGC VOLTAGE 10 SIS -130 -40 DBM 
CT0191 VVHF I AM RECAGCVOLTAGE 10 SIS -25 T - = ~t 
C T0212 V S-BA ND REC STATIC PHASE ERROR 10 SIS -60K +60K DEV CPS 
C T0215 V S-BAND XMTR DETECTED RF OUTPUT 10 S IS 0 600 MW 
C T0261 V UDL REC SIGNAL STRENGTH 10 S IS -110 -90 DBM 
C T0262 V UDL SYS VALIDITY SIGN.--\L 8-BIT 50 SIS DIGITAL 
C T0320 V VHF I AM XMTR DETECTED RF OUTPUT 100 S IS 0 12 WATTS 
C T0330 V VHF I FM XMTR PA DETECTED RF OUT 10 SIS 0 18 WATTS 
C T0340 X PCM TIMING SOURCE EXT OR INT 10 SIS INT EXT EVENT 
b. SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS 
(l) 	SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM CONFIGURA nON 
(a) Ordnance was only installed and electrically connected in the forward deck area under the 
forward heat shield. The forward deck harness was disconnected from pyro continuity verifi­
cation box and shorting plugs were installed. All other ordnance which was installed did not 
contain the initiating devices. 
(b) The flight connections, which are made to the GSE access connectors of the RCS control box· 
es in order to reset the 51-second time delays during the terminal count EDS test, were not 
connected . due to a checklist error. 
(c) A circuit breaker box was inserted between the SM pyro batteries and the SM jettison con­
trollers in order to termina te -x transl ation of the SM at CM/ SM separation, to prevent SM jet­
tison ba ttery depl etion. 
(2) . COMMENTS ON DATA 
An analysis of the SC-012 sequential system data for the time period from 23:12:00 GMT 
throegh 23 :31:17.398 GMT indicates nOlmal system operation dl~Iing this time. 
At approximately 23:31:12 GMT the battery buses were switched on the main buses, 
which caused the logic bl'ses to drop to the main bl~s voltage level. Refer to subsequent 
paragraph c. for further discussion of the switching. 
At 23 :31:15 .5 GMT a master alarm occl!Ired. This condition was caused by 02 high 
flow, in that 02 flow rate was satl!rated for the 15 seconds prior to this master alarm (See 
figure 3-5). 
At 23:31:26.712 GMT, hardline data indicates that EDS " unsafe A" came on. This 
indicates that at this time one of the three EDS bl!ses from the spacecraft to the launch vehicle 
was lost. Since two of the EDS bl!s circl!it breakers were open when cockpit configuration 
was established post-incident , the deter mination is that the first circuit breaker was tripped at 
this time. 
One non-instrumented anomaly was noted by the launch vehicle personnel dur ing the EDS 
test at 20:52:23 GMT. At this time the launch Vehicle Attitude Reference Fail check was 
being per formed. EDS bus 1 was turned off and astronaut was to ver ify no change in the 
panel 5 status light. However, he stated that the "Engine 8 Out" light went off. This 
light came back on 8 seconds later as reported by the astronaut and verified on the voice 
tape. Data review shows no switching in the cockpit from the time the EDS bus 1 went off 
for approximately 39 seconds . No further information is available since this is the "B" side 
of the light and it is not instr umented . At this time no explanation is available. 
c. 	ELECTRICAL POWER 
(1) . SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
Just prior to the incident, the spacecraft DC buses were being powered fr om GSE ground 
power supplies via the S j M GSE flyaway umbilical. Spacecraft batteries were not connected 
to the main DC bl!ses. The fuel cell (FjC) simulator (CI4-395 battery pack)- was connected 
to fuel cell no . 1 and fl!el cell no . 3 harnesses (fuel cells 1, 2 and 3 were disconnected) but 
not tied to the spacecraft buses. 
Spacecraft AC bus 1 was power ed by inverter 1 which was powered from DC bus A, 
and AC bl!s 2 was powered by inverter 2 which was powered from DC bus B. Inverter 
3 was not operating since it is used only for backup in the event of failure of inverter no . l 
or 2. 
Bus versus equipment configuration is shown in Table 4 .3-1. 
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(2). 	COMMENTS ON DATA 
(a). The electrical power system was operating nOlmally throughout the performance of 
OCP·FO·K-0021-1 up to approximately 23:30:55 GMT. At that time a small, shOlt dur­
ation increase in AC bus 2 voltages (all three phases) was noted. Prior to this time the 
AC bus 2 voltages were steady to within one bit of information and as follows (see 
Figure 3-2): . 
Phase A (CC0203) - 117.0 to 117.6 VAC 

Phase B (CC0204) - 116.6 VAC 

Phase C (CC0205) - 112.5 VAC 

The voltages varied from this steady state vall!e as follows: 
AMPLITUDE AMPLITUDE 
TIME (GMT) (VOLTS). TIME (GMT) (VOLTS) 
Phase A 23:30:54.920 	 125.8 23:30:55.020 117.0 
Phase B 23:30:54.920 	 120.8 23:30:55.026 117.2 
Phase C 23:30:54.927 	 117.2 23:30:55.027 113 
The voltages then returned to the values previously recOlded (Iefer to Panel 18 RepOlt, 
AC bus 2 voltage variations, fm further discussion) and remained at those values up to 
LOS . 
The only other unusual indication in the EPS system prior to LOS occurred at 
23 :31:13 GMT with indications that Bat B&C had been connected to the main DC buses, 
followed at 23:31:14 GMT by indications that Bat A&C had been connected to the main 
DC buses (see Figure 2-3). This was accomplished by crew manual connection of these 
batteries to the main buses. The switches used to accomplish this (panel 22 - main bus 
tie Bat B&C) were found during post-incident inspection to be in the positions that would 
connect these batteries to the main buses. 
(b). There is no evidence of an electrical short indicated in any of the other EPS 
parameters. 
(3). SYSTEM POWER REMOVAL 
Following the incident, removal of external power was begun at 23:32:46 GMT and all 
external power was removed by 23:33 :13 GMT. However, there was no way to remove Bat A, 
B, and C from the buses, and spacecraft buses remained powered until the batteries were 
depleted (estimated at approximately 05:30 GMT, 28 January 1967). 
d. 	GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM 
(1). SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The guidance and navigation system was in the normal launch configuration with the follow· 
ing exceptions; 
(a). The coupling display units (CnU) hermetic sealing panel was not installed. 

(b) . The ground test access connector covers were not installed on the power-servo assembly 

trays. 

(2). 	DATA EVALUATION 
Data evaluation of all the instrumented parameters associated with guidance and naviga­
tion has not revealed any facts that would indicate a malfunction which might have contrib­
uted to the accident. All system operation was normal prior to the incident. 
The physical characteristic of the system design lends itself to supplying nonsystem related 
facts associated with the incident, e.g.: 
(a). Change in navigation base pitch angle correlates with crew compartment pressure 
changes, as discussed in the Panel 18 report. . 
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TABLE 4.3-1 SC 012 EQUIPMENT VS BUS CONFIGURATION AT 23:30:00 GMT 
EQUIPMENT 
DC 
MN A 
DC 
MN B BAT A BAT B 
PYRO 
A 
PYRO 
B 
AC 
BUS I 
AC 
BUS 2 
EPS 
Entry Bat A 
Entry Bat B 
Post Land Bat 
Pyro Bat A 
Pyro Bat B 
Bat Charger 
Inv 1 DC (Input) 
Inv 1 AC (Output) 
Inv 2 DC (Input) 
Inv 2 AC (Output) 
Inv 3 DC (Input) 
Inv 3 AC (Input) 
Power Factor Corr Box 
Phase Synch Box 
AC OIY-UIY Unit 
DC UIY Unit 
FUEL CELL & CRYO 
None 
SEQUENTIAL 
MESC 
ELSC 
RSC Con tr Box 
C&W Power Sup/ Lights 
Dig Event Timers 
PCVB 
Emerg Det System 
SCS AND GIN 
IMU 
IMU Heater 
Computer 
Lighting 
SCS Partial Power 
Rate Gyro 
Rotation Control 
BMAG 
TVC (l & 2) 
RCS Direct Coils 
RCS Normal Coils 
N/C 
N/ C 
Conn 
N/C 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
N/C 
Conn 
N/ C 
N/ C 
Conn 
N/C 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
N/ C 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
NiC 
Conn 
N/ C 
Conn 
N/ C 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
N/C 
Conn 
N/C 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
NC: Not Connected. Conn: Connected. 
TABLE 4.3-1 SC 012 EQUIPMENT VS BUS CONFIGURATION AT 23:30:00GMT (Continued) 
EQUIPMENT 
INSTRUMENTATION 
PCM 
SCE 
Central Timing Equip 
Fit Qual Rcdr 
DSE 

Panel 204 (Non ESS) 

Panel 204 ( ESS) 

C14A12 Fuse Box 

MDAS 

COMMUNICATIONS 
UDL 

TV 

VHF / FM 

S Band PA 

PMP 

Audio Center 

VHF / RCV BCN 

HF 

DSEA 

VHF/ AM 
C Band 
·Power connector not hooked 
up to DSEA . Circuit breaker 
was on. 
PROPULSION 
None 
ECS 
H20 Accum 
Cabin Air Fan I 
Cabin Air Fan 2 
Suit Compressors 
Glycol Pumps 
Waste & Pot H2O 

Xdcrs. Press GP 1&2 

ECS Xdcr, Temp 

Radiator Isol Valve 1 

Radiator Isol Valve 2 

Pot H20 
DC 
MN A 
DC 
MN B BAT A BAT B 
PYRO 
A 
PYRO 
B 
AC 
BUS 1 
AC 
BUS 2 
Conn 
Conn Conn Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn N/ C 
Conn Conn N/ C 
Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn Conn N/C Conn 
Conn Conn Conn N/ C 
Conn Conn Conn N/ C 
Conn Conn 
N/ C N/ C 
N/ C N/ C 
NlC· N/ C 
Conn Conn 
Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn 
Conn 
Conn N/ C 
Conn N/ C 
Conn Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn Conn 
Conn 
N/ C 
Conn Conn 
(b). Changes in gimbal torque motor input voltages indicate vehicle movement , as dis­
cussed in the Panel 18 report. 
Since the G&N system was in the gyrocompassing mode during the test, the system 
attempted to maintain the inertial platform horizontal to local gravity and the azimuth 
at a predetermined heading. Any motion that tends to alter these conditions results 
in a correcting voltage being applied to the platform gimbal torque motors. Crew activity 
can impart motion to the vehicle, which could result in torque motor voltages which 
can be discerned from normal signals applied during gyrocompassing. 
(3) . DATA PECULIARITIES 
After the fire started, the Check Fail Alarm CG5005 and Error Detect PGNS alarm 
CG5023 came on at 23:31: 17 .3 . 
e. STABILIZATION CONTROL SYSTEM 
(1) . SCS CONFIGURATION 

The SCS was configureq to launch configuration, with the following exceptions: 

(a) . Only one (1) rotation controller was installed. 

(b) . Only one (1) translation control was installed . 

(c) . The A14-275 quad simulators were connected instead of the RCS engines. 

(2). COMMENTS ON DATA 
Data analysis indicates normal operation of all parameters until loss of data, with the 
following exceptions: 
(a). ROTATION CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS 
At 23 :30:54:85 GMT, a momentary shift in level was noted on the rotation control 
output pitch (CH0025), yaw (CH1025), and roll (CH2025) measurements. The power 
for these parameters was supplied by AC bus 2, phase A. This occurrence is associated 
with the AC transient (see Figure 5.2-1 in the Panel 18 Report for further discussion). 
At 23 :31: 14.6 GMT a signal was noted on the roll rotation control output of approx­
imately l.75 VAC and the associated signal of the roll error amplifier output which is 
equivalent to monitoring the controller for position roll. At the same time, small tran­
sients were noted on the pitch and yaw rotation control output measurements are pro­
portional to the amount and direction of controller position . 
At the time of the incident, the rotational control was pinned in a null pOSitIOn. 
Physical examination of the rotation controller following the incident showed the handle 
still pinned and with no apparent damage to the pin. Soot deposits on the pin indicated 
slight pin motion. Special tests indicate the pin will allow slight movement of the controller 
with an appreciable output signal. 
(b) . RATE ERROR AMPLIFIER OUTPUT OSCILLATIONS 
Beginning at 23:31:04 GMT, and continuing to loss of signal, small amplitude oscil­
lations were noted on the roll rate error amplifier output. Smaller oscillations and trans­
ients were noted on the pitch and yaw rate error outputs (see Figures 3-7 and 3-8). 
These changes correlate with spacecraft movement. 
(c) . MTVC ENGAGE 
At 23:31:18 .2 GMT, following a loss of signal of approximately 800 milliseconds, 
the event manual thrust vector control (MTVC) engage was noted to have changed state 
from OFF to ON . This condition continued until loss of signal. 
Following this event, pitch and yaw MTVC rate gyro outputs showed activity in­
dicating the MTVC circuits were active (see Figure 4.5-2). MTVC engage is actuated 
by physically rotating the T-handle on the translation controller to a CW position. Ex­
amination of the translation controller following the incident showed the T-handle to be 
in a MTVC ON position . 
(d) . Beginning at 23:31 :20 GMT, RCS solenoid driver activity was indicated, which could 
be the result of shorts in spacecraft wiring. This time was just prior to the loss of data . 
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CH2025 ROLL MAN ROTATION CONTROL OUl 
I 
- ..,........ 

: I "\ 
C 
o 1 
-I 

-I 

CH20S0 ROLL RATE ERR AMP OUT 
!.:J-r3-f t-ftff [ 1·1 [YFfJfE 
• CH002S PITCH MAN ROTATION CONTROL 
~ Jf I 11 I I I I I I I I I EI I I I f I 
CHOOSO PITCH RATE ERR AMP OUT 
!J II J I 1-] J I I 1 I I I I I f IAI H 
• CH102SV YAW MAN ROTATION CONTROL 
:_:] I I I 1 I I [ I 11f I I [ I I I I I I 
CH10S0R YAW RATE ERR AMP OUT 
!J 1 H f Ilill [ 11111111 H

11.0 11.1 II •• II •• II.' n.D n.1 n .• n •• n .....0 ...1 I....... I••• II.D 11.1 II •• II •• II.' .... 

• eGG. 
II!!.' II!I.. II!'" n!l.. n!I.. n!l.. ..~.. ..~.. II!I.. II~N Ill.u. _ •.•I•••C ~ 
FIGURE 4.5-1 ROTATION CONTROLLER OUTPUT SIGNALS 
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f. 	ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
(1) . OXYGEN SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION (See Figure 4.6-1) 
Gaseous oxygen from K-bottles was utilized for environmental oxygen throughout the 
test. The following GSE was used for support:. 
(a). K-Bottle and Regulator 
The K-bottle regulator was adjusted at 14:15 GMT and maintained throughout 
the test at approximately 1000psig to the gas pressure panel. One K-bottle change 
was performed at approximately 20:18 GMT. 
(b). Gas Pressure Panel 
The outlet from the K-bottle regulator was regulated down to 650-750 psig in the 
unit and maintained at this value throughout the test. 
(c). Oxygen Valve Panel 
This panel was used as an isolation interface between gas pressure panel and the service 
module oxygen pneumatically operated disconnect (POD). 
(d). Spacecraft Oxygen System Configuration 
The oxygen entering the service module was isolated from the cryogenic tanks by 
check valves. The 02 entered the command module through one of two available supply 
lines to the oxygen surge tank, one pound bottle, and regula tots for distribution to various 
02 subsystems. 
(2). COMMENTS ON OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM DATA 
The oxygen system worked normally both prior to and after the report of the fire, with 
the exception of the high 02 flow rate. This is discussed in the Panel 18 Report. 
(3). SUIT CIRCUIT OXYGEN SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
Oxygen at 100 psig was supplied to the suit circuit through the demand pressure regu­
lator (see Figure 4.6-2). 
The demand pressure regulator is used for normal makeup, or demands of up to 0.70 
lblmin of oxygen. The demand regulator test selector is used to pressurize the suit circuit 
for suit integrity tests. 
(4) . COMMENTS ON SUIT CIRCUIT OXYGEN SYSTEM DATA 
The suit circuit oxygen system worked normally both prior to and after the report of 
the fire. At 23:31:09.6 GMT, the suit flow for the SRP suddenly went to lower limit for 
2 seconds and back to full scale in a step function. See Panel 18 Report for further discussion. 
(5). 	WIG SUBSYSTEM CONFIGURATION (see Figure 4.6-3) 
Water glycol was being supplied from GSE (S14-053) and as it would be for normal 
laW1ch, with one exception, the solenoid-operated valve on the return line in the service module 
was powered by an auxiliary 28 VDC supply to maintain flow after the umbilical disconnect 
(Plugs Out). Cold water glycol is supplied to the SIC from the trim control unit (S14-053) 
at constant pressure, temperature, and flow rate. The final adjustments of these conditions 
were made immediately following inner hatch installation at 19:45 GMT. Supply pressl.\re 
was constant at 69.5 psia (FF5062). 
Supply temperature was adjusted in order to achieve 40 ± 1 degree F at the glycol evap­
orator outlet. 
Actual value was constant 40.9°F, measured at CF0018T. Flow rate was adjusted 
to a constant 196.5 lblhr (FF5063). 
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(6) COMMENTS ON DATA 
At about 8 minutes prior to the crew call of fire the accumulator quantity pressure meas­
urement started a gradual decrease which continued to the time when the cabin pressure rose 
because of the fire. The supply pressure measurement, which also senses changes of pressure 
within the glycol system, showed an associated change during this period of time. See Panel 
18 Report for further discussion. 
g. COMMUNICATION 
(1) . The communication system was in launch configuration except for the following: 
(a) . Only one data storage electronic assembly voice recorder (DSEA) was installed, but 
was not electrically connected. Two DSEA's are required for launch configuration, with 
only one connected . 
(b). Only one bio-med tee adapter was installed (SRP position). For flight there would 
be three. 
(c). CMD Pilot was using a flight-space cobra cable (-51) instead of the normal cable 
(-41); the cobra cable was changed during the "live mike" troubleshooting. 
(d). Audio control panel and cobra cable switches were in position to facilitate testing 
as a workaround for the "live mike" problem. 
(e). The USBE was in the "transponder only" mode (power amplifier "off"). The launch 
configurat{on transponder power amplifier mode would have been selected at T -10 minutes. 
Figure 4.7-1 shows the astronaut umbilical communication system cobra cable, tee adap­
ter, etc. 
(2). COMMENTS ON DATA 
(a). All data reviewed indicates that the spacecraft communication system performed 
normally between 23:30 :00 GMT and LOS, except for the following: 
(1). VHF I FM DROPOUT - A momentary dropout occurred in the RF detected 
PCM video wave-train at 23 :30:54.85 GMT and lasted for approximately 30 milli­
seconds. MSOB and the TEL IV signal strength parameters of the VHF /FM carrier 
had a momentary dropout coincident with the PCM video dropout. See Panel 18 
Report for further discussion . 
(2). C-BAND DROPOUT - A C-band dropout occurred at 23:30:54.85 GMT and 
lasted for 1.7 seconds (see Figure 3-2). The dropout was indicated in the receiver 
decoder and in the transmitter output. Both are PCM data points which are sampled 
10 times per second, and both have RC time constants of 0 .1 second . See Panel 
18 Report for additional details. 
(3). "LIVE MIKE" CONDITION - Voice tape analysis and PCM data records 
showed a "live mike" (constant keying) condition existed from the CMD Pilot position 
during a considerable portion of the final test period . See Panel 18 Report for great­
er detail. 
(b). VOICE RECORDINGS 
Voice recordings wer.e made in the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building (MSOB) 
ACE Station, MSOB Open Loop Communication Station (MOLC), Blockhouse 34, MCCK 
at Cape Kennedy, MSC-Houston , and NAA Downey via Houston (see Figure 4.7-2). 
The data from these tapes were studied in an attempt to determine possible clues to 
the cause and crew reaction to the fire . A transcript was made of the S-band and 
VHFI AM tracks of the MOLC voice tape from 23:29:45.5 GMT to LOS . This tape 
was chosen because it contained the only direct S-band voice from the SIC and was 
less noisy than the OIS tapes. 
(c). ANALYSIS OF OSCILLOGRAPH RECORDING 
The voice transmissions shown in Figure 3-9 were analyzed with the use of MOLC 
tapes and PCM data . This figure shows the VHF/ AM and S-band voice tracks oscillo­
graph readout from 23:29:42.5 GMT to LOS. 
(1). 23:29:42 .5 to 23:30:14 GMT 
(a). The CMD was transmitting on S-band . The SRP made a voice transmISSiOn 
on S-band and VHF IAM. There was no voice transmission by the PLT. 
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(b). The ground personnel were transmIttmg to the SIC on S·band. The voice of the 
CMD was being turned around by the CAST (astro communicator console) system and 
retransmitted to the SIC on VHF. 
(c). The "live mike" noises are not evident, probably because of the higher noise level 
caused by the uplink S-band being patched to the MOLC RF recorder . 
(2) . 23:30:14 to 23:31:00 GMT 
(a) . There were no voice transmissions from the SIC. 
(b). The ground pe~sonnel were not transmitting to the SIC on VHF. 
(c). There was no chan~e in the "live mike"· condition. Considerable amounts 
of noise similar to those obtained when a microphone is brushed or tapped, 
including breathing sounds, were evident. Some of the louder noises appear 
to have had sufficient amplitude to trigger the uplink VHF/AM via CAST. 
(3). 23:31 :00 GMT TO LOS 
(a). There were two series of voice transmissions on S-band. The times for these 
two transmissions are detailed in Figure 3-9. No voice communications on VHF 
were made from thr SIC during this time period. 
(b). The ground personnel were not transmitting to the SIC on VHF. The 
voice transmissions from the SIC were being turned around by the CAST system 
and were retransmitted to the SIC on VHF. 
(d) . ANALYSIS OF VOICE TAPES DURING THE PERIOD OF FIRE 
The tape transcripts of the voice tapes from the Command Module during the time 
period of the fire (referred to as the first and second transmission, on Table 4.7-1), have 
been extensively analyzed. This analysis included a review of all transmissions prior to 
the fire that were made by the crew during the test in an attempt to aid in the deter­
mination of who made these last two transmissions and what was said. This analysis was 
made by NASA personnel familiar with the communication systems, the crew and their 
voice characteristics, the sequence of events before, during and after the fire as determined 
during the accident investigation . The Apollo 204 Review Board also reviewed these 
transmissions. Experts at the Bell Telephone Laboratories also performed extensive analysis 
of the tape · record. Review by other experts, such as Civil Aeronautics Board accident 
investigation personnel, is currently in progress. Any new findings from these additional 
reviews will be included in Appendix G of the Final Report. 
Except for a portion of the first transmission, which is quite clear, the remainder 
of the first and second transmission is not clear and it is impossible to define exactly 
what was said by the crew. Two points made by the Bell Telephone Laboratory experts, 
however, should be noted: 
(1). The present state·of-the-art of analysis of voice records is such that little, if any­
thing, can be determined as to what was said if the recording is not sufficiently clear 
to be intelligible by listening alone. Analysis, however, can, under these circumstances, 
provide some clues; but these clues cannot be used to definitely determine which 
crew member initiated the transmission. 
(2). When the recording of the transmj.ssion is not clear, there will be nearly as many 
interpretations of what was said as there are qualified listeners. Many interpretations 
of what was said have been made. A summary of these interpretations is made in 
the following paragraphs. 
The analysis of the first voice transmitted is as follows: 
This transmission began at 23:31:04.7 GMT with an exclamatory remark. This 
transmission is not clear. Most listeners believe this initial remark was one of the follow­
ing: 

"Hey" 

"Fire" 

"Break " 

Most listeners believe, and laboratory analysis supports this belief, that this transmission 
was made by the Command Pilot. This remark is followed by a short period of noise 
(bumping sounds, etc.). 
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TABLE 4.7 - 1 TRANSCRI PT OF VOICE CHANNEL FOR LAST 27 SECONDS 
MOLC VHF / AM TRACK TRANSCRIPT 
23:30:58.5 (Short noise 0.6 sec) 
23:31 :04 .7 >II(First voice transmission) 
23:31 :10.0 (End of first transmission) 
23:31: 17. I (Second voice" transmi ssion) 
23;31 :21.8 (End of second transmi ssion) 
>II Analysis of these transmissions appears in 
paragraph 4.7 
23:30:55.5 
23:30:56 
23:30:56.5 
23:30:58. I 
23:31 :04 
23:31 :04.7 
23:31 :10.0 
23:31: 16.8 
23:31 :'21.8 
23:31 :22.4 
MOLC S - BAND TRANSCRIPT 
(Noise) 

(Breathing sound) 

(Noise) 

(Noise) 

(Breathing sound) 

(First voice transmission 
of spacecraft problem) 
(End of transmission) 
(Second voice transmission " 
of spacecraft problem) 
(End of second transmission) 
(LOS) 
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The second portion of this first transmission begins at 23 :31:06.2 GMT with an unclear 
word. Most listeners believe the first to be one of the following: 
" I 've" 
"We've" 
The remainder of this transmission is quite clear and is: " .......Got a fire in the 
cockpit", followed by a clipped word sounding like "VHEH", which ended at 23:31 :10 
GMT. Many listeners believed this transmission to have been made by the Pilot. Some 
believe it could have been made by the Command Pilot or the Senior Pilot. However, 
laboratory analysis assigns the greatest pr<:>bability that it was made by the Pilot, but 
the results of the analysis do not negate the possibility that one of the other crew members 
could have made the transmission. 
The analysis of the second voice transmission is as follows: 

Following a 6 .8 second period of no transmission the second transmission began at 

23 :31 :16.8 GMT and ended at 23:31:21.8 GMT. The entire second transmission is some­
what garbled. This second transmission, therefore, is subject to wide variation of inter­
pretation as to content ·and as to who was making the transmission or transmissions . The 
general content is what appears to be three separate phrases aJld it has been interpreted 
several ways by many listeners . The following is a list of some of the interpretations 
that have been made: 
(1) . "Fighting a bad fire · Let ' s get out. .. .. 

Open 'er up." 

(2) . "We 've got a bad fire· Let's get out. .... 

We're burning up." 

"I'm reporting a bad fire .... I'm getting out..Oh, AAH." (Scream) 

Some people feel that the very end of this second transmission is a scream or the 

start of one. Many listeners believe this traasmission was made by the Pilot. 
It should be noted that: 
(1). The total time duration of these two transmissions was brief, lasting 17.1 seconds; 
the first lasted 5 .3 seconds and the second lasted 5 .0 seconds, with a 6.8 second 
period of no transmission between . 
(2). The transmissions provide evidence only of the time the crew first transmitted 
a report of the existence of the fire and do not provide any direct information as 
to the cause of the fire . 
H. 	FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM 
(1). FUEL CELLS 
Fuel cells were inactive and were not being monitored during the incident. A review 
of the data from 23:26:00 GMT to the incident indicated no fuel cell anomalies . 
(2). CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM (CGSS) 
The CGSS was inactive during the test. . Gas was supplied to the environmental control 
system from " K" bottles through port OP. on the service module. A review of data from 
23 :26:00 GMT to the incident indicated no anomalies in the CGSS . 
i. PROPULSION (SPS AND RCS) 
(1). 	SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The differences from the normal launch countdown configuration were as follows: 
Propellant tanks, helium storage tanks, and engine actuation system GN2 tanks were not 
serviced to flight pressures but were at low (normal) blanket pressures (using GN2) . 

(2). COMMENTS ON SPS DATA 

All data on the SPS remained normal and constant until loss of data. 

(3). 	REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
CSM RCS was configured for launch with the following exceptions: 
(a). The engine simulators were installed in lieu of actual engine circuitry. 
(b). No consumables were on board. The scupper supports were in place . 
(c) . A temperature thermocouple was taped to CM "B" system oxidizer isolation valve 
to monitor valve temperature rise during plugs out mission run. 
(d). The engine throat plugs and flow sensors were partially installed in preparation for 
flight readiness test. The engine covers were installed on quad engines . CM engines 
were environmentally sealed with tape. 
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(4). 	COMMENTS ON RCS DATA 
A simulated SM RCS +X engine static firing had been completed at approximately 
23: 15:00 GMT using Pilot's rotation controller. No anomalies were observed in this test. 
Following the simulated static firing the CSM RCS system was monitored for remainder of 
the active test. A review of the data tapes for the period 23:26:00 GMT to 23:31:30 GMT 
did not disclose any system anomalies. Significant RCS data peculiarities are detailed below: 
(a). A linear rise in temperature from an ambient condition of 70° F to 19~ F occurred 
between 23:31:19.858 GMT and loss of signal at 23:31:22:432 GMT on CR4561T. This 
transducer is a resistance thermometer type and is .spot welded to the upper surface of 
CM RCS "A" CCW engine between frames No. 21 and 22, (closer to frame 21), and 
behind panel CM 18. It is also covered with 3/4 inches of insulating Q-felt. A second 
transducer, CR2201T, mounted on the oxidizer injector value of the same engine, showed 
no temperature increase. Although this transducer is of a similar resistance type, it was 
bonded to and encapsulated in silicon rubber. It was also 90 degrees further around 
the engine on its outward side and located between frames no. 20 and 21 (closer to frame 
21). Although partially covered by the boost protective cover, CR2201T was exposed 
to ambient conditions (panel CM 19). The sudden rise in temperature of CR4561T is 
indicative of exposure to flame at the time of cabin pressure vessel rupture. Time corre­
lation with other rupture data points must take into account the fact that the engine and 
transducer are enclosed with insulating Q-felt as noted above. 
(b). The RCS propellant isolation circuit breakers (CB16 and CB15) on panel 25 were 
found to be open during post-fire inspection. Further inspection revealed that the- circuit 
breakers' stems were only slightly smutted indicating that the circuit breakers opened 
after the fire started to subside. 
(c). The RCS selector switch was found in the SM-A position rather than the SM-D 
position called for by the procedure. This switch selects a particular SM quad for para­
meter monitoring and has no change-of-state function. The SM-A position is assumed 
to be a pilot's natural reaction to return to the initial monitoring position instead of 
leaving it in the final position following simulated static fire. 
j. CREW SYSTEMS, BIOMED, AND EXPERIMENTS 
(1). 	SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The biomed system was in launch configuration with the following exceptions: 
(a). An E. O. was released to pot the octopus cable connectors to prevent breakage of 
connector back shells . Planning was also in work to wrap the cable with tefglas and attach 
Velcro to provide attach points for support of the cable. 
(b). Only one biomed tee adapter was installed and this was in the SRP position . The 
biomed parameters for the SRP position were being monitored on both PCM and the 
MDAS recorder and the time of incident. 
Only the crew systems equipment required to support OCP-FO-K-0021-1 was stowed 
in the SIC. The stowed crew systems equipment which has an electrical interface with 
the SIC (cameras, hygrometer, alignment sight) were not connected to the SIC at the time 
of the accident. ' 
(2). 	COMMENTS ON DATA 
(a). PCM and MDAS recorder data throughout the test was normal except for several 
noise glitches which appeared on the biomed data channels. Physicians verified these 
glitches were not normal biomedical data. The first glitch occurred at 18:28:02 GMT 
and recurred randomly with the last one at 23:24:00 GMT. These noise spikes are believed 
to be caused by RFI, which has been duplicated during post-incident bench test by glitch­
ing the input power. From the time the MDAS was turned on and the timer reset to 
zero (17:36:02 GMT) until LOS of the timer (23:31:21.2 GMT), the timer operated 
normally with no loss of, or change in, timing. 
(b). Based on the PCM and MDAS data available from SIC 012, there is no indication 
that the biomed system contributed to the case of the incident. 
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TIMES SHOWN ARE DERIVED FROM SAMPLED MEASUREMENTS AND ARE 
UNCERTAIN BY THE SAMPLING RATE OF THE SPECIFIC MEASUREMENT 
" 
.¥ 
ACCUMULATOR QUANTITY STARTS DECREASING 23:31:13.0-­
'.. ~ 
0 
Z 
~ 
w 
~ 
FROtv' 
ci. '" . 
~ 
£:0 
~ 

~ 
 ROTATION CONTROLLER MOVED IN PITCH ROLL AND Y AW 23:31: 1 
0 
w 
a 
~ 
N 
23:30:00 23:31:00 23:31 :0 5 23 : 3 t : 1 0 
"' 
01 0 3 04 06 0 7 0 8 09 1 1 12 
END OF TRANSMISSION 
BEGINNING OF 
FIRE TRANSMISSION ON S-BAND 23:31 :04.'7 
COMMUNICATIONS 
C-SANO BEACON DROPOUT 23 : 30: !i 4.8 !5 TO 23:30:56.9 
V HF· FM CARRIER DROPOUT 23 : 3 0 :54 . 85 
INSTRUMENTATION LOS , V HF - FM O .ATA . aO MSEC 23 : ~O: !i 4.8 
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH SIGNAL STARTS INCREASING 2 3:30: 50 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ,SYSTEM, 
SMALL STEP 
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 
I 
MIDDLE 6: OUTER GIMBAL AC TIVITY STARTING 23 :30 :39 
I 
ACTIVIT Y SUeSIDES 23 :30 : 44 
AC BUS 2. TRANSIENT 23:30:54.85 
CABIN 81 ~UIT PRESSURE STAR' T INCREASING 23, :3..' :08.4 
CABIN TEMPERATURE INCREASING AND SUIT DELTA P INCREASE 23 : 31 :Oti.4 
I 
FLOW MAXIMUMlcAUSES C6:W ALARM 1 5 SECONDS LATER, 23 : 30 : 59 .4 
00,"" 0'"""" "''''''.'l 
MIDDLE GIMBAL DISTURBANCE STARTING 23: 3 1 :00----.., 
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM ROTATION C ONTROLLER OUTPUT TRANSIENT 23:30:154.8'5 
cc w ROLL ENGINE OUTERI INTERLE A. 
S - B A N D &- SPLIT-PHASE 
LOS S - BAND V HF- F M INTERLEA V ED HARDLINE & SPLIT Pt 
PLT SUIT FLOW STARTS FLUCTUATIN 
COMPRESSOR INLET TEMI=ERATURE STARTS INCREASING 23:31 
CMD SU i T FLOW ST AR TS FLUC TUA T ING 2 3:31 : 12.!iI----
SURGIE TANK PRE SSURE STARTS DECREASING 23 : 31 : 12.4--------
SRP SUIT F 'LOW BAC K TO NORMAL 2 3: 31 : 11:9 I 
SRP SUIT FLOW TO LOWER LIMIT 23 : 31 :09.6 ,. ...... r i . I' tl 
" ~ ~ <.' 
~ i,l ..II':', 
L V PITCH &; Y AW ACCELEROM ETER DIS TURBANCE 23:31 : 0 
I 
INNER G IMBAL a OUTER GIMBAL D ISTURBANCES START ' " 
I 
ROLL RATE OSCILLATIONS 
AIR/GROUND VOICE 
FRAME COUNT 23:31 :21 
AND SPLIT PHASE HAROLINE DA TA 23:31 :2 1.363 
RECO V E:RY 23:31:21.519 
DATA 23 : 3 1:22 .40 
DATA 23:3 1:22 . 42 
COMMUNICATIONS 
57 5B 59 
TIMES SHOWN ARE , DERIVED FROM SAMPLED MEASUREMENTS AND ARE 
UNCERTAIN BY THE SAMPLING RATE OF THE SPECIFIC MEASUREMENT 
FIVE SECOND SCALE 
23:31:00 23:31:05 23:31:10 23 :3 1 : 15 23:31 :2 0 
v ~ 
23'31 '25 23:32:00 23:33:00 
0 1 02 03 0 4 DB 07 DB Og II 12 1 a 1 4 
END OF TRANSMISSION 
BEGINNING OF LAST TRANSMISSION 23:31 :16 . 6 LOS DOWN LINK S~BAND 23: 3 ':2.2.4 
FIR"E TRANSMISSION ON S·BAND 23:31 :04 . 7 
VHF FM CARRIER OFF 23: 31 :22 . 32 
ccw ROLL ENGtNE OUTER WALL TEMPERATURE STARTS TO INCREASE 23:31:1Q .8I I NTERLEA V ED HARDLINE DATA RECOVERY 23:31 : 18 .398 
S·SAND & SPLI T- PHASE HAR OL1 NE DATA RECO VERY 23:31:17.659 
"HF-FM DATA RECOVERY 23:31:1758 
LOS S - BAND V HF-FM INTERLEAVE D HARDL tN E &: SPLIT PHASE HAROLINE DATA 23 : 31:17 .398 
IN TE RL E A V ED HARD LINE D ATA LOST PRIME 
LOS INTERLEA VE D 
INTERLEAVED AND SP LIT PHASE DATA 
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DISASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES PANEL 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Disassembly Activities Panel, 4. The task assigned for 
accomplishment by Panel 4 was prescribed as follows : 
Develop plans and procedures for progressive disassembly of Apollo Spacecraft 012 for purposes 
of inspection and failure analysis . Disassembly should be configured to proceed on a step-by-step 
basis, in a manner to obtain the maximum amount of information prior to disturbing the evidence. 
Contents of testing requirements shall also be considered. Disassembly plans should consider both 
the cockpit and the area outside the pressure hull. Means for cataloging documentary information 
within the spacecraft and for the display of removed items shall be a part of these plans and pro­
cedures. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP: 
The 	assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Disassembly Activities Panel : 
Mr. Scott H . Simpkinson, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Samuel T. Beddingfield, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Robert G. Covel, Jr., Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Paul J. Graf, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Robert J. Reed, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Harry C. Shoaf, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Charles G . Stevenson, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. Joseph C . Campbell, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Dean F. Grimm, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Patrick J . Hanifin, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey 
Mr. John M. Moore, North American Aviation (NAA), Kennedy Space Center 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Colonel Frank Borman, U. S. Air Force, Board Member, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA, 
was assigned to monitor the Disassembly Activities Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
l. INVESTIGATIVE APPROACH 
a . SPACECRAFT 012 DISASSEMBLY PROCEDURES . Immediately after the accident, at 6 :31 
p.m., EST (23:31 GMT) on January 27, 1967, NASA Kennedy Space Center Security placed 
Launch Complex . 34 under additional security. Special guards were assigned to the service structure 
and to the adjustable-eight (A-8) level at the entrance to the Command Module (C/M): Controls 
were established for personnel access to the .service structure and the CI M. Everything located 
at the Launch Complex such as Ground Support Equipment (GSE), spare parts, documents and 
drawings, special clothing, breathing apparatus and fire fighting equipment, etc ., was impounded. 
The NASA Test Supervisor in the blockhouse, in conjunction with NASA Security, controlled all 
activities on' the service structure, Implementation of these directions was coordinated through the 
NASA Operations Engineer and the NAA Pad Leader at the C/M. 
After the fire, prior to disturbing any items in the spacecraft, a series of photographs were 
taken. Several photographs were made of the surrounding areas on adjustable levels A-7 and A-8. 
Photographs showing the configuration of the area around the Pad Leader's desk on A-8 and a 
closeup of the desk may be seen in Enclosures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. The step-by-step photography 
method was established as a standard operating procedure for the entire activity of the Disassembly 
Activities Panel. 
D-4-3 
Aft.er the last crewman was removed at approximalely 2:00 a.m ., EST on January 28 , 1967, 
two spacecraft observers entered the e l M at 3:00 a .m. to verify certain panel switch positions . 
Other than this there was no activity inside the CI M on the day after the accident . Small groups 
of NASA and NAA management , the Apollo 204 Review Board Members, Representatives, and 
Consultants and others with a need to know , inspected the exterior of Spacecraft 012. They looked 
in through the open hatch , but did not enter the C / M. 
At 1:00 a.m ., EST , Sunday, January 29, 1967, a NASA photographer took additional pictures 
inside the CI M and an astronaut entered the spacecraft to verify additional switch positions needed 
to clarify the data . Considerable inspection of the exterior of the spacecraft and the A-8 level 
was accomplished throughout the day. At 10:00 a .m . EST, a second astronaut entered . the CI M 
and removed a few items of Government-furnished crew equipment after it was determined that 
they had no relation to the accident. Following this, one member of the Press was escorted to the 
A-8 level and was permitted to take pictures, with the stipulation that he could not enter the 
spacecraft. No more activity took place inside the spacecraft on that day. 
At noon on Monday, January 30, 1967, a NASA operation engineer entered the CI M to 
examine the Gas Chromatograph Cable and direct a photographer to take pictures in the vicinity 
of the cable . At about the same time, the Apollo 204 Review Board created a Hardware Removal 
and Disposition Panel (later retitled Disassembly Activities) to establish the procedures for disassembly 
of Spacecraft 012. This Panel immediately established criteria that required a standard Apollo Test 
Preparation Sheet (TPS) for any work or inspection on Spacecraft 012. Each TPS had to be signed 
by both NASA and NAA systems engineers and by the Panel Chairman (NASA) or his delegate 
(NASA) and a NAA member of the Panel. These TPS's were necessary to assure proper coor­
dination and will remain as a permanent record of the work accomplished . All prepared TPS's 
are contained in the Apollo 204 Review Board General File. 
The first step toward an orderly disassembly was to assure safe working conditions at the 
spacecraft. A meeting was held with KSC and Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) Safety 
personnel in which it was decided that (1) the Launch Escape System (LES) should be removed 
and properly stored, (2) the forward heat shield should be removed and all pyrotechnics removed 
and stored or made safe, (3) the structure should be examined by structural engineers, and (4) 
all pressure vessels should be declared safe, or the pressure should be relieved. It was also decided 
that work inside the spacecraft would not be allowed until dust samples were taken and the a ir 
declared free from possible harmful concentrations of beryllium dust. (Beryllium is used in the 
structure of the Guidance and Navigation (G&N) System .) After obtaining Board approval , these 
tasks were accomplished and Spacecraft 012 was considered safe for investigative purposes by 10:00 
p .m . EST on Thursday , February 2, 1967. 
The Hardware and Disposition Panel prepared and issued a memorandum which stated t\1e 
mode of operation for those concerned . It is included as Enclosure 4-4 to this report. 
Members of Panel 5, Origin and Propagation . of Fire, cleaned the couches in a carefully 
planned manner and documented all phases of the task. Charred data books and procedure manuals 
removed from the couches were carefully packed and hand carried to the Federal Bureau of In­
vestigation Laboratory, Washington, D. C ., in an attempt to identify any notes that may have 
been made by the crew . . 
After a specially constructed plywood cover was installed on the couches, NASA and NAA 
Quality Control (QC) inspectors entered the spacecraft and recorded all unusual appearances of 
hardware, including damaged components, but not including superficial damage such as smoke dis­
coloration and other accident effects . After more than four hours of inspection by QC, the systems 
engineers then entered the spacecraft. Each system engineer was allotted sufficient time to visually 
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inspect all of the exposed hardware of his system. This was necessary in order to formulate an 
effective plan for an orderly disassembly and to establish an overall priority for component removal. 
Following approximately four hours of engineering inspection, a NASA photographer took a series of 
close-up stereo photographs of the C /M interior, including many special points of interest required 
by various systems engineers. Before removing the couches, the top egress hatch was removed. 
It was recognized that the task of searching the physical evidence would be difficult and time 
consuming because of the confined area within the C/M and the small hatch through which every­
thing had to enter and leave . In order to remove the components as quickly as possible and keep 
the members of the investigating team informed of the findings, it was necessary to have an en­
gineer and a technician enter the spacecraft to remove the equipment and then have a photographer 
take the place of the technician and document the conditions after each removal. With proper 
distribution of the engineer's findings and the color photographs, all parties with a need to know 
were informed of the progress and considerable time was saved in the disassembly process. 
Removal of the couches posed a unique problem in that it was desirable not to disturb the 
aft bulkhead (crew compartment floor) in any way. The normal removal requires technicians to 
lie on the floor and work on the couches from the underside . To accomplish removal of the couches 
without disturbing evidence, a special platform was built which was supported from the hatch 
sill at one end and from strut attachment fittings at the other end . The technicians were able 
to lie on this platform and perform the work necessary to remove the couches. 
After the couches were removed, a special false floor, fabricated from aluminum angles sup­
porting removable 18-inch squares of 3/4-inch thick Plexiglass, was suspended from the existing 
couch strut fittings to provide access to the entire inside of the spacecraft including the floor, 
without disturbing any of the evidence. The false floor, after a check fitting in Spacecraft 014, is 
shown installed in Spacecraft 012 in Enclosure 4-S. A NASA photographer then entered the space­
craft and took a series of precision scale photographs of the interior which were later glued to the 
inside of a one-half scale model for a three dimensional reference. Members of Panel 10, Analysis of 
Fracture Areas, then enteres the spacecraft for an inspection of the structural failures in the aft 
bulkhead . 
At this point, with the couches removed, Panel S, Origin and Propagation of Fire, with Mem­
bers and Consultants of the Apollo 204 Review Board, entered the spacecraft to look over the cabin 
from the vantage provided by the transparent false floor. 
A decision was made to repeat investigation inspections by QC and the various systems en­
gineers. In order to disseminate information and to retain a permanent record of important ob­
servations during this type of inspection, a TPS was generated requiring a written summary of all 
significant findings after performing an inspection but before leaving the A-8 level of the service 
structure. These summary sheets were distributed to all parties with a need to know. 
The preparations for disassembly proceeded quite well; however, upon entering the next phase 
involving the need for closely controlled and coordinated equipment removal, it became obvious 
that new procedures were required. To implement these procedures, the Board appointed a Panel 
Coordination Committee (PCC), which included three Board Members and several Consultants. 
The first order of business of this Committee was to amend the procedures for accomplishing 
work in the C / M. Panel 4 was redesignated the Disassembly Activities Panel instead of Hardware 
Removal and Disposition Panel. Apollo 204 Review Board Administrative Procedure Number 18 
concerning the Use and Control of Test Preparation Sheets was published. This procedure covered 
the plan and control by which spacecraft hardware would be removed, inspected, analyzed or 
otherwise modified. Under this plan, requirements were reviewed by the PCC and presented to the 
Board for approval. After approval of a specific requirement by item number, TPS's to implement 
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the required action were generated by the appropriate NASA/NAA systems engineers and approved 
by members of: 
. NASA-MSC and NASA-KSC Engineering 
NAA Engineering 
Panel 5, Origin and Propagation of Fire 
Panel 18, Integration Analysis 
Materials Analysis Branch, KSC 
Panel Coordination Committee 
Panel 4, Disassembly Activities (only In those cases where execution of the TPS involved work 
inside or on the C/M) 
Concurrently, two new categories of investigation TPS's were established. These were the Com­
ponent Analysis (CA) for testing a removed component or a component from spares stock and the 
Material Analysis (MA) for analyzing a sample of material from the spacecraft or from the stock­
room. 
By February 7, 1967, this system was fully operational. The concentrated effort of organized 
and coordinated equipment checkout and removals continued on a three-shift seven day a week 
basis. All unusual or suspect circumstances or conditions were immediately brought to the attention 
of Panel 5, Origin and Propagation of Fire, and the appropriate systems engineers for any desired 
change in direction. 
During the equipment removal, electrical connectors used to connect large bundles of wires 
were in general disconnected; however, if any connectors showed physical evidence of damage, 
the wires were cut at the point where they were the least damaged and were clearly identified 
with separate tags on each cut end. In the case of tubing, lines were generally cut at a convenient 
distance from the joints to allow a leak check to be performed on the original joint. Exact inter­
faces were photographed and marked prior to disassembly, where possible, so that original con­
ditions could be reassembled if desirable. 
All interfaces, such as electrical connectors, tubing joints, physical mounting of components, 
etc., were closely inspected and photographed immediately prior to, during, and after disassembly 
as shown in Enclosure 4-6. All disconnects were made over clean plastic bags to catch any debris 
or contamination. Every item removed or taken from the C/M was appropriately tagged, sealed 
in clean plastic containers and transported under the required security to bonded storage. 
On February 17, 1967, the Review Board was satisfied that removal and wiring tests had 
progressed to the point that moving the spacecraft would not disturb any remaining evidence. 
The C/M was moved to the Pyrotechnic Installation Building (PIB) at KSC where better working 
conditions were available. The structural integrity of the damaged C/M was questionable; therefore, 
a special sling was constructed to be used to remove the C/M and lower it to ground level. This 
sling consisted of the standard sling designed to hoist the entire stacked Apollo spacecraft (includ­
ing the Lunar Module) plus two straps at approximately ninety degrees going around the C/M 
and under the aft heat shield. These added straps were designed to support the entire C/M in 
case of a structural failure in the spacecraft. The verification test of this sling using a boilerplate 
Flight Verification Vehicle (CI M), with the structural interconnection points disconnected to simu­
late a failure, is shown in Enclosure 4-7. 
After verification of the sling, it was attached to the 012 Command Module and used to lower 
it to a mounting ring on a trailer at the base of the service structure. The trailer was used to 
transport the C/M to the PIB. In order to minimize vibration, the speed was held to below five 
miles per hour over the 6.6 miles traveled. The moving operation is shown in Enclosures 4-8, 
4-9, 4-10, and 4-1l. At the PIB, the C/M was placed in the fixture normally used for alignment 
of the Launch Escape System. This fixture, shown supporting the aft heat shield in Enclosure 
4-12, was used for a period of 18 days to support the spacecraft during equipment removal and 
special testing. 
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With the improved working conditions in the PIB, it was found that a work plan of two 
eight-hour shifts per day for six days a week was sufficient to keep pace with the analysis and 
disassembly planning. The only exception to this was a three-day period of three eight-hour shifts 
per day, utilized to remove the aft heat shield, move the C /M to a more convenient work station 
(Enclosure 4-13), and remove the crew-compartment heat shield (foreground of Enclosure 4-12). 
This activity took place on March 7, 8, and 9, 1967 . The planned disassembly of the C/M was 
completed on March 27, 1967. 
In general, non-functional panels and low-suspect hardware were removed from around areas 
of suspect or heavy damage. This was done to gain better access for inspection and component 
removal within damaged areas without disturbance of evidence. 
b. CATALOGING AND DISPLAY OF ITEMS REMOVED FROM THE SPACECRAFT 
In accordance with the task assignment for Panel 4 , Disassembly Activities, the Panel took 
immediate action to catalog and place on display, the hundreds of items that would be removed 
from CI M 012 during the course of the investigation. The KSC PIB was assigned to the Apollo 
204 Review Board as an area in which components removed from the C/M could be placed 10 
bonded storage, but be available for inspection by personnel associated with the investigation. 
The following areas were established within the PIB: 
(1) BOND ROOM - A bonded area to receive components as they were removed from C/M 
012. This area was provided with a receiving table; ten storage cabinets for small components, 
areas for large components and items associated with the investigation, but not from the C/M 
itself. Enclosures 4-14 and 4-15 show the interior of this room. 
(2) ASTRONAUT EQUIPMENT ROOM AND WORK ROOM - An area in which the 
spacesuits and other Government furnished crew equipment were investigated, 
(3) BONDED DISPLAY AREA - An area in which components could be displayed under 
controlled conditions. The purpose of this area was to permit investigators to make visual exam­
ination of C/M 012 components. Work other than visual examination was not permitted in the 
display area . Enclosure 4-16 shows the components that were on display on February 21, 1967, 
and Enclosure 4-17 on March 14, 1967. 
During the course of the disassembly, there were approximately 1025 items removed from the 
spacecraft, logged, and either placed on display or held in bonded storage. Enclosure 4-18 is a list 
of these items by log number. This list does not include nearly 250 items that were logged into 
the PIB Bond Room from the launch complex and similar areas of cbpcern (not removed from 
the C / M); however , these items were numbered in the same series, resulting in a total of over 
1250 items. A set of C/M drawings was prepared and distributed that was marked with the re­
moved-item log numbers, indicating the area in or on the spacecraft from which each one was 
removed. In addition to these documents, which were issued weekly as the disassembly progressed, 
a third document showing the display location of each removed item was prepared daily and 
distributed weekly, and a fourth document was updated daily and distributed weekly showing the 
location of all logged items that were carried out of the PIB for further analysis·i; .· 
(4) COMMAND MODULE 012 WORK AREA - At the PIB, the C /M was placed in a 
supporting ring within an existing workstand. The C/M remained in this area until the aft heat 
.. 	
shield was removed. The C/M was then transferred to a standard support ring in the north end 
of the building . While in these areas , technicians continued to disassemble the C /M in accord­
ance with approved TPS's. These two work areas are shown in Enclosures 4-12 and 4-13 . After 
a component was removed from C /M 012, it was photographed and then sent to the appropriate 
bond area . 
(5) SPACECRAFT 014 COMMAND MODULE - Spacecraft 014 Command Module was 
shipped to KSC on February 1, 1967, to assist the Apollo 204 Review Board in the investigation. 
This C/M was placed in the PIB as shown in the foreground of Enclosure 4-19, and was used as 
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a vehicle for f-lracticing difficult rcmovals of C / M 012 comf-lonents . 
(li) MOCK-U l' NO . 2 - Mock-uf-l No.2, a full-scale plywood C / M, was also brought to 
KSC and f-llaced in the PIB on February 8 , 19(i7, as shown in the background of Enclosure 4-19. 
This llIOCk-uf-l was cOllfigured witll VdcrO-, dcbris traps, couch positioning, etc., to duplicate the 
(: / 1\1012 configuratioll at the tillle of thc firc. 
(7) 1L\LF-SCALE :'-10CK-UI' - A half-scale mock-up of a C / M interior was placcd in thc 
bonded display ,Ire:! on February 8, 1967. This mock-up was used to display half-scale intcrior 
surface f-lhotographs LIken after the fire in C / M 0\ 2. 
Drawing SC:\: :11190.'>, Rev. A, indicates the layout of the v;lrious areas within the PIB (En­
closure 4-20). Security was maintained within the Pin through thc usc of access lists, sign in/out 
lists. and guards stationcd at the main entrancc and at the entrance to each of the bonded areas 
within the building . (Sec guard station A, 13, and C on Enclosure 4-20.) Guard station J3 was 
discontinued ,Iftel' C / 1\1 () 12 was moved to the bonded work area at the north end of the PIB . 
i\ lllember of P,Il1c1 4 Disassembly Activities was also present in the PIB throughout all work 
f-leriods. 
c. RELE,\SE OF 11\1POUNDED EQUIPMENT - Immediately after the accident, all Spacecraft 
012 equif-lment and associated data, and also the Launch Vehicle, at KSC were impounded. This 
was done to establish the configuration of the spacecraft, associated GSE, documents, personal 
tools. and miscellaneous items . 
. \ 1\1aterial Release Record System (MRR) was devised by the Review Board to control the 
release of all imf-lounded items . The M RR was the method used to classify items in one of three 
categories as determined by the Apol.lo 204 Review Board. The three categories werc as follows: 
(I) CATEGORY A - Items which may have a significant influence or bearing on the results 
or findings of the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
(2) CATEGORY n - Items other than Category " A" that are considered relevant to the 
:\pollo 204 Review Board investigation . 
C1) CATEGORY C - Material released from Board jurisdiction. 
Impounded items were systematically reviewed and approved on MRR's for release from Cate­
gory A to Category B or C by the Apollo 204 Review Board. In those cases for which no con­
straints to release were made, the items were processed for release by TPS's written and signed 
by the appropriate NASA or NAA systems engineers and signed by the Chairman of the Disassembly 
Activities Panel. In addition, the TPS's were accompanied by release letters signed by the Dis­
assembly Activities Panel Chairman . 
In those cases for which constraints to release were made by the Review Board, TPS's were 
required to show precisely what steps were to be worked in order to clear the restraints. When 
the restraints were removed, the items were released by TPS's and release letters . 
The Spacecraft 012 C / M, its s.ystems and components, will be retained In bonded storage in 
Category A or B at KSC . All GSE was appropriately released by MRR. All prepared MRR's 
are contained in "Schedule of Physical Evidence"; Appendix F to the Final Report of the Apollo 
204 Review Board . 
D. SUPPORTING OAT A 
List of Enclosures 
Enclosure Description Drawing or 
Neg. No. 
4-1 Level A-8 - looking toward East Wall B-128-1-C 
4-2 Level A-8 - looking toward North Wall B-128-2-C 
4-3 Level A-8 - close-up of Pad Leader's desk B-128-5-C 
(Sheet 6 of 7) 
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4-4 Hardware removal and disposition panel modus operandi Memo dated 
Feb. 2, 1967 
4-5 False floor installed in spacecraft 33-72C-3 
4-6 Electrical interface photography 139-315C-11 
4-7 Special sling verification test 94-205-2 
4-8 CI M being moved out of service structure 109-281C-3 
4-9 CI M on special sling being lowered to ground 113-276C-1 
4-10 C/M being lowered onto trailer 109-282C-6 
4-11 C /M moving out of gate at Complex 34 111-286C-4 
4-12 Aft heat shield in alignment fixture with crew- 303-651C-2 
compartmen~ heat shield in the foreground 
4-13 C I M in finaI' work station, with all heat shield 303-654C-1 
removed 
4-14 PIB bond room looking toward the North wall 303-654C-2 
4-15 PIB bond room looking toward the South wall 303-654C-3 
4-16 PIB bonded display area on February 21, 1967 142-322C-3 
4-17 PIB bonded display area on March 14, 1967 303-651C-3 
4-18 Items removed from SI C 012 and placed on display 
or in bonded storage. 
4-19 C /M 014 and C/M Mock-up 2 303-651C-5 
4-20 AS-204 component arrangement in PIB SCX 311905 
\ 
This page left blank intentionally . 
D-4-10 
ENCLOSURE 4-1 


ENCLOSUR E 4-2 


ENCLOSU R E 4-3 

( 
TO: Those Concerncd 
SUBJECT: Designation of Hardwarc Removal and Disposition Panel 
.\ Ilardwarc Removal and Disposition Panel has been established to plan and control the removal and 
disposition of ,\S·204 spacecraft hardwarc . The Chairman of the panel will report to the Chairman of 
thc Board of Inquiry who will approve the plan and be kept informcd of all removal and disposition 
actions. Thc composition of the panel is as follows : 
SCOtt H. Simpkinsoll Chairman 
Sam Beddingfield l\1ember 
John l\loore l\1ember 
Patrick J . Hanifin l\lember 
The panel may call upon l\ISC. KSC and ':'.AA for necessary assistance in accomplishing its assigned 
task. 
After an intendcd removal and disposition action has been planned and approved by the Chairman of 
the Board of Inquiry, the actual removal and disposal work within the local KSC area will be executed 
by the Panel through the normal :'\fASA and NAA pad and industrial area organizations . The Panel 
will provide written instructions (in accordance with APOP procedures) and broad supervision to desig­
nated NASA and ;\lA:\ operations engineers. The designated operations engineers are Ernie Reyes, 
:\ASA, and Bruce Haight , NAA. The two designated engineers will arrange for necessary alternates 
to act for them during extra shift operations . The operations engineers will arrange for access to the 
pad :lnd schcduling of (hcir work through the Tcst Supervisor on duty <It Launch Complex 34. 
The following will govern the operation of hardware removal and disposition : 
1. WORK Al'THORIZATION AND DOCUMENTATION 
a . TEST PREPARATION SHEET 
,\11 work on SI C 012 and on the spacecraft GSE that is, or has been connected to the space. 
craft , is to bc authorizcd by Test Preparation Sheets (TPS 's) . The TPS is required to be written 
and signcd by ;\iAA and ':'.ASA KSC-SCO Systems Engineering. The TPS is approved by signa. 
ture of a ':'.ASA and a :'\AA member of the Hardware Removal and Disposition Panel. 
(1) A specific and complete statement of the "reason for work " is required on each TPS. 
(2) The TPS's are to consist of step-by-step work items written in .a detailed manner that will 
leave no question as to what is specifically required to be done . 
(3) No wire bundle electrical connectors are to be disconnected without specific call -out by 
W IB connector number of the TPS. 
(4) All work on the spacecraft is to be accomplished by NAA technicians unless otherwise 
indicated on the TPS. 
(5) All work is to be witnessed by NASA KSC-SCO and NAA Inspection . In addition, it is 
the responsibility of the HRD panel to make sure that the TPS includes the necessary requirements 
for official observers when required . Upon completion of each TPS work item , the item is to be 
stamped by NASA / NAA Inspection indicating completion. 
(6) It is required that TPS's which authorized removal of equipment from the spacecraft con­
clude with the following statement as the last item of work : " Transport equipment to the Pyro 
I nstallation Building (PIB) and stock in bonded storage." 
(7) \-Vork or examination of the equipment upon removal from the spacecraft must be authorized 
by a subsequent TPS which is to begin with a statement that authorizes removal of the equipment 
from the bonded storage room, if required. 
(8) Upon completion of work authorized by a TPS, it is required that a summary statement 
be made on the last TPS mod sheet by the NASA / NAA Systems Engineers. The summary state­
ment is to include all items of a significant nature that were observed during the work activity 
indicating where follow-up action is needed. 
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b. TPS i\IODIFIC.\TIO\: SHEETS 
\\'hencver a TPS is required to bc modified in order to allow continuance of work activity, 
a TPS mod sheet is required. Thc TPS mod sheet is required to bc written and signed by ;'I;AA 
and \:1\SA KSC-SCO Systcms Engineering and the Chairman of the Hardware Removal and 
Disposition Pancl, In addition : 
(1) A specific and complete statement of the reason for the mod sheet is required on each TPS. 
(:l) The TPS mod sheet must authorize work that is within thc intent of the original TPS . 
c. PARTS I~STALLATION A\:D REMOVAL RECORD 
,\11 equipment or material removed from the spacecraft must be documented on a Parts In­
stallation and Removal Record (PIRR). The information noted on the PIRR consists of a part 
number (if available or applicable); a description of the equipment or material; and time and 
date of removal. 
The PIRR is to be used as noted in the APOP, with Q C required to buy off all entries . 
d. PARTS TAG. 
All equipment or material removed from the spacecraft must be tagged with a parts tag . The 
tag is to be attached to thc hardware in such a manner that will not affect the condition of the 
equipment. The tag is to be attached to the container or bag that the material is placed into. 
(1) The parts tag is to accompany the equipment or material at all times . 

(:l) Hardware removal tape : 

I t is required that prior to: removal of spacecraft hardware; spacecraft system components; 
disconnect of spacecraft electrical connectors; and, disconnect of spacecraft plumbing lines, a 
short length of silver-gray tape be attached across the mating line between the hardware to be 
removed and the adjacent hardware remaining in the spacecraft. 
An indexing line is to be then marked on the tape with a black ball-point pen at right 
angles to, and across, the hardware mating line. A number correlating to the spacecraft hard­
ware removal form entry is also to be written on each end of the tape. 
The tape is then cut along the hardware mating line and the hardware IS removed from 
the spacecraft. 
The purpose of the indexing tape is to provide a capability of duplicating the as-was 
installation as accurately as possible, if and when necessary. 
e . APOLLO PRE-FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL (APOP). 
The APOP is the reference document to be used during all work activity on the spacecraft. 
"Vhere differences exist between this memo and the APOP, this memo is the ruling document. 
f. A separate investigation TAIR book has been establishing and all TPS's associated with spacecraft 
work, including GSE, will be retained in the investigation TAl R book . Copies of completed TPS 
with all deviations, mod sheets, summaries, and other notations, shall be furnished to the' Chairman, 
one to be distributed to the Board. 
2 . WORK SUPPORT 
a. OPERATIONS ENGINEERING . 
It is required that NASA KSC-SCO and NAA Operations Engineers be on duty at the space­
craft on an around-the-clock basis. 
(1) The Operations Engineers represent the HRD Panel at the spacecraft and at the PIB . 
They are in charge of the operations at the sites. 
(2) The Operations Engineers have the responsibility to schedule the daily spacecraft activity 
in detail. They also have the authority to stop work on the spacecraft when deemed necessary . 
(3) The Operations Engineers are responsible to maintain a spacecraft log, which documents 
all activity on the spacecraft on an hourly basis. A copy of the log is to be provided to the HRD 
Panel and is to be updated on a daily basis. 
b. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. 
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It is required that :\.\S.\ KSC·SCO and :\AA SYSTE\IS Engineers be on duty on a first 
shift basis with an evening shift contact specified by name. 
c. QL\LlTY C:O:\TROL 
I t is required that :\:\S :\ KSC·SCO and :\AA i.nspection personnel be assigned at the space· 
craft on ::In around-the-clock basis . It is required that i'\.\S .\ KSC-SCO and :'\A,\ Inspection be 
assigned in the PIB bonded storage room on an around-the-clock basis . 
GE:\ERAL 
I . :\0 task will be initiated until those individuals assigned to accomplish the task are thoroughly 
briefed by the responsible engineer and the Accident Investigator . :'\0 disassembly task will be per· 
formed on S IC 012 until the same task has been perform~d on S , C 014 by the same individual. 
:l . Access to the spacecraft area will be tightly controlled and will be restricted to those individuals 
who have a specific task associated with the accident investigation. Specific pad access will be con· 
trolled by the test supervisor on duty at Launch Complex 34 through the pad leader at the Command 
l\lodule. 
3 . Requests for work in the spacecraft or on any equipment attached to the spacecraft will come 
from only one source, defined as follows : 
THE APOLLO :l04 REVIEW BOARD . When a specific task has been defined by the 
Apollo :l04 Review Board. the applicable systems group will be directed by the Hardware 
Removal and Disposition Panel to prepare a TPS of the task for submittal to the Review Board 
fGr approval, if indicated in the task request by the Board. The TPS. a more detailed plan of the 
task to be accomplished. will contain the applicable signatures of the Hardw::lre Removal and Dis­
position Panel as discussed in paragraph I above . 
/ s / 	 Scott H . Simpkinson 
Chairman 
/s/ 	 lohn M. Moore 
Member 
/ s/ 	 I . Ianokaitis for S. T. Beddingfield 
Member 
l sI 	 Patrick I. Hanifin 
Member 
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~lodification to :'\Iemo " Designation of Hardware Removal and Disposition Panel" 
Mr. Dean F . Grimm is assigned as a special representative of the H RD panel to work in the PIB . 
Mr . Grimm is authorized to sign all TPS and mod sheets for the HRD panel for work in the PIB. 
The designated operations engineers are ~1r. R. G . Covel of NASA, and R. A. Gore of NAA . The 
two designa ted engineers will arrange for necessary alternates to act for them during extra shift oper· 
ations . 
Paragraph 1. (a ) step 5 is modified to read .. All work is to be witnessed by both NASA KSC-SCO 
and l\'AA I nspection unless specified otherwise on the TPS" . 
Paragraph 1. (b) is modified to read . 'Whenever a TPS is required to be modified in order to allow 
continuance of work activity, a TPS mod sheet is required. The TPS mod sheet is required to be 
written and signed by NAA and NASA-KSC-SCO system engineering and the Chairman of the Hard­
ware Removal and Disposition Panel if the Chairman is present. Mr. S . T. Beddingfield is authorized 
to sign in the chairman 's absence . If Mr. Beddingfield is not present then the astronaut on duty can 
sign. 
( 1) A specific and complete statement of the reason for the mod sheet is required on each TPS. 
(2) The TPS mod sheet must authorize work that is within the intent of the original TPS. 
(3 ) The Chairman of the committee must be appraised of the mod as soon as practical. 
The following astronauts will be on duty: / s/ Scott H . Simpkinson 
Chairman 
Major Donn Eisele 
Captain Stuart Roosa 
Major Ed Givens 
/s / S. T . Beddingfield 
Member 
Captain John F. Swigert 
/ s / I. M. Moore 
Member 
/ s/ Patrick I . Hanifin 
Member 
(Sheet 4 of 4) 
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SPECIAL SLING VERTIFICATION TEST 
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COMMAND MODU'LE BEING MOVED OUT OF SERVICE STRUCTURE 
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COMMAND MODULE OR SPECIAL BEING LOWERED TO GROUI'ID 
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5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
ITEM REMOVED FROM SI C 012 AND PLACED ON DISPLAY OR IN BONDED STORAGE 
Revised 3/4/67 
LOG No. NOUN 
1 Bolt Assy 

2 Bolt Assy 

3 Bolt Assy 

4 Bolt Assy 

Screw 

6 Splice 

7 Splice 

8 Splice 

9 Splice 

Splice 

11 Splice 

12 Mating Hardware 

13 t>.1ating Hardware 

14 Mating Hardware 

Mating Hardware 

16 Switch Lock 

17 Debris 

18 (Oil) Debris 

19 Debris 

(Rubber Finger) Debris 
21 Debris 
22 Debr'is 
23 Debris 
24 Debris 
Debris 

26 Debris 

27 Debris 

28 (Filler) Debris 

29 (Filler) Debris 

(Filler) Debris 
31 (Filler) Debris 
32 (Tape) Debris 
33 (QC Note) Hardware 
34 B.P.C . FWD Sect. 
Boost Protect Hatch 
36 Boost Protect Cover 
37 Boost Protect Cover 
--i . 38 Boost Protect Cover 
39 Boost Protect Cover 
FWD Heat Shield 

41 Switch Checklist 

42 Pilot Logbook 

43 D,ivider 

44 Debris 

Debris 
46 Pack Pad 
47 (Cover ) Divider 
48 (R.H. Couch) L.H. Arm Rest 
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PIRR No. 
38 
36 
39 
37 
21 
19 
15 
17 
18 
16 
13 
40 
42 
44 
43 
N / A 
1 
3 
5 
6 
11 
12 
14 
20 
23 
25 
32 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
36-44 
10 
9 
7 
8 
105 
142 
140 
145 
147 
150 
146 
144 
139 
TPS 
001 
001 
001 
001 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
001 
001 
001 
001 
N / /\ 
001 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
004 
010 
010 
001 
003 
003 
003 
003 
010 
001 
004 
004 
004 
004 
003 
012 
012 
012 
012 
012 
012 
012 
012 
49 Back Pad 148 012 
50 Handbook 141 012 
51 (Pilot) Logbook 138 012 
52 Debris 149 012 
53 Debris 151 012 
54 Paper 143 012 
55 Cobra Cable 158 012 
56 Small Debris 159 012 
57 Small Debris 156 012 
58 Small Debris 160 012 
59 Small Debris 157 012 
60 Small Debris 154 012 
61 Cable Run 153 012 
62 Loose Debris 155 012 
63 Debris 137 012 
64 Back Pad 152 012 
65 Head Rest (Center) 161 015 
66 Hardware for Head Rest 162 thru 167 015 
Center Couch 
67 Head Rest L.H. Couch 168 015 
68 Hardware for Head Rest 169 thru 174 015 
L. H. Couch 

69 Head Rest R. H . 175 015 

70 Head Rest R.H . Hardware 176 thru 181 015 

71 Leg Rest R.H. Couch 182 015 

72 Hardware Seat Belt 183 015 

73 Screw 184 015 

76 Inner Hatch 189 016 

77 Outer Hatch 190 016 

83 Debris 135 004 

97 Hand Controller 187 015 

99 CTR Couth Leg Rest 191 015 

100 L. H . Couch Leg Rest 221 015 
101 Debris 225 015 
102 L.H. Crew Couch Hardware 222 thru 224 015 
103 Bracket 192 thru 194 015 
120 Base Assy 226 015 
131 SCS Phase Inverter 256 018 
136 Translation Controller 268 022 
141 Egress Tun. Hatch 276 023 
149 1 Bag Debris 271 015 
150 1 Bag Debris 272 015 
151 1 Bag Debris 273 015 
.. ~1" ' 152 1 Head Rest Pad 275 018 
159 Debris 292 018 
160 Debris 259 018 
161 Pip Pin 295 024 
162 02 Hose Umbilical 279 023 
163 02 Hose Umbilical 278 023 
164 02 J lose Umbilical 280 023 
165 Torque Tube 293 024 
166 Book 336 012 
167 Book 335 012 
168 Book 337 012 
169 L. H. Crew Couch 
170 R. H. Crew Couch 
171 CNTR Crew Couch Back Rest 
172 R /H ZZ Strut 
173 Z Axis L.H. Strut Assy 
174 R .H. Couch Strut Assy Head 
175 L.H. XX Strut 
181 Pitch RCS 8 PC Access 
192 Debris 
193 Bolts 
194 Bolts 
195 Loose Debris 
196 Bolt-Nut Washer 
197 Bolt-Nut 2 Washers 
198 Docking Handle 
199 Bolt-Nut 2 Washers 
200 Bolt-Nut Washer 
201 Pip Pin 
202 Bolt-Nut Washer 
203 Bolt-Nut Washer 
204 Bolt-Nut Washer 
229 Panel 319 
230 Atten. Panel Assy 
232 Insulation from Translation Controller 
233 Comp " C" Scientific 
234 MDAS 
235 (For MDAS) Screws 
236 Food Compt. Door 
237 Garment Compt. Door 
238 Disconnect PlOl (in SI C) 
240 G&N Panel Screws 
241 Screws 
242 Panel 
243 G&N Front Panel (102) 
249 Water Gun 
250 WI G Bracket 
251 Panel 
252 Screws 
254 Panel Assy 
258 Entry" A" Battery 
259 Entry "B" Battery 
260 Post Landing Battery 
261 Batt Mounting Hardware 
2(;2 Suit Ventilator 
263 Suit Ventilator 
264 Suit Ventilator 
265 Suit Ventilator 
266 Suit Ventilator 
267 Suit Ventilator 
268 Suit Ventilator 
269 Suit Ventilator 
270 Terminal Board Cover 
272 Screws 
273 Screws 
358 024 
308 024 
301 024 
302 024 
354 024 
307 024 
360 024 
325 018 
359 
299 024 
298 024 
300 024 
357 024 
353 024 
297 024 
306 024 
304 024 
296 024 
356 024 
305 024 
355 024 
339 032 
340 032 
269 022 
351 011 
348 011 
350 011 
341 033 
366 033 
349 
367 048 
352 048 
363 048 
368 048 
373 0:)0 
374 050 
376 050 
375 050 
383 053 
402 060 
403 060 
404 060 
405 060 
NA 014 
NA 014 
NA 014 
NA 014 
NA 014 
131 014 
132 014 
130 014 
408 040 
409 040 
410 040 
274 Terminal Board Cover 
275 Terminal Board Cover 
276 Screw 
27M Main Chute 
279 Main Chute 
2MO Main Chutc 
2M1 Retention Flap 
2R2 R('tenlioll Flap 
2M3 Retention flap 
2M4 Screws 
2M5 Screws 
28() Brake Cord 
2M7 Tyrap 's 
28M Nor Mex Cord 
2M9 02 Analyzer 
290 02 Analyzer 
291 1fi mm Sequential Camera 
292 Cable Assy 
29:3 Spit Cohra Cahlc 
294 Ifi mm Sequential Camera 
295 Sensor Cable & Sensor 
29() Power Cable 
297 Cobra Cable (SS RP) 
298 Hydro Meter Control Unit 
299 1() mm Power Cable 
300 Lithium & Charcoal 
301 SCMD Cable Assy 
302 Sample on Kim Wipe 
303 Attenuation Panel (313) 
304 Bag of LIOH Crystals 
305 Compo A Odor Absorber 
306 Vacuum Cleaner Bag 
307 Bag of Carbon 
308 Screws 
309 Connector Module 
310 18 ea. Samples 
311 02 Panel 
312 Screws 
313 H20 Panel 
314 Panel R.H. E. B. 
315 Screws 
316 Screws 
317 Metal Chip 
318 L.H . Piece of Wire Switch Guard 
319 R.H. Piece of Wire Switch Guard 
320 Screws (4) Nuts (3) Washers (2) . 
321 Cover Plate & Mount Hardware 
322 C02 Sensor 
123 Bracket C02 Mount 
J24 02 Tank 
325 02 Tank Mounting Hardware 
326 Steam Duct & Mounting Hardware 
329 Screws (2 ea.) 
310 Screws (2 ea .) 
331 Tube 
411 040 
413 040 
412 040 
419 0()7 
420 0()7 
421 O()7 
42fi 0()7 
121 Ofi7 
425 Ofi7 
423 Ofi7 
422 0()7 
4:30 0()7 
427 0()7 
429 0()7 
10M 007 
109 007 
4MO OMI 
47() 071 
4:~() & 4:37 071 
4MO OMI 
48:3 OMI 
4M4 OMI 
477 thru 479 071 
482 081 
481 081 
447 039 
439 & 440 071 
432 0()2 
486 039 
450 039 
44() 039 
485 0:39 
449 039 
487 039 
448 069 
451 079 
493 0()3 
494 06:3 
491 065 
489 070 
490 070 
4q2 O():) 
506 086 
507 08() 
508 086 
512 070 
509 082 
513 090 
514 090 
525 092 
524 092 
526 thru 529 094 
558 109 
559 109 
555 108 
D-4-50 
332 Water Glycol in Plastic Bag 
333 Pyro " A" Battery 
334 Pyro " B" Battery 
335 Access Panel 
336 Tube 
340 Screws 
341 Samples 
346 Sector #1 Fairing 
352 Screws 
353 Screws 
354 Screws 
355 Lock 
356 Lock 
357 Lock 
358 Clamps 
359 Elect. Module 
368 Container 
370 Debris Valastat 
376 String Tie 
377 "Melted Metal 
382 Tension Tie Bol t 
383 Counter Sunk Washer 
384 Spacer 
385 Washer 
386 Nut 
387 Tension Tie Bolt 
388 Counter Sunk Washer 
389 Spacer 
390 Washer 
391 Nut 
392 Tension Tie Bolt 
393 Counter Sunk Washer 
394 Spacer 
395 Washer 
396 Nut 
397 Strap Assy 
398 Clamp 
401 Bolt 
402 Ablator Plug 
403 Bolt 
405 Panel 24 
406 Panel 24 Hardware 16 Screws 
407 02 Valve Handle 
408 LIOH Canister 
409 Plug Ablator 
no Shims 
411 Debris 
418 Gas Chromatograph Conn . & Wiring 
419 A-N Tee Bulkhead 
420 Water Line Assy 
421 C02 Sensor Line 
422 C02 Sensor Line 
423 Water Line 
424 Delta P Sensor 
622 108 

556 109 

557 109 

550 100 

560 108 

644 112 

623 079 
652 112 

650 112 

649 112 

670 112 

640 112 

639 112 

638 112 

654 112 

651 562 

656 155 

667 

665 116 

666 116 

668 112 

669 112 

670 112 

671 112 

672 112 

673 112 

674 112 

675 112 

676 112 

677 112 

678 112 

679 112 

680 112 

681 112 

682 112 

684 SI C 012 / S/ C 112 

549 SI C 012 / S/C 097 

693 112 

685 thru 687 112 

688 112 

001 IV SI C 012 C I M 041 

002 IV SI C 012 CI M 041 

003 IV SI C 012 C I M 041 

007 IV C I M 061 

008 IV C I M 043 

012 IV CI M 061 

0) ) IV C I M 061 
031 IV SI C 012 CI M 075 
019 IV SI C 012 CI M 074 
014 IV SI C 012 CI M 074 
016 IV SI C 012 C I M 074 
017 IV SI C 012 CI M 074 
015 IV SI C 012 CI M 074 
020 & 023 IV SI C 012 C I M 074 
425 Compression Pads 
426 Diffuser 
427 Bracket 
428 Screws 
429 Floodlight Hardware 
430 Floodlight Guard Connector 
431 Floodlight Hardware 
432 Floodlight 
433 Floodlight 
434 Watch 
435 Sunglasses 
436 Scissors 
437 Penlight 
438 Survival 
439 Neck Dam & Pocket 
440 Shroud Cutter 
441 Penlight 
442 Inlet Temp. Transducer 
443 Bolts 
444 Debris 
445 Debris 
446 Washers 
447 Debris 
448 Kim Wipes 
449 Debris 
450 ECU 
451 Bolt ECU Mount 
452 Washer ECU 
453 Nuts (ZEA) ECU 
454 Washer ECU 
455 Bolt ECU 
456 Line, Tubing ECU 3 / 8" OD (Debris) 
457 Line Tubing 1/ 4" OD (Debris ECU) 
458 LIOH Debris (ECU Removal) 
459 Hardware (ECU Removal) 
460 R .H . (XX Foot) Floodlight 
461 L.H. (XX Foot) Floodlight 
462 Console Floodlight 
463 Console Floodlight 
464 Vial of Liquid (ECU) 
465 Food Compt. B-C-D-E 
466 Plate & Mount Hardware 
467 Panel Assy 
468 Screws, Food Compt. Doubler 
469 Doubler 
470 DSE Recorde r 
488 Panel #25 
489 Hardware for Panel #25 
490 R.H. Rendezvous window 
491 Screws, R. H. Rend{' zvol ~ V\" :,d{Jw 
492 Ablator Plugs R.H . Rend. 'Window 
493 L .H. Rend Wir l<'.ow 
494 Screws, L.H. Rend. Wir:dow 
495 Ablator PhlgS L.II. Rend Wiudow 
025 S IC 012 C / M 036 
024 036 
030 036 
033 S IC 012 S IC 036 
033 032 
034 032 
037 033 
033 032 
037 032 
046 IV C / M 076 
047 IV C / M 076 
048 IV C / M 076 
049 IV C / M 076 
050 IV C/M 076 
051 IV C / M 076 
052 IV C / M 076 
053 IV C / M 076 
045 IV C/M 074 
054 IV C / M 074 
061 IV C / M 074 
062 IV C / M 074 
057 IV C / M 074 
065 IV C / M 074 
064 IV C/M 074 
063 IV C / M 074 
054 IV C / M 074 
055 IV C / M 074 
058 IV C / M 074 
059 IV C / M 074 
060 IV C/M 074 
066 IV C / M 074 
068 IV C / M 074 
069 IV C / M 074 
072 IV C / M 074 
073 IV C / M 074 
075 IV C / M 059 
074 IV C / M 059 
079 IV 029 
078 IV 028 
082 IV C / M 074 
083 091 
084 091 
087 091 
085 091 
086 091 
092 046 
097 IV C / M 025 
102 IV C / M 025 
108 IV C/M 089 
107 IV C / M 089 
103 & 104 IV C / M 089 
106 IV C / M 089 
105 IV C / M 089 
093 & 094 IV C / M 089 
496 Mylar (Small piece in Bag) 
497 Signal Conditioner Bolts 
498 Dummy Module 
499 Dummy Module 
500 Dummy Module 
501 Dummy Module 
502 Dummy Module 
503 Power Supply 
504 Spacer 
505 Front Retaining Plate 
506 Front Retaining Panel 
507 Attenuator Module 
508 Amplifier 
509 Attenuator Module 
510 Dummy Module 
511 Attenuator Module 
512 Amplifier Module 
513 Attenuator Module 
514 Front Retaining Plate 
515 Dummy Module 
516 Attenuator Module 
517 Dummy Module 
518 Reg . Module 
519 Reg. Module 
520 AMP Module 
521 AMP Modul e 
522 AMP Module 
523 Data File, Door & Hinge Pin 
524 Spacers - Top & Bottom, Sig . Condo 
525 J 1 Module 
526 J2 Module 
527 J3 Module 
528 J4 Module 
529 J5 Module 
530 J6 Module 
531 J7 Module 
532 J8 Module 
533 J27 Module 
534 J28 Module 
535 J29 Module 
536 J30 Module 
537 J31 Module 
538 J32 Module 
539 J 33 Module 
540 J34 Module 
541 J35 Module 
542 J36 Module 
543 J37 Module 
544 J38 Module 
545 J39 Modul e 
546 J40 Module 
547 J41 Module 
548 J42 Module 
549 Spacer 
III 
113 
121 
118 
120 
117 
119 
115 
116 
114 
129 
123 
124 
127 
122 
125 
126 
128 
130 
135 
133 
136 
132 
131 
138 
134 
137 
141 
142 & 143 
152 
151 
150 
149 
148 
147 
146 
145 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
168 
167 
166 
165 
164 
163 
162 
161 
169 
SI C 012 SI C 090 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
SIC 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
SI C 049 
IV CI M 106 
IV CI M 049 
IV CIM 049 
IV CI M 049 
IV CI M 049 
IV CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 e l M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CI M 049 
IV SI C 012 CIM 049 
550 Spacer 
551 Screws (SCE Base Plate) 
552 Screws (SCE Base Plate) 
553 SCE Base Plate 
554 Hardware, Washers & Screws 
555 Ablator Plugs 
556 Hardware, Screw & \Vasher 
557 Ablator , Astro-Sextant 
558 Seal 
559 Seal 
560 S-Band X-Ponder 
561 SCT Crown (Lower) 
562 Screws (4 ea. ) 
563 Screws (3 ea.) 
564 SCT Crown Half 
565 Screws (4 ea. ) 
566 Sextant Crown Upper H alf 
567 SCT Crown , H alf Lower 
601 Ablator Plugs 
fl02 Te lesc ope Cover 
603 Sextant Con' r 
604 G&N Computer 
605 Screws 
606 Controller 
607 Box of Controllers 
608 Panel #2 
609 Panel #2 (Howe) 
610 Panel #1 
611 Hardware for Panel #1 
612 Hand-Hold 
613 Hardware for Hand-Hold 
614 Connector Octopu s Cable 
615 Flight Qual. Recorder 

621 Bolts 

622 Washers 

623 Barrel Nuts 

624 Bolts 

625 Poly Tapc 

626 Ablator Panel 

627 Q. Felt 

628 Nutpla te Strips 

629 Z Strip 

630 Abl ative Panel Inner 

631 I nsula tion Strip 

632 Washers (34 ea .) 

633 Yaw ECA 

634 Display ECA 

635 AUX ECA 

636 Roll ECA 

637 Panel 22 

638 Panel 21 

639 Cam Locks 

640 MDP Panel #3 

641 Hardware for Panel #3 

642 D&C Panel # 10 

170 
176 
174 
175 
178 
110 
177 
109 
181 
182 
185 
192 
200 
190 
193 
202 
195 
194 
201 
184 
183 
203 
204 
None 
None 
207 
208 
210 
209 
215 
216 & 217 
219 
212 
787 
801 
802 
800 
803 
198 
231 
230 
221 
228 
220 
197 
222 
229 
238 
243 
257 
254 
249 
266 
265 
269 
IV SIC 012 C/M 049 
IV S IC 012 C /M 049 
IV C /M 049 
IV C / M 049 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C / M 090 
IV C /M 125 
IV C /M 090 
IV C / M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV CI M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 070 
IV C /M 070 
P .1. 031 
P .1. 031 
018 
018 
019 
019 
019 
019 
IV SIC 012 C /M i30 
IV SIC 012 C /M 045 
S IC 012 SIC 161 
S IC 012 SIC 161 
S IC 012 S IC 161 
SIC 012 S IC 161 
S IC 012 SIC 161 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C/M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 090 
IV C /M 052 
IV C /M 051 
IV C / M 053 
IV C /M 055 
IV C / M 023 
IV C /M 022 
IV C /M 055 
IV C/M 015 
IV C /M 015 
IV C /M 002 
643 Hardware for Panel #10 

644 D&C Panel 11 

645 Hardware, D&C Panel 11 

646 D&C Panel #16 

647 D&C Panel #15 

648 Hardware, Panel #16 

649 Hardware, Panel #15 

650 Pads 

651 Washer 

652 Safety Wire 

653 Screws 

654 Washer 

655 Cotter Pin 

656 Nut 

657 Washer 

658 Screw 

659 Bolt 

660 Nut 

661 Washer 

662 Debris 

663 Half Ring 

';~64 Support 
665 Ring 
666 Seal 
667 Screws, Mount Panel #12 
668 D&C Panel #12 
669 PCM #1 
670 Nut (PCM #1) L.H. 
671 Cold Plate Fuzz 
673 PCM #2 
674 VHF Multiplexer 
675 S-Band Pwr. AMP 
676 Pitch ECA 
677 Main DSKY 
67~ Mount Screw for Main DSKY 
671? Shock Washers for Main DSKY 
680 Shock Washer Triangle Main 
681 DSKY 
682 Cold-Plate Fuzz 
683 Band"C n 
684 Cold Plate Fuzz 
685 Panel #5 
686 UHF FM Xmitter 
687 UHF AM Recovery Beacon 
688 UHF AM Rec. Cold Plate Fuzz 
689 Nut UHF AM Rec. 
690 Panel #4 FDAI 
691 Cold Plate Fuzz 
692 Pre-Modulation Processor 
693 P&C Panel #7 
694 Panel #6 
695 Door Assy. & Screws 
696 #2 Inverter 
697 Bolts Inverter 
268 IV C / M 002 

272 IV C / M 003 

271 IV C / M 003 

276 IVC / M 010 

280 IV C / M 011 

275 IV C / M 010 

279 IV C/M 011 

SM 077 S IC 012 161 

SM 076 S IC 012 161 

SM 073 S I C 012 161 

SM 064 S IC 012 161 

SM 065 S IC 012 161 

SM 068 SIC 012 161 

S I M 069 SI C 012 161 

S I M 070 S IC 012 161 

SI M 071 S IC 012 161 

S IM 074 S IC 012 161 

SIM 075 SIC 012 161 

SIM 078 SIC 012 161 

S IM 083 S IC 012 161 

SI M 066 SIC 012 161 

SIM 079 S IC 012 161 

SI M 080 S IC 012 161 

S IM 081 S IC 012 161 

284 C / M 009 
285 C / M 009 
287 IV S IC 012 C / M 047 

289 IV S IC 012 C/M 047 

297 IV SI C 012 CI M 047 

290 IV S IC 012 C / M 048 

300 IV C / M 127 

301 IV C / M 126 

310 IV C/M 054 

312 IV C / M 020 

313 IV CI M 020 

315 IV C / M 020 

314 IV C / M 124 

319 IV C / M 124 

320 IV C/M 124 

321 IV C / M 132 

324 IV C / M 132 

334 IV C / M 017 

325 IV C / M 131 

330 IV C / M-123 

330 IV C / M 123 

340 IV C/M 123 

337 IV C / M 016 

339 IV C/M 016 

345 IV C/M 138 

349 IV C/M 013 

352 IV C / M 014 

S / M 155 IV S I M 006 

C / M IV 353 IV C / M 085 

C / M 354 IV C / M 085 

S/ M 170 
S/M 165 
S/ M 167 
S/ M 164 
S/M 166 
C /M 355 
C/M 355 
357 & 358 
359 
363 
375 
371 
372 
373 
375 
376 
377 
380 
378 
379 
S/ M 146 
See Note on 
390 
389 
395 
396 
394 
154 
171 
172 
174 
173 
244 
244 
397 
402 
404 
403 
400 
401 
422 
423 
C /M 425 
C/M IV 427 
C/M 428 
430 
429 
432 
431 
434 
433 
435 
436 
IV S / M 006 
IV S/ M 006 
IV S/ M 006 
IV S/M 006 
IV S/M 006 
IV C/ M 085 
IV C / M 085 
IV C / M 085 
IV C /M 050 
IV C /M 144 
IV SIC 012 
IV S IC 012 012 
IV S IC 012, 012 
IV S IC 012 07 
IV S IC 012 07 
IV S IC 012 C /M 139 
IVC/ M1 39 
IV C /M 005 
IV C / M 005 
IV C /M 005 
IV S/M 004 
Q11 Tag See Note on Q11 Tag 
IV C/M 008 
IV C /M 008 
IV C /M 135 
IV C /M 135 
IV C /M 135 
S/M IV 008 
IV S /M 008 
IV S/M 008 
IV S/ M 008 
IV Sl M 008 
IV 018 
IV 018 
IV 133 
IV 134 
IV 134 
IV 134 
IV 134 
IV 134 
IV C /M 092 
IV C /M 093 
IV S IC 012 C/M 093 
IV S IC 012 C /M 094 
IV S IC 012 C /M 094 
C /M 049 C IA 
IV C/M 103 
IV C /M 104 
IV C/ M 102 
IV C /M 101 
IV C /M 096 
IV C /M 095 
IV C/ M 097 
IV C /M 098 
698 Panel S/ M -4 
699 Cover Assy . 
700 Cover Assy . 
701 Cover Assy . 
702 Cover Assy . 
703 Inverter #1 
704 Mount Bolts 
706 #3 Inverter & Hardware 
716 Splice BPC 
717 Audio Center 
727 Panel #8 Display 
728 Screws 
729 Debris 
730 Panel 19 
731 Screws 
732 Blank Panel #17 
733 Mount Screws Panel #17 
734 Hand Hold 
735 Panel #18 
736 Screws Panel #18 
737 Debris 
738 Burned Paper 
739 D&C Panel #20 
740 Panel #20 Screws 
741 AC Control Box 
742 AC Control Box Mount Bolt 
743 AC Cont. Unit Nut Plate Bracket 
744 Separation Monitors 
745 Debris 
746 Debris 
747 Debris 
748 Debris 
749 Biomed. Ext. Cable 
750 Physio Simulator 
751 Battery , Charger & hardware 
752 Motor Switch C14-56 
753 Motor Switch C14-53 
754 Motor Switch & Hardware C14-52 
755 Cable Clamps 
756 Screws 
757 NAV DSKY 
758 Screws 
759 Eye Piece (Unit 103) Stowage Compt. 
760 G&N Indicator Panel 105 
761 Mounting Bolts for G&N Panel 105 
762 W/ B Assy. Insul. 
763 PSA Tray #9 
·764 PSA Tray #10 
765 PSA Tray #2 
766 PSA Tray #1 
767 PSA Tray #4 
768 PSA Tray #3 
769 PSA Tray #5 
770 PSA Tray #6 
Rotation Cont. 
771 PSA Tray #7 
772 PSA Tray #8 
773 CDU #1 
774 CDU #2 
775 CDU #3 
776 CDU #4 
777 CDU #5 
778 Signal Conditioner 
779 Panel 101 & Hardware 
780 Rate Gyro 
781 Gyro Attitude 
782 Master Event Seq. Cont. 
783 Master Event Seq. Cont. 
784 Debris 
785 Piece of Glass 
786 Panel 150 Conn. Mount Screws 
798 "c" Band Antenna 

<, 
799 Panel C / M 5 

800 Clamps 
801 Clamp 
802 Clamps 
803 Cushion 
804 Clamps 
805 Clamp 
806 Clamp 
807 Clamp 
808 Life Preserver 
809 Screws 
810 Screws 
811 Screws 
812 Screws 
813 String Tie 
814 Clamp 
815 Clamp 
816 Unidentified Material 
817 Clamp 
818 Teflon Wrapping 
819 Screw C / M 6 

820 Clamp Set 
821 Metal Bead 
822 Screws 
823 Rod 
824 T IB Cover 
437 IV C / M 099 

438 IV C/M 100 

439 IV C/M 112 

439 IV C/M 112 

439 IV C/ M 112 

439 IV C / M 112. 

439 IV C/M 112 

444 IV C/M 119 

446 IV C / M 113 

448 IV C / M 056 

449 IV C / M 057 

405 IV C / M 062 

413 063 

204 IV SIM 005 

202 IV S I M 005 

460 IV C / M 149 

461 IV C/M 121 

463 IV C/M 121 

485 IV C / M 174 

492 IVC / M 174 

469 IV C / M 174 

495 IV C / M 174 

488 IVC/M 174 

490 IV C/M 174 

482 IVC / M 174 

483 IV e l M 174 

473 IV C / M 174 

470 IV C/M 174 

489 IV C / M 174 

486 IV C / M 174 

487 IV C / M 174 

494 IV C / M 174 

491 IV C/M 174 

493 IV C/M 174 

478 IV C / M 174 

484 IV C / M 174 

471 IV C / M 174 

470 IV C/M 121 

456 IV C/ M 121 

465 IV C / M 171 

455 IV C / M 171 

472 IV C / M 121 

481 IV C/M 174 

261-1060 - 67 • 14 D-4-57 
825 Panel 150 String Tie 

826 Screws C/M 18 

827 Felt 
828 G .Felt 
831 Mounting Screws 
832 Mount Screws 
833 Panel 150 Pyro Bat CI B 
834 Adhesive 
835 Sample Bottle 
836 Stowage Door Vacuum Clean 
837 Panel 201 

838 Panel 202 Waste Management 
839 Screws for Pnl. 202 

840 Bolts , Heat Shield 
841 Scissors & Suit Debris 
842 Suit Debris 
843 Sun Glasses 
844 Case - Sun Glasses 
845 Dosimeter 
846 Molten Metal 
847 Molten Metal & Wire 
848 Molten Metal 
849 Metal 
850 Metal 
851 Tubing 
852 Screws & nuts 
853 Clamps 
854 Asbestos Insulation 
855 Piece of Fiberglass 
856 Shims 
857 Fiberglass Tape 
858 Q .Felt 
859 RF Cable Clamp 
860 J 87 Mounting Hardware 
861 AFT. Heat Shield 
862 Cable Clamps 
863 Cable Tray 
864 Bolts for Cable Tray 
865 Bolts for Cable Tray 
866 Samples L/ H Crew Couch 
L/ H Foot Rest 
867 Safety Wire 
868 Cable Tray Assy., With Hardware 
869 Air Diffuser & Cable Tray 
871 Cable Tray & Hardware 
872 Debris from above Cable Tray 
873 Insulation CM6 
874 Heat Sink 
875 Bolts-Heat Sink Mounting 
876 Wire Twisted Pair 
877 Roll Engine CW 
878 Panel & Engine Roll CCW 
IV C /M 149 

476 IV C / M 121 

499 IV C / M 121 

498 IV C / M 121 

505 IV C / M 145 

500 IV C / M 145 

496 IV C/M 149 

MA008 
SIC 017 

501 IV C/M 145 

504 IV C/M 145 

502 IV C/M 145 

503 IV C / M 145 

010 IV C / M 093 

531 IV C / M 147 

530 IV C / M 147 

526 IV C / M 147 

532 IV C / M 147 

525 IV C / M 147 ,> 

533 IV C / M 147 

535 IV C / M 147 

534 IV C/M 147 

527 IV C/M 147 

528 IV C/M 147 

529 IV C/M 147 

524 IV C/M 147 

523 IV C/M 147 

544 IV C/M 043 

548 IV C/M 043 

541 IV C/M 043 

543 IV C/M 043 

552 IV C/M 121 

555 IV C/M 121 

557 IV C/M 121 

510 IV C/M 043 

560 IV C/M 121 

561 IV C/M 121 

563 IV C / M 121 

562 IV C / M 121 

405 C / M MA 007 

405 IV C / M 062 

564,568,569 IV C/M 121 

559,566,558,567 IV C/M 121 

596,565 IV C/M 121 

C/M 565 IV C/M 121 

570,571,572 IV C/M 140 

578 IV C / M 140 

577 IV C / M 140 

597 IV C / M 178 

580 IV C / M 140 

466 IV C / M 121 

D-4-58 
879 Pencil, Debris Red MatI. 
880 Q. Felt 
881 Bolts 
882 Q. Felt 
883 Cable Tray & Hardware 
884 Cable Tray & Hardware 
885 Cable Tray & Hardware 
886 Cable Tray 
887 Q. Felt 
888 Blanket CCW Engine 
889 Blanket CW Engine 
890 Heat Sink 
891 Engine Bolts 
892 Hardware 
893 Bolts 
894 Blanket " A" 
895 Blanket " B" 
896 Panel &' Engine CW Roll 
897 Q. Felt 
898 Engine, Yaw System " B" 
899 Engine, Yaw System" A" 
900 Engine CCW 
901 Bolts 
902 Cable Tray & Hardware. 
903 Q. Felt 
904 Cable Tray & Hardware 
905 Blanket & + Yaw 
906 Blanket & + Yaw 
907 Hardware 
908 Nuts & Washers 
909 Engine + Pitch System A 
910 Engine + Pitch System B 
911 Engine + Yaw System A 
912 Engine + Yaw System B 
913 Protective Cover "Pitch" 
914 Bolts & Washers 
915 Steam Duct 
916 Debris 
917 + Pitch Engine Blankets 
918 RCS Cont. Box C19A1 
919 Screws & Washers 
920 Air Vent 
921 Washer 
922 Nuts 
923 Washer 
924 RCS Cont. Box 
925 RCS Motor SW Assy. 
926 Clamps & Screws 
927 Debris 
928 - Pitch Engines A&B and Mounting 
Struct 
929 Mounting Hardware - Pitch 
930 Insulation & Blanket 
931 Cable Clamp 
D-4-59 
603 C / M 073 

601 IV C / M 121 

579 IV C / M 140 

584 IV C / M 043 

605 IV C/M 121 

602 IV C / M 121 

598,600 IV C / M 121 

595 IV C / M 121 

584 IV C/M 043 

606 IV C / M 140 

611 IV C / M 140 

583 IV C / M 140 

614 IV C / M 140 

599 IV C/M 121 

613 IV C/M 140 

592 IV C/M 140 

593 IV C / M 140 

616,477 IV C / M 140 

594 IV C/M 043 

590 IV C/M 140 

591 IV C / M 140 

615 IV C / M 140 

589 IV C / M 589 

604 IV C / M 121 

584 IV C / M 140 

617 IV C / M 121 

629 IV C / M 140 

628 IV C / M 140 

637 IV C / M 140 

547, 548 IV C / M 121 

644 IV C / M 140 

645 IV C / M 140 

635 IV C / M 140 

634 IV C / M 140 

646 IV C / M 140 

643 IV CiM 140 

549 IV C / M 121 

549 IV C / M 121 

638 IV C / M 140 

673 IV C/M 067 

674 IV C / M 067 

672 IV C / M 121 

659 IV C / M 121 

658 , 670 IV C / M 121 

671 IV C / M 121 

669 IV C / M 068 

697 IV C / M 069 

711,712 IV C/M 069 

IV C / M 069 

721 IV C / M 140 

720 IV C / M 140 

627 IV C / M 140 

715 IV C / M 121 

932 Bracket 
933 Screws 
934 Screws for RCS Cont. Box 
935 Screws for H20 Water Panel 
936 Water Glycol 
937 Washers , Bolt, Spacer 
938 Nut Plate Assy. 
939 Bolts Stringer #5 
940 C/C Heat Shield 
941 Q. Felt 
942 Cobra Cable 
943 Wire 
944 Hardware 
945 Hardware 
946 Bonding Jumpers 
947 Cotter Pins 
948 Bolts 
949 Debris 
950 Hardware and Mounting 
951 Washers 
952 Safety Wire Umbilical 
953 Spacer 
954 Scanning Telescope 
955 Optics Shroud Assy. 
956 Screws Optics Mount 
957 D&C Panel G&N 
958 Screws D&C Mount 
959 Samples 
960 Soot Samples 
961 Soot Sample 
962 Ring Phenolic 
963 Ring Teflon 
964 Ring Phenolic 
965 Se<\ l Teflon Sxt. 
966 Bolts 
967 Nav. Base Optics Assy. 
968 IM U 
969 Bolts 
970 Bolts w Iwashers 
971 Control Elec . Assy. 
972 USBE Front Panel 
973 ~ Surge Tank 
975 02 Valve Assy. 
976 Hardware Surge Tank 
977 Outlet Line Surge T ank 
978 Surge Tank ISO Valve Inlet Line 
979 Bolts 
980 Tube Assy 
981 02 Relief Varve 
982 Water Glycol Valves 
983 Hand Controller Cable 
984 Tee (Adapter) 
985 Valve 
986 Cobra Cable 
754 IV C / M 121 

753 IV C / M 121 

670 IV C / M 068 

492 SIC 012 065 

IV C / M 121 

750, 751, 752 IV C / M 121 

741 IV C / M 121 

732 IV C/M 121 

742 IV C/M 121 

648 IV C / M 121 

762 C / M C I A 065 

767 IV C / M .179 

764 thru 766 IV C / M 179 

710, 713, 714 IV C / M 121 

761 IV C / M 121 

676 IV C / M 121 

624 IV C / M 121 

760 IV C/M 121 

726 IV C/M 121 

626 IV C / M 121 

763 IV C / M 121 

625 IV C/M 121 

768 IV C / M 151 

770 IV C / M 111 

769 IV C / M 111 

771 IV C / M 118 

773 IV C / M 118 

IV C/M 099 
MA C/M 008 
MA C / M 008 
783 IV C / M 176 

782 IV C / M 176 

784 IV C / M 176 

781 IV C / M 176 

791 IV C / M 126 

795 IV C / M 176 

780 IV C / M 176 

785 IV C/M 176 

796 IV C/M 176 

790 IV C/M 176 

814 IV C / M 168 

812 S IC 012 SIC 095 

804 SIC 012 IV C/M 153 

814 IV C / M 153 

800 IV C / M 153 

799 IV C / M 153 

807 IV C / M 153 

816 IV C/M 153 

808 IV C / M 153 

834 IV C / M 153 

833 IV C / M 122 

830 IV C / M 122 

826 IV C / M 153 

832 IV C / M 122 

987 Cobra Cable 
988 Cobra Cable 
989 Mtg. Brkt. Hardware 
990 CMC " Y" Wire Assy 
991 Press-Xducer 02 Surge Tank 
992 Box Assorted Items 
993 Panel 316 C23Z2 
994 Hand (Long) Hold Assy 
995 Short Hand Hold Assy 
996 LM Ret. Cont. Mount 
997 G&N Eye Relief 
998 Loop Clamp G&N 
999 Screws Panel 316 

1000 Bracket & Hardware 
1001 Wire Harness Cover 
J 1002 ELSC 
1003 ELSC 
1004 Shim . Toe Cap 
1005 Screw 
1006 Screw & Nuts 
1007 PSA Toe Plate 
1008 Thermal Interface Mat ' !. 
1009 Wire Covering 
1010 Screws 
1011 Connectors w IScrews 
1012 Clamps & Hardware 
1013 CDV Frame Assy 
1014 Stringers 
1015 PSA & Connector Assy 
1016 Panel 209 Invert Sync 
1017 Bracket for Panel 209 Invert Sync 
1018 Screws Panel 209 Mount 
1019 Panel 208 Invert Sync Box 
1020 Screws Panel 208 Mount 
1021 Plate Below Frame R I H Side 
1022 Panel 203 & Hardware 
1023 Attenuator Panel 
1024 Atten. Panel Mtg. Screws 
1025 Relay Box (VDL) 
1026 PCVB & Hardware 
1027 Heat Shield Sample 
1028 Aft Heat Shield Sample 
1029 TV Camera 
1030 Wire Harness 
1031 DSEA Voice Tape Recorder 
1032 Film Magazine 16 mm 
1033 Panel 100 

1034 Screw for Pnl 100 

1035 Guard Plate Assy 
1036 Panel 200 

1037 Hardware for Pnl 200 

1038 Guard Plate Assy 
1039 C14A8 Phase Correcting Box 
1040 Screws (C14A8) 
829 IV C/M 122 

831 IV C / M 122 

828 IV C / M 153 

839 IV C / M 193 

809 IV C / M 153 

PI 047 

842 IV C / M 107 

843 IV C/M 084 

844 IV C / M 084 

846 IV C/ M 084 

845 IV C/ M 084 

817 IV C / M 180 

840 IV C / M 107 

822 IV C/ M 192 

824 IV C/M 192 

866 IV C / M 064 

861 IV C / M 065 

884 IV C / M 120 

880 IV C / M 120 

881 IV C/ M 120 

883 IV C / M 120 

847 IV C / M 120 

852 IV C/ M 192 

879 IV C/M 180 

879 IV C/M 180 

885 IV C/M 120 

879 IV C/M 180 

IV C / M 121 

873 IV C/M 180 

886 IV C/M 183 

904 IV C / M 183 

887 IV C / M 183 

903 IV C / M 184 

902 IV C/ M 184 

910 IV C / M 179 

905 & 907 IV C / M 169 

908 IV C / M 169 

909 IV C/M 169 

913 IV C / M 198 

918 IV C / M 066 

930 IV C / M 191 

928 IV C / M 191 

931 IV C / M 082 

934 IV C/ M 081 

933 IV C / M 081 

480 C / M MA 013 

936 IV C/ M 027 

934 IV e l M 027 

941 I"V C / M 026 

940 IV C/ M 026 

937, 943, 942 IV C / M 026 

947 IV C / M 182 

946 IV C / M 182 

944 IV C/ M 182 

1041 Fuse Box 
1042 Fuse Box Bolts & Tee Bracket 
1043 Fuse Box Mtg . Bolts 
1044 R.H. Control Unit Anti Rotational 
Casing 
1045 Control Level Knobs 
1046 Anti Rotational Casing 
1047 Cabin Press Control Lever Support 
1048 Cabin Press Control Unit 
1049 R . H . Control Assy 
1050 RIV Cabin Press 
1051 2 Brkts. Cover 
1052 Screws 
1053 Mtg. Hdwr. 
1054 Mtg. Screws 
1055 J185 Plug 
1056 Hardware 
1057 Harness Brkts. 
1058 Sleep Adapter 
1059 Sleep Adapter 
1060 cwe Adapter Cable 
1061 cwe Adapter Cable 
1062 D.C . Pwr. Control Box 
1063 Screws for D . C . Pwr. 
1064 C14A13 Cont. Box Uprighting 
1065 Screws for C14A13 Mount 
1067 Hatch Tool 
1068 Vacuum Cleaner Assy 
1069 Louver Cabin Air Valve 
1070 Xducer Front Cabin Air Valve Louver 
1071 Suit Hose Connector 
1072 Suit Hose Connector 
1073 Heat Exchanger 
1074 Screws 
1075 Suit Host Contr. 
1076 Contr. Hdwre. 
1077 Access Panel 
1078 Utilization Panel 
1079 Clamp & Hardware 
1080 Honeycomb 
1081 Cabin Press Xducer 
1082 Screws Cobra Cable 
1083 Xducer Cabin Temp 
1084 Closure Valve 
1085 Amplifier Xducer Cabin Temp. 
1086 Fans CalJin Air 
1087 Cabin Temp. Controller 
1088 Xducer Cabin Temp. 
1089 Debris 
1090 Panel #13 
1091 Panel 13 Hardware 
1092 Panel 23 Hardware 
1093 Panel 23 
1094 Panel 26 
949 IV CI M 185 

952 IV CI M 185 

948 IV CI M 185 

958 IV C /M 188 

954 IV C /M 188 

953 IV C/M 188 

955 IV C/M 188 

956 IV C /M 188 

957 IV C /M 188 

960 IV C/M 188 

927 IV C/M 175 

920 IV C/M 175 

925 IV C/M 175 

926 IV C/M 175 

961 & 962 IV C/M 179 

964 IV C/M 179 

965 IV C/M 179 

983 IV C /M 116 

984 IV C /M 116 

986 IV C /M 116 

985 IV C /M 116 

981 IV C /M 195 

980 IV C/M 195 

990 IV C /M 194 

989 IV C /M 194 

1002 IV C /M 072 

991 IV C/M 078 

1001 IV C/M 189 

1003 IV C/M 189 

1004 IV C/M 189 

1004 IV C /M 189 

1010 IV C/M 189 

1011 IV C /M 192 

1016 IV C /M 189 

1016 IV C/M 189 

1022 IV C/M 189 

1018 IV C/ M 181 

1021 IV C /M 181 

IV C /M 191 

999 IV C/M 189 

1000 IV C/M 189 

1023 IV C /M 189 

1026 IV C /M 189 

1013 IV C /M 189 

1025 IV C/M 189 

1012 IV C /M 189 

1024 IV e l M 189 

1025 IV C/M 189 

1034 IV C /M 004 

1033 IV C /M 004 

1035 IV C /M 021 

1038 IV C /M 021 

1042 IV C /M 024 

1095 Panel 26 Hardware 
1096 Mtg . Brkt. C151A52 
1097 Cable Clamp 
1098 Motor SW Panel C14A3 
1099 Helmet Bag 
1100 Helmet Bag 
1101 Helmet Bag 
1102 Close-Out Panel 
1103 Potable Water Assy. 
1104 LEB Hardware 
1105 Hardware Data Tray 
1106 Access Panel 206 
1107 1/4 " Snap On" Socket 
1108 LEB Hardware & Brackets 
1109 Wire Harness Wrap 
1110 Clamps 
1111 Xducer Mount Hardware 
1112 Press Xducer 
1113 Press Xducer 
1114 Press Xducer 
1115 Signal Cond . 
1116 Pwr. Dist. Box 
1117 Hardware Bolts & Nuts Washers 
1118 Pwr. Dist. Box 
1119 Accelerometer 
1120 Acce lerometer 
1121 Panel 204 
1122 Sig . Conditioner 
1123 Accelerometer 
1124 Sig . Condi tioner 
1125 Sig . Conditioner 
1126 Current Limiter 
1127 Current Limiter 
1128 Current Limiter Hardware 
1129 Washer 
1130 Hardware Clamps Brackets 
1131 Hardware 
1132 Hardware 
1133 Elect. Cable Wrapping 
1134 Check Valve 
1135 Relief Valve 
1136 Shut-Off Valve 
1137 WIG Line Insulation 
1138 Shut-Off Valve 2.28DE 
1139 Relief Valve 2.2AB 
1140 Water Glycol Sample 
1141 Water Glycol Sample 
1142 Temp . Sensor 
1143 Check Valve 22.1 
1144 S, TXY Canister 
1145 Stowage Canister 
1146 TV Flex Coil Cord 
1147 Debris 
1039 IV C /M 024 
1043 IV C/M 205 
1044 IV C/M 205 
1045 IV C/ M 205 
1047 IV C /M 080 
1046 IV C /M 080 
1048 IV C /M 080 
1049 IV C/M 001 
1053 IV C/M 001 
1057 IV C/M 179 
1058 IV C /M 192 
1059 IV C/M 206 
1063 IV C/M 192 
1062 IV C/M 192 
1064 IV C /M 192 
1065 IV C / M 192 
1068 & 1069 IV C/ M 201 
1070 IV C/M 201 
1068 IV C/M 201 
1069 IV C/M 201 
1067 IV C/M 201 
1083 IV C/M 187 
1084 IV C/M 187 
1080 IV C/M 187 . 
1089 IV C/M 202 
1090 IV C/M 202 
1094 IV C /M 202 
1072 IV C/M 202 
1092 IV C/M 202 
1075 IV C/M 202 
1071 IV C/M 202 
1086 IV e l M 186 
1087 IV C/M 186 
1088 IV C/M 186 
1103 IV C/M 192 
1102 IV C /M 192 
1114 IV C/M 038 
1111, 1112, 1113, 
1115 IV C/M 038 
1126 IV C/M 192 
1128 IV C/M 038 
1107 IV C /M 038 
1108 IV C /M 038 
1129 IV C/M 038 
1119 IV C /M 038 
1118 IV C/M 038 
1120 IV C /M 038 
1130 IV C/M 038 
1110 IV C/M 038 
1109 IV C/M 038 
1132 IV C/M 073 
1134 IV C /M 073 
1137 IV C /M 208 
1139 IV C/M 073 
1148 Debris 
1149 COAS 
1150 COAS Bulb 
1151 Hardware Cover S & T 
1152 Hardware Canister 
1153 Clamps & Screws 
1154 Storage Box 
1155 Shelf, Vacuum Cleaner 
1156 SCS] Box 
1157 Knobs Cont. WMS Panel 
1158 Panel & Hardware WMS 
1159 Panel & Hardware WMS 
1160 Vert. Angle & Hardware 
1161 Horiz. "T" & Hardware 
1162 Back-Up Valve 
1163 Back-Up Valve 
1164 UDL Line 
1165 Line, Fr. WMS Sel. Valve 
1166 Valve Selector WMS 
1167 Line Assy 
1168 Valve Check 
1169 Clamp 
1170 Line Assy 
1171 Line Assy Waste Man . 
1172 Blower Waste Management 
1173 Urine Dump Lock 
1174 Check Valve 
1175 Check Valve 
1176 ECU P-33 Connector 
1177 ECU P-34 Connector 
1178 Events Conditioner 
1179 Canister Med. Science 
1180 Events Conditioner Hardware 
1181 Bol ts for J-80 J Box 
1182 RF Coax Switch 
1183 Hardware for RF Coax Switch 
1184 Dust Cap and Tape 
1185 Sample WIG 
1186 Sample WIG 
1187 Debris 
1188 Debris 
1189 Debris 
1190 Debris 
1191 Debris 
1192 Debris 
1193 Debris 
1194 Debris 
1195 Debris 
1196 Debris 
1197 Debris 
1198 Debris 
1199 Debris 
1200 Debris 
1201 Debris 
1138 IV C/M 073 
1136 IV C/M 073 
1135 IV C/M 073 
1131 IV C/M 073 
1138 IV C/M 073 
1140 IV C/M 209 
1141 IV C/M 200 
1099 IV C/M 200 
1148 CA C/M 231 
1149 IV C/M 200 
1150 IV C/M 200 
1151 IV C/M 200 
1142 IV C/M 200 
1143 IV C/M 200 
1154 IV C/M 200 
1157 IV C/M 200 
1158 IV C/M 200 
1160 IV C/M 200 
1161 IV C/M 200 
1162 IV C/M 200 
1164 IV C/M 200 
1165 IV C/M 200 
1174 IV C/M 200 
1171 IV C/M 200 
1170 IV C/M 200 
1163 IV C/M 200 
1172 IV C/M 200 
1173 IV C/M 200 
1177 IV C/M 209 
1178 IV CI M 209 
1179 IV C/M 117 
1185 IV C/M 117 
1180 IV C/M 117 
1182 IV C/M 117 
1186 IV C/M 203 
1188 IV C/M 203 
1204 IV C/M 162 
1294 IV C/M 207 
1294 IV C/M 207 
1226 IV C/M 211 
1224 IVC/M 21l 
1223 IV C/M 211 
1225 IV C/M ,211 
1229 IV C/M 211 
1222 IV C/M 211 
1230 IV C/M 211 
1231 IV C/M 211 
1219 IV C/M 211 
1232 IV C/M 211 
1227 IV C/M 211 
1228 IV C/M 211 
1221 IV C/M 211 
1220 IV C/M 211 
1234 IV C/M 211 
1202 

1203 

1204 

1205 

1206 

1207 

1208 

1209 

1210 

1211 

1212 

1213 

1214 

1215 

1216 

, 
L 1217 

1218 

1219 

1220 

1221 

1222 

1223 

1224 

1225 

1226 

1227 

1228 

1229 

1230 

1231 

1232 

1233 

1234 

1235 

1236 

1237 

1238 

1239 

1240 

1241 

1242 

1243 

1244 

1245 

1246 

1247 

1248 

1249 

1250 

1251 

1252 

1253 

1254 

1255 

Debris 
Debris 
RF Conn. Loc . Clamps 
C and W Detection Unit 
Hardware for C and W Detection Unit 
Access Panel 
J 11 Brkt. Hardware 
J9 Brkt. Hardware 
Sample #1 
Sampe #2 
Sample # 3 
Sample #4 
Dye Marker 
Dye Marker Swimmer 
End Cap Dye Marker 
Circuit Interrupter 
Circuit Interrupter 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Tube Sample 
Brkt. Bundle Clamp 
Line End " A" 
Brkt. Assy. & Hardware 
Tubing End " B" 
Tubing H20 Waste Tank 
Tube End " c" 
Tube End " D" 
Bracket 
Clamp Section 
Hdwre. & Clamps 
Teflon & Spot Tie 
Food Compt. " A" 
Wire from C28 AR173 
G & N Loose Equipment 
Test Panel 
Door Scientific D 
Panel 
Door, Assembly RHEB 
Door, Assembly RHEB 
Door, Assembly RHEB 
Door, Assembly RHEB 
ECS Restrictor Assembly 
Filter Assembly 
Filter Assembly 
Check Valve 
Check Valve 
Line Assembly 
Line Assembly 
1233 IV C / M 211 

1236 IV C / M 211 

1237 IV C / M 203 

1238 IV C / M 006 

1203 IV C / M 006 

1239 IV e l M 006 

1241 IV C / M 006 

1240 IV C / M 006 

MA C / M 026 
MA C/ M 026 
MA C / M 026 
MA C / M 026 
1242 IV C / M 112 

1247 IV C / M 112 

1243 IV C / M 112 

1249 IVC / M 152 

1248 IV C / M 152 

1250 IV C / M 190 

1251 IV C / M 190 

1252 IV C / M 190 

1253 IV C / M 190 

1254 IV C / M 190 

1255 IV C / M 190 

1256 IV C/M 190 

1257 IV C / M 190 

1258 IV C / M 190 

1259 IV C / M 192 

1264 IV C / M 190 

1268 IV C / M 190 

1265 IV C / M 190 

1269 IV C / M 190 

1266 IV C / M 190 

1267 IV C/ M 190 

1270 IV C / M 179 

1261 IV C / M 192 

1263 IV C /M 192 

1262 IV C / M 192 

1271 IV C / M 105 

1272 IVC / M179 

1276 IV C / M 115 

1277 IV C/M 115 

1275 IV C / M 115 

1278 IV C / M 115 

1281 IV C / M 141 

1280 IV C /M 141 

1279 IV C /M 141 

1282 IV C / M 141 

1291 IV C / M 086 

1292 IV C / M 086 

1293 IV C / M 086 

1294 IV C / M 086 

1295 IV C / M 086 

1296 IV C / M 086 

'1297 IV C / M 086 
1256 Line Assembly 1298 IV elM 086 
1257 Line Assembly 1299 IV elM 086 
1258 elamp 1300 IV elM 086 
1259 Hardware 1301 IV elM 086 
1260 02 Line 1302 IV elM 086 
1261 Oxygen Restrictor Assembly 1303 IV elM 086 
D-4-66 
COMMAND MODULE 014 AND COMMAND MODULE MOCKUP #2 
ENCLOSURE 4-19 
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